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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSA YS ON THE INFLUENCE OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS ON 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Michael David Crum 
September 30,2011 
This dissertation is composed of three essays in which I examine the influence of 
formal institutions on entrepreneurs and new firms. In the first essay, "The Influence of 
Institutions on the Likelihood of Self-Employment: A Multilevel Analysis," I examine 
how institutions at the country-level are related to the likelihood that individuals in those 
country are self-employed. Country-level measures of formal institutions are paired with 
individual-level data on self-employment from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(Reynolds et aI., 2005). Using the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World 
index and the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom separately as measures 
of institutions, I find that sound money in a country is positively associated with 
individual self-employment with both indices. Property rights and trade freedom are 
positively related to self-employed using the Economic Freedom of the World index. 
In the second essay, "Labor Market Institutions and New Firm Employment 
Growth,'" I examine how state-level labor market characteristics such as minimum wages, 
union densities, and unemployment insurance premiums influence employment growth in 
new firms. I use firm-level data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (DesRoches, Robb, & 
IV 
Mulcahy, 2009), which contains data from several thousand new firms for years 2004-
2008. Minimum wages, union densities, and unemployment insurance structure do not 
predict the level of employment in new firms in the manner hypothesized. 
In the third essay, "The Impact of Taxes and Regulations on New Firm Births and 
Deaths in State Border Counties," I examine how state-level measures of government 
size, taxation burdens, unionization levels, and minimum wages influence the birth and 
death rates of firms in counties located on state borders. Tabulations containing data on 
establishment births and deaths by U.S. County (Plummer & Headd, 2008) were merged 
with measures of government size, taxation burdens, union densities, and minimum 
wages. I find a negative relationship between the overall tax burden and the birth rate of 
new firms. However, unionization, minimum wages and government size are not related 
to the bilih and death rates of firms in the manner hypothesized. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The decision to become an entrepreneur, as well as one's ultimate success at it, is 
the result of both individual characteristics as well as the environment in which 
entrepreneurs find themselves (Shane, 2003). In addition to individual differences, 
environmental factors are likely to influence the behavior of entrepreneurs as well. As 
noted by Baumol (1990), the reward structure in an economy may not only influence the 
level of entrepreneurship, but it is likely to influence the types of entrepreneurship that 
manifests itself. When the "rules ofthe game" incentivize certain activities and 
discourages others, the behavior of economic actors is bound to be influenced by them 
(North, 1987). In this dissertation, I examine how formal institutions - the rules of the 
game developed through constitutions, statutory law, and legal precedent (Williamson, 
2000) - influence entry into entrepreneurship as well as the behavior of existing 
entrepreneurs. 
In this dissertation I develop three essays that discuss and test the influence of 
formal institutions on the behavior of entrepreneurs. The first essay, "The Influence of 
Institutions on the Likelihood of Self-Employment: A Multilevel Analysis," examines the 
relationship between institutions and self-employment. Country-level institution 
measures include taxation levels, the strength of property rights, soundness of money, 
trade freedom, and the level of business regulation. I also examine how individual 
1 
characteristics interact with country-level variables to detennine the likelihood that 
individuals will be self-employed. In the second essay, "Labor Market Institutions and 
New Finn Employment Growth," I examine how state-level labor market factors such as 
minimum wages, union density, and unemployment insurance premiums influence 
employment growth in new finns. Finally, in the third essay, "The Impact of Taxes and 
Regulations on New Firm Births and Deaths in State Border Counties," I examine how 
state-level measures of government size, tax burdens, unionization levels, and minimum 
wages influence the birth and death rates of new finns in counties located on state 
borders. Differences in birth rates between manufacturing and service finns are 
examined as well. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, entrepreneurship is briefly 
discussed. Secondly, the literature on institutions and their impact on growth and 
entrepreneurship are examined. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief summary of 
the three essays of this dissertation. 
1.1. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The tenn entrepreneurship is associated with multiple definitions, including the 
creation of a new finn (Gartner, 1988), the discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of 
opportunities to create future goods and services (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), 
innovation (Schumpeter, 1942), self-employment and small business management 
(Davidsson,2004). Not only has entrepreneurship been defined in various ways, it also 
has been measured in many ways, such as self-employment rates, nascent 
entrepreneurship rates, and new finn births (Davidsson, 2004). In this dissertation, 
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several measures of entrepreneurship will be used, such as self-employment and new firm 
entry (creation of a new firm). 
The level of entrepreneurship varies substantially among various legal 
jurisdictions, whether measured by self-employment, new firm startups, or innovation. 
Countries tend to have varying levels of self-employment (Blanchflower, 2000; 
Noorderhaven, Thurik, Wennekers, & Van Stel, 2004), nascent entrepreneurship (Arenius 
& Minniti, 2005; Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik, & Reynolds, 2005) and innovation 
(Shane, 1993). Furthermore, states and provinces within a country vary in the level of 
entrepreneurship that they have (Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Sobel, 2008). A number of 
possible explanations may exist for these differences, including varying institutions 
(formal and informal), wealth, unemployment levels, and human capital differences 
among regIOns. 
Determining what factors influence the level and type of entrepreneurship is 
important for several reasons. Entrepreneurship may be personally fulfilling because it is 
challenging and allows a high degree of personal freedom. Engaging in entrepreneurship 
is something that individuals often prefer to do in comparison to working for a wage 
(Blanchflower, Oswald, & Stutzer, 2001; Gohmann, in press; Kolvereid, 1996). 
However, certain environmental factors may limit an individual's ability to become an 
entrepreneur, even when they have the desire to become an entrepreneur and profitable 
opportunities exist. Entrepreneurship is also important for the wider economy due to the 
positive externalities that it generates. Entrepreneurship leads to the commercialization 
of new goods and services (Kirchhoff, 1994; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) and 
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entrepreneurs have brought many innovations to market (Kenney, 1986). Furthermore, 
evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is associated with economic growth (Thurik & 
Wennekers, 2004) as well as job creation (FoIster, 2000; Kirchhoff, 1994). 
1.2. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
The term "institution" is a broad term that has been defined in various ways in the 
social sciences. For this dissertation, I use the concept of "institutions" that has been 
found in the new institutional economics literature. Thus, institutions set the "rules of the 
game" in an economy; determining incentives, reducing uncertainty, and influencing 
transaction costs in an economy (North, 1987). Pejovich (1998) similarly states that 
institutions are "the legal, administrative and customary arrangements for repeated 
human interactions" (p. 23). Institutions constrain human action and influence how 
humans interact with one another (North, 1990). 
Institutions can be both informal and formal (North, 1990). Informal institutions 
include norms, social conventions, codes of behavior, and customs. These originate from 
the experience, routines, culture, and religious beliefs of a society (Klein, 2000; Pejovich, 
1998; Williamson, 2000). Thus, informal institutions may last a very long time, perhaps 
centuries (Williamson, 2000) and may influence a number of economic outcomes (North, 
1990). For example, in many societies, dishonesty is considered an inappropriate form of 
behavior (Knowles & Weatherston, 2006; North, 1990). Individuals who are dishonest 
will face social sanction which is likely to discourage dishonest behavior, decreasing 
transaction cost in the society (Knowles & Weatherston, 2006). Conversely, formal 
institutions are the rules that originate from constitutions, statutory law and legal 
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precedent (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Formal institutions typically change with 
more regularity, although some may last substantial periods oftime as well (Williamson, 
2000). Informal and formal institutions are closely and causally related to one another. 
Norms, customs, and traditions have an impact on formal institutions, by such 
mechanisms as the laws and constitutions that a country adopts. Furthermore, the laws of 
a country may influence the norms, customs and codes of behavior in a society. For 
example, in addition to affecting changes in social norms leading to increased tobacco 
taxes and regulations in the United States, it is likely that increasing regulations (changes 
in formal institutions) have also affected the norms regarding smoking (Hamilton, Biener, 
& Brennan, 2008; Nyborg & Rege, 2003). 
North (1990) uses the example of a sporting event to further clarify what is meant 
by institutions and to differentiate institutions from organizations. Take the example of a 
basketball game that occurs between two opposing teams. The teams are an organization; 
they do not set the rules of the game, but they are obligated (or at least have a strong 
incentive) to abide by them, just like individuals and organizations within an economy. 
Formal institutions are the rules of the game actually written down in the rulebook that 
are enforced by the referees. These would include rules against excessive physical 
contact with other players (fouling), rules that prevent players from blocking shots that 
are on a downward trajectory (goaltending), and rules determining how many points a 
basket is worth. The rules against goaltending clearly give players a substantial incentive 
not to engage in goaltending because the punishment for doing so is to count the basket 
as if it were actually made. Furthermore, in basketball, there are many informal 
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institutions that influence player behavior as well. For example, sportsmanship is a social 
convention among basketball players. It is generally considered unsportsmanlike for 
basketball players not to shake the hands of other players at the end of a game. Although 
a player breaking this "rule" is not breaking any official basketball rules and will face no 
punishment from referees, they likely will face disgust by fans and other players. Both 
the formal and informal institutions in this example reduce the uncertainty that players 
and teams face because they are aware of what behaviors are acceptable as well as the 
sanction they will face for behaving in an unacceptable manner. They also know what 
punishment players of the opposing team will face if they violate these rules, and thus 
have some expectations about what the opposing team is likely to do (the other team is 
likely not to engage in goaltending very often, for example). The institutions also 
determine the incentives in the basketball game. Because basketball rules (formal 
institution) state that a shot taken behind the three-point line is worth three points instead 
of two, players have more of an incentive to take these shots than they would if they were 
simply worth two points. 
Institutions, both formal and informal, have been used to explain economic 
outcomes, such as economic growth. However, many theories developed to explain 
economic growth do not explicitly consider the institutions (Gwartney, Holcombe, & 
Lawson, 2004). Solow's (1957) neoclassical growth model predicted that economic 
output was a function of capital, labor, and the effectiveness of labor. Therefore, in 
Solow's model, economic growth was mainly due to the effectiveness oflabor! (Romer, 
1 Although variation in capital could increase economic growth according to the Solow model, long-term 
growth would be due to changes in the effectiveness of labor. 
6 
1996). Although economic thinking regarding economic growth has since evolved, the 
convergence prediction of Solow's (1957) model has received some empirical support 
(Barro & Xavier, 1992). That is, economies with low level of per capita income tend to 
grow more quickly over time and tend to catch up with those with higher initial levels of 
per capita income. Later, theories of endogenous growth began to emerge that focused 
on the effectiveness oflabor factor that explained much of the variance in economic 
growth in Solow's (1957) model (Romer, 1994). Additionally, researchers (Gallup, 
Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999) have argued for many other predictors of economic growth, 
including climate and geography. Climate and geography have an effect on 
transportation cost, the productively of agriculture, and the level of disease. Natural 
resources are thought to have an influence on economic growth, with substantial natural 
resource wealth, oddly enough, being associated with low economic growth (Sachs & 
Warner, 2001). This is thought to be due to "Dutch Disease" which occurs when an 
extreme increase in a nation's wealth due to an increase in the value of natural resources 
causes the currency to strengthen relative to other currencies. This makes products 
manufactured in the country more expensive on the world market, leading to fewer 
exports and less investment in manufacturing (Corey, 2009; Stevens, 2003). 
Institutional economics does not view economic growth as an inevitable outcome. 
Instead, institutions first must be adopted in an economy that reduces the cost of 
transacting, encourages capital and labor to be put towards productive uses, and allows 
the sharing and transfer of risk (Klein, 2000). Like with the basketball example, the rules 
in a society are likely to determine how the game is played, as well as the outcome. In 
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the 1986-1987 basketball season, the NCAA adopted the three-point line (Bradley, 2009). 
This rule change allowed more total points to be scored in a game, gave an advantage to 
teams that had effective long-range shooters, and gave teams a greater chance to come 
back and win the game after being substantially behind. Likewise, differences in the 
"rules of the game" between countries will lead to different behavior by individuals and 
organizations within those countries, which will ultimately lead to differences in 
economic outcomes- such as growth, unemployment levels, and the distribution of 
income. While some institutions may lead to stagnation and high unemployment, those 
that encourage specialization of labor and efficient use of capital are likely to lead to high 
levels of employment and substantial economic growth (North, 1990). Subsequent 
research has produced a plethora of findings supporting the idea that different types of 
institutions are associated with different levels of wealth and growth in economies 
(Barro, 1996; Dawson, 2003). 
One challenge in using institutions to predict economic growth is determining 
which institutions are likely to influence economic growth, as well as how to measure 
them. While the "quality" of institutions has been conceptualized and measured in many 
different ways, one common measure of institutions has been the level of economic 
freedom in an economy (Gwartney & Lawson, 2003). Economic freedom refers to the 
"freedom to choose which goods or services to buy, where to invest, and with whom to 
trade, and to set a mutually acceptable exchange price" (Johnson & Lenartowicz, 1998: p. 
337). Economic freedom is said to exist when property rights are protected; governments 
are small, and taxes are low; currency is sound; and few government restrictions are 
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placed on an individual's ability to contract with other parties (Gwartney et aI., 2004). 
Empirical research has generally supported the hypothesis that countries with high levels 
of economic freedom have higher growth rates than those with low levels of economic 
freedom (De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Dollar, 1992; Easton & Walker, 1997; Farr, Lord, & 
Wolfenbarger, 1998; Gwartney, Lawson, & Holcombe, 1999; Heckelman, 2000). The 
specific effect of property rights on economic growth have been discussed and examined 
as well (Gwartney et aI., 2004; Leblang, 1996; Torstensson, 1994). Property rights refer 
to "the individual's ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the 
asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange" (Barzel, 1997: p. 3). When 
property rights are protected by governments through legal protections, individual actors 
in the economy can make long-term, capital investments without worrying about whether 
their property will be expropriated by the government or other parties. Because contracts 
will be enforced by the courts, transaction costs are low (Pejovich, 1998). Thus, strong 
property rights reduce uncertainty, and thus give economic actors more incentive to make 
long-term investments (Besley, 1995). 
While institutions have been associated with economic growth, institutions merely 
set the "rules of the game" in an economy; economic players must act in order for 
economic growth to occur. Thus, institutions are likely to influence other drivers of 
economic growth, such as entrepreneurship. Certain institutions may influence the 
number of individuals who become entrepreneurs (McMullen, Bagby, & Palich, 2008; 
Ovaska & Sobel, 2005), the type of entrepreneurship in which individuals engage 
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(Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008), as well as the ultimate success of their business ventures 
(Sobel, Clark, & Lee, 2007). 
In this dissertation, I build on this research by examining how institutions 
influence the behavior of entrepreneurs in three different contexts. 
1.3. SUMMARY OF THE THREE ESSAYS 
Essay #1: The Influence of Institutions on the Likelihood of Self-Employment: A 
Multilevel Analysis 
Past research has examined the relationship between institutions and 
entrepreneurship (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2009; McMullen et ai., 2008; Sobel, 
2008). Although some relationships have been found between measures of institutions 
and entrepreneurship, there has been little attempt to examine how institutions interact 
with individual characteristics to influence the likelihood that an individual will be self-
employed. Small government size, property rights protection, sound money, freedom to 
trade, and business freedom are hypothesized to increase the probability that an 
individual in that country is engaged in self-employment. Also, an individual's education 
level and regulatory focus are hypothesized to interact with institutional factors to 
determine the likelihood that an individual will be engaged in self-employment. 
In this essay, the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship is tested 
using two sets of measures of institutions: (1) The Economic Freedom of the World index 
(Gwartney, Lawson, Sobel, & Leeson, 2007) and (2) the Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation, 2005). The 10 components from the Index of Economic Freedom 
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are modified so that they are conceptually equivalent to the five components from the 
Economic Freedom of the World index. Therefore, five different measures of institutions 
are used from the two different indices: size of government, property rights, sound 
money, trade freedom, and business freedom. This allows the robustness of these 
relationships to be examined. Individual-level data on self-employment comes from the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Reynolds et aI., 2005). Multi-level modeling is 
performed using the lmer and glmmPQL packages in R to estimate how these 
institutional variables influence the probability that an individual is engaged in self-
employment. Some support is found for a positive relationship between trade freedom, 
property rights, and sound money in the country in which an individual resides and the 
likelihood that they are engaged in self-employment. Government size/taxation levels 
and the level of business regulations do not predict engagement in self-employment in the 
hypothesized manner. This essay is presented in Chapter 2. 
Essay #2: Labor Market Institutions and New Firm Employment Growth 
Labor market institutions include the taxes on labor, minimum wages, 
employment regulations, social security taxes and benefits, and laws governing 
unionization in an economy (Nickell 1998). Labor market institutions develop over time, 
often as a result of various social movements and economic shocks (Thelen, 2004) and 
vary widely across countries and sometimes even among regions or states within a 
country. Because these institutions set the rules for both employees and employers, they 
ultimately influence the cost of labor and affect hiring, firing, and other employment 
decisions within the firm. In this essay, I examine how minimum wages, unemployment 
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insurance premiums, and unionization levels impact employment growth in new firms. I 
hypothesized that low minimum wages and low unemployment insurance premiums will 
increase hiring and lead to higher levels of employment among new firms. Conversely, 
high levels of unionization are predicted to lead to increased firm employment levels. 
For this essay, I obtain firm-level data from Kauffman Firm Survey (DesRoches, 
Robb, & Mulcahy, 2009), which contains data on several thousand new firms followed 
longitudinally across five waves which were collected for years 2004-2008. I match 
these data with state-level data minimum wage, unemployment tax, and unionization 
data. Multilevel modeling using the SAS Glimmix procedure is then used to see how the 
labor market factors in the state in which the firm operates predicts the firm employment 
level over time. State union density is found to have a marginal negative effect on firm 
employee growth. I found no relationship between both minimum wages and the 
unemployment insurance structure and employee growth in new firms. This essay is 
presented in Chapter 3. 
Essay #3: The Impact of Taxes and Regulations on New Firm Births and Deaths in 
State Border Counties. 
This essay answers the following question: How do state-level taxes and 
regulations influence the birth and death rates of firms? I hypothesize that small 
government size, low tax burden, and low minimum wages will be associated with high 
levels of firm births, especially among manufacturing firms. In addition, I hypothesize 
that small government size, low tax burden, and low minimum wages will be associated 
with a high level of firm deaths as well. 
12 
Data on finn births and deaths by industry are obtained from a custom tabulation 
from the U.S. Census Bureau's Company Division. Known as the EBD (establishment 
births and deaths), these tabulations contains data on establishment births and deaths for 
each county in the United States from 1989-2005 (Plummer & Headd, 2008). More 
specifically, for each county in the United States, these tabulations contain the total 
single-unit, multi-unit, and total establishment births and deaths and the finn's five-digit 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. These data are merged 
with measures of government size, tax burdens, union densities, and minimum wages 
from the Economic Freedom of North America index (Karabegovic, McMahon, & 
Mitchell, 2005). Furthermore, the overall county tax burden data are obtained from the 
U.S. Census of Governments. In the analysis, only counties on state borders are 
examined, and these counties are matched with other counties that are located on the 
other side of the state border. This allows for the control for a number of unobservable 
factors (Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a). I found support for a negative relationship 
between overall tax burden and the birth rate of new finns. However, unionization, 
minimum wages and government size did not influence the birth and death rates of finns 
in the manner hypothesized. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS ON THE LIKELIHOOD 
OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Formal institutions are significant predictors of economic growth in an economy 
(Barro, 1996; De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). In 
addition, scholars have argued that a relationship exists between institutions and the level 
and type of entrepreneurship that manifests itself (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008). Recently, 
empirical work has started to examine the influence institutions have on entrepreneurship. 
For example, small government size is positively related to sole proprietor growth rates 
(Kreft & Sobel, 2005) and self-employment rates (Nystrom, 2008). Furthermore, a 
heavily regulated business environment is associated with a decrease in new firm entry 
(Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006; van Stel, Storey, & Thurik, 2007). The level of 
economic freedom, or the extent to which governments allow free exchange and protect 
property rights (Gwartney et aI., 2007), is associated with increased levels of 
entrepreneurship, indicated by increases in variables such as venture capital availability, 
innovation (Sobel, 2008), and net new business formation (Campbell & Rogers, 2007). 
Likewise, economic freedom is negatively related to unproductive entrepreneurial 
activities such as lobbying (Sobel, 2008). 
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Although empirical work has begun to examine the relationship between 
institutions and entrepreneurship, many unanswered questions remain. Most research 
examining the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship uses aggregated 
measures of entrepreneurship, such as the rate of self-employment or innovation in a 
country or state (Bjornskov & Foss, 2008; McMullen et aI., 2008; Sobel, 2008; Sobel et 
aI.,2007). The disadvantage to using an aggregated analysis is that it does not allow for 
the control of individual characteristics and for the testing of cross-level interactions 
(Luke, 2004; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Thus, we do not know to what degree 
individual characteristics interact with the institutional environment to influence the 
likelihood that an individual is engaged in entrepreneurship. Another concern is that 
many studies use different samples and different yet overlapping measures of institutions. 
For example, whereas small government size relates positively to entrepreneurial activity 
in several studies (Bjornskov & Foss, 2008; Nystrom, 2008), a recent study using a 
different measure of government size found it to be non-significant (McMullen et aI., 
2008). Although many measures of institutions are available, economic freedom indices 
are perhaps the most commonly used. Two major economic freedom indices exist for 
countries (1) the Economic Freedom of the World index, published by the Fraser institute 
(Gwartney et aI., 2007), and (2) the Index of Economic Freedom, published by the 
Heritage Foundation (2005). These indices contain some similar measures; however, 
they are constructed differently. This difference in construction may lead to conflicting 
results when comparing studies that use different indices. Therefore, we do not know if 
the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship is robust across the different 
indices or if it is just an artifact of the measure being used. 
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In this essay, I examine the following research question: Does a country's formal 
institutional environment influence the likelihood that individuals are engaged in self-
employment? Baumol (1990) argues that the institutional environment has a profound 
impact on entrepreneurship. This essay adds to previous research by examining how 
individual-level moderators of this relationship, such as regulatory focus and human 
capital, influence self-employment. This essay has implications for public policy as well. 
Some empirical evidence indicates that job creation (FoIster, 2000) and economic growth 
(Carree, van Stel, Thurik, & Wennekers, 2002) might become impaired when self-
employment levels become too low. Thus, it is important for policy makers to assure that 
the institutions in their country do not hamper the ability of individuals to become self-
employed. 
This essay starts by reviewing the literature concerning institutions and 
entrepreneurship and by developing hypotheses concerning how the formal institutional 
environment influences the likelihood that individuals engage in self-employment. 
Furthermore, I develop several hypotheses predicting cross-level interaction effects, 
focusing on how institutions interact with an individual's regulatory focus and human 
capital to determine the likelihood of self-employment. Finally, I use data from the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) dataset to test the hypotheses. 
2.2. INSTITUTIONS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The institutional environment influences many outcomes in an economy, 
including economic growth (Barro, 1996; De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Rodrik et aI., 2004) 
and the level of entrepreneurship (McMullen et aI., 2008; Ovaska & Sobel, 2005). The 
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institutional environment may also affect the amount of productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship that exists (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008). As North (1990) states: 
"Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
human devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic" 
(p.3). 
Therefore, institutions set the "rules of the game" in an economy; determine incentives, 
reduce uncertainly, and influence transaction costs (North, 1987). 
Institutions can be both formal and informal (North, 1990). Informal institutions 
(or informal constraints) include norms, social conventions, codes of behavior, and 
customs, which originate from the experience, routines, culture, and religious beliefs of a 
society (Klein, 2000; Pejovich, 1998; Williamson, 2000). Formal institutions are the 
rules developed by human beings, such as constitutions and statutory law (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 2000). Informal and formal institutions are closely and causally related to 
one another. Norms, customs, and traditions (informal institutions) influence the laws 
and the constitution a country adopts (formal institutions). Furthermore, the laws of a 
country may influence its norms, customs, and traditions. For example, changes in social 
norms lead to increased tobacco taxes and regulations in the United States, and yet it is 
likely that increased regulations have influenced the norms regarding smoking, making 
smoking less socially acceptable (Hamilton et aI., 2008; Nyborg & Rege, 2003). 
Informal and formal institutions typically differ in how quickly they change. While 
informal institutions can last centuries, formal institutions typically change more often 
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(Williamson, 2000), although they vary greatly with respect to how quickly they change. 
While the U.S. Constitution was created over a short period of time, other institutions, 
such as British common law, evolved over a much longer period (North, 1990). 
Although there is a close relationship between informal and formal institutions 
and both may have an impact on entrepreneurship, this essay will focus exclusively on 
how formal institutions in a country affect entrepreneurship. Hereafter, the term 
"institutions" will refer exclusively to formal institutions. 
2.3. MODEL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY 
To predict how institutions affect the self-employment decision, it is necessary to 
understand why people flow in and out of self-employment. I use a model similar to 
Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo (1997) to predict exit from self-employment to wage 
employment. I also modify this model to explain entry into self-employment from wage 
employment. 
Switching from Self-Employment to Wage Employment 
In their model, Gimeno et aI., (1997) assume an individual compares the 
threshold level of performance to the actual economic performance of her business to 
determine whether to continue the venture. The threshold level of performance is the 
minimum performance that he or she requires from the venture to keep operating it. The 
threshold performance is a function of the opportunity cost associated with other forms of 
employment, the cost of switching occupations (from self-employment to the new 
occupation), and the difference in psychic income between continuing self-employment 
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and other possible sources of employment. Figure 2.1 displays a simplified version of the 
model. 
Figure 2.1: Model of Entrepreneurial Exit 
Adopted/rom Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo (1997) 
Income Available in 
Other Employment 
Psychic Income in 
Self-Employment -
Psychic Income in 
Alternative 








When the expected economic performance of a venture is higher than the 
threshold level of performance, an individual will continue to be self-employed. When 
the expected economic level of performance falls below the threshold level of 
performance, the firm is abandoned, and the individual leaves self-employment for wage 
employment. Threshold performance is determined by three factors. The first is income 
available from other sources of employment, or the opportunity cost of being self-
employed. If the individual can earn a substantial return in wage employment, then the 
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threshold level of their business will be high. The second factor is the difference between 
the psychic income from self-employment and the psychic income from alternative 
employment. If the individual enjoys self-employment more than wage employment then 
this difference will be large, and will further increase the threshold level of performance. 
Psychic income can be substantial for the self-employed (Hamilton, 2000). The third 
factor is the switching cost associated with moving from self-employment to wage 
employment. High switching cost will increase the threshold level of performance 
(Gimeno et aI., 1997). 
An individual will discontinue the business and become a wage earner when the 
expected utility of operating the entrepreneurial venture (UE) is less than the utility of 
alternative employment (U A) minus the associated cost of switching from self-
employment to alternative employment (SCEA): 
(1) 
UE is determined by the expected economic performance of the venture (EPE) plus 
the psychic income that the individual obtains from operating the venture (PIE). EPE is a 
function of the entrepreneur's general human capital (Xl) and his or her human capital 
specific to the current firm (X2). PIE is a function of a number of individual 
characteristics (x.). 
The expected utility of alternative employment (U A) is determined by the 
expected economic performance of alternative employment (EPA) plus the psychic 
20 
(2) 
income that the individual obtains from alternative employment (PIA). EPA is a function 
of the entrepreneur's general human capital (Xl) and his or her human capital specific to 
alternative employment (X3). The PIA is a function of a number of individual 
characteristics (Xs). 
(3) 
Subsituting (2) and (3) into (1) yields the combined model: 
Thus, an entrepreneur will close a firm when the expected utility gained from 
operating the venture becomes less than the expected utility of alternative employment 
minus the cost of switching from entreprneuership to alternative employment. The 
expected utility the entrepreneur recieves from the venture is derived from both the 
economic performance of the venture as well as the psyhic income of operaing the 
venture. Likewise, the expected utility of alternative employment is due to both the 
economic performance and psychic income of alternative employment. 
Switching from Wage Employment to Self-Employment 
Although the model developed by Gimeno et al. (1997) is used to predict whether 
a self-employed individual will switch to an alternative form of employment, the same 
factors can be used to predict if an individual who is currently engaged in wage 
(alternative) employment will switch into self-employment. An individual will 
discontinue wage employment and start a venture when the utility of alternative 
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employment (V A) is less than the utility of self-employment (VE) minus the cost of 
switching from alternative employment to self-employment (SCAE): 
(5) 
V A is determined by the expected economic performance of alternative 
employment (EPA) plus the psychic income that the individual obtains from alternative 
employment (PIA)' EPA is a function of the individual's general human capital (Xl) and 
his or her human capital specific to alternative employment (X3). PIA is a function of a 
number of individual characteristics (Xs). 
Equation 6 displays the combined equation. The expected performance of the 
venture (EPE), the expected performance of alternative employment (EP A), and switching 
costs (both SCEA and SCAE) are likely to be influenced by the institutional environment. 
2.4. INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF SELF -EMPLOYMENT 
The institutions in a country influence the likelihood that an individual will switch 
into or out of self-employment. I examine the institutional factors associated with 
economic freedom, which have been found to affect the level and type of 
entrepreneurship in an economy (Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Nystrom, 2008; Sobel, 
2008). Economic freedom refers to the extent to which property rights are protected and 
voluntary transactions and competition are allowed in an economy (Gwartney et aI., 
2007). An economy is economically free when governments protect private property and 
do not burden economic actors with high levels of taxation or business regulation. 
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Institutional factors associated with economic freedom include government size/taxation, 
the level of business regulation, the level of restrictions on international trade, the 
protection of property rights, and the soundness of money. 
Government Size and Taxation 
Government size may affect the costs and benefits associated with self-
employment in several ways. Small governments require less tax revenue to operate. 
Large governments require more revenue and often tax businesses in a number of ways to 
generate the needed funds. For self-employed people, business profits are often taxed at 
personal income rates (Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider, & Rosen, 2001). In countries with 
progressive income taxes, self-employed individuals with high incomes face high 
marginal tax rates (Wolff, 1998). These high tax rates may reduce the incentive for 
individuals engaging in entrepreneurship. In addition, governments may choose to tax 
the self-employed in ways other than income taxes. These include capital gains tax, user 
fees, business license fees, etc. (Bruce & Mohsin, 2006; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002). As governments grow larger, they wi11likely increase many 
of these different taxes in order to fund themselves. 
In addition to high taxes limiting the potential return of self-employment, they 
may also reduce people's ability to become self-employed because high taxes may 
exacerbate liquidity constraints (FoIster, 2002). Liquidity constraints occur when 
individuals or firms have profitable opportunities that they would like to exploit but 
cannot due to a lack of the capital necessary for opportunity exploitation. Although the 
idea of liquidity constraints deterring entry into self-employment and firm growth is a 
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controversial one, some support has been found in industrialized countries (Dunn & 
Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Johansson, 2000; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996), and any effect is likely 
even more pronounced in countries with less developed capital markets. Because high 
taxes reduce the amount of cash retained by an individual or firm, prospective 
entrepreneurs may choose not to start new firms and may limit the extent to which 
existing ones expand (FoIster, 2002). If high levels of taxation increase the liquidity 
constraint, then higher taxes in an economy are likely to be associated with lower levels 
of self-employment. 
Small governments are less involved in the economy compared to larger ones. 
When governments are large, their presence in the economy may crowd out private firms 
and deter new firms from entering the market. A large government may playa role in 
industries that are typically not entered by smaller governments. Larger governments 
often enter and compete in certain industries, such as education, air travel, and healthcare 
(Poterba, 1995; Salvatore, 2003). For example, in the United States as well as many 
other countries, the government operates substantially in the education industry, with a 
strong presence in primary, secondary, and post-secondary education (Heller & Rogers, 
2006). Although post-secondary education in the United States is provided by a number 
of private colleges and universities as well as public colleges and universities, public 
colleges and universities enroll a substantially larger number of students (Eckel & King, 
2004). Government subsidization of education makes it difficult for private firms to 
compete because they must charge students substantial tuition; whereas, students may 
attend government schools for free, or in the case of post-secondary schools, at a 
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subsidized rate. The more industries in which the government is involved, the fewer 
opportunities there will be for entrepreneurs to exploit (Gohmann, Hobbs, & McCrickard, 
2008). 
Empirical research on the relationship between government size/taxation levels 
and levels of entrepreneurship finds mixed results. Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik, and 
Reynolds (2005) found that the ratio of tax revenue to GDP is positively related to the 
nascent entrepreneurship rate across countries. However, several other studies found a 
negative relationship between government size/taxation levels and entrepreneurship. 
Using data from 23 OECD countries from 1972 to 2002 Nystrom (2008) found that 
government size, using the measure from the Economic Freedom of the World index 
(EFW), is negatively related to self-employment. Bjomskov and Foss found that 
government size (EFW measure) is negatively associated with the total entrepreneurial 
activity rate (a country's self-employment rate plus the nascent entrepreneurship rate) 
using data from 29 countries. Furthermore, they found that government size is negatively 
associated with entrepreneurship that is undertaken to exploit a lucrative opportunity 
(opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship) as well as entrepreneurship that is undertaken 
due to personal necessity (necessity-motivated entrepreneurship), thus finding that large 
governments deter both types of entrepreneurship. Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2009) 
found that a limited state sector is positively associated with nascent entrepreneurial 
entry. Likewise, Kreft and Sobel found a negative relationship between tax burden 
measure from the Economic Freedom of North American (EFNA) index and the sole 
proprietor growth rate in U.S. states. 
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In summary, small government demands less tax revenue from their citizens, 
giving them the ability and more incentive to start and operate their own firms. 
Furthermore, small governments are less likely to compete directly with private firms in 
certain industries, leading to more areas in which entrepreneurs can pursue opportunities. 
Much of the existing research shows a negative relationship between government 
size/taxation levels and measures of entrepreneurship. 
Hl: There is a negative relationship between the size of governmentllevel of 
taxation in the country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that 
he or she will be self-employed. 
Level of Business Regulation 
Governments can regulate businesses in a number of ways: by making it difficult 
to obtain a business license, by setting price controls, or by restricting firm entry 
(Brunetti, Kisunko, & Weder, 1997; Gwartney et aI., 2007). These sorts of regulations 
can vary widely across countries. For example, meeting the government requirements for 
starting a business in Italy requires that the prospective entrepreneur perform 16 
procedures, wait 62 days, and pay the equivalent of$3,946 in fees. Alternatively, in 
Canada this task can be performed in 2 days with an equivalent of $280 in fees (Djankov 
et aI., 2002). Clearly, such regulations have direct and indirect costs and may playa large 
role in deterring individuals from starting new firms. 
If entry regulations are burdensome, new firms may find it difficult to enter the 
formal sector of the economy. The formal sector of the economy refers to the part of the 
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economy subject to regulation, in which taxes are levied, wages are regularly paid, and 
the relationship between workers and employers is governed by explicit contracts 
(Pradhan & Van Soest, 1995). The informal sector does not feature these attributes, and 
many firms in the informal sector engage in ethically questionable or illegal activities. 
This may lead to a number of outcomes, including a formal sector made up mostly of 
larger already existing firms. Large amounts of regulation regarding starting a new 
business tend to increase the size of an economy's informal economy and decrease the 
size of its formal economy (De Soto, 1989). The size of the informal sector has been 
shown to vary greatly by country; making up only around 9.4% ofthe economy in 
Denmark while constituting around 76% of the economy in Nigeria (Antunes & 
Cavalcanti, 2007; Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobation, 2000). Although 
entrepreneurship may still exist in the informal sector, starting a new firm in this sector 
may be much less feasible because firms in the informal sector often lack securable 
collateral and, therefore, access to capital that firms in the formal sector can obtain 
(Antunes & Cavalcanti, 2007). Furthermore, entrepreneurship in the informal sector is 
unlikely to have the social benefits that formal sector firms have in terms of leading to 
greater economic growth, greater human capital investment and greater employment. 
Thus, a large informal sector in an economy is likely to retard the creation of new firms 
and self-employment. 
Another way in which governments often regulate firms is by regulating the 
relationship between firms and employees. This is done through legislating minimum 
wages, forcing firms to pay overtime, making firms pay severance packages to dismissed 
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employees, and protecting labor unions (Emerson, 1988; Freeman, 2007; Gwartney et al., 
2007). These rules increase the cost of hiring. These rules may influence the decision of 
individuals whether to become self-employed by increasing the cost of switching to self-
employment. According to results from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics, 
the median firm plans to have two employees in addition to the owner within the first 
year of business operations (Human & Matthews, 2004). Because most new firms plan 
on hiring paid employees and doing so relatively quickly, the costs of hiring employees 
will likely influence individuals when deciding whether to start a new firm. 
Several empirical studies examine the relationship between business regulation 
and entrepreneurship. McMullen, Bagby, and Palich (2008) use both the level of 
business regulation and labor market freedom measures from the Index of Economic 
Freedom (lEF) index to predict the level of entrepreneurship in 37 countries included in 
the 2002 GEM survey. Measures of entrepreneurship used included entrepreneurship 
undertaken in order to exploit a lucrative opportunity (opportunity-motivated) as well as 
entrepreneurship undertaken due to personal necessity (necessity-motivated). They found 
that business regulation is not associated with entrepreneurship. Likewise, Bjomskow 
and Foss (2008) found no relationship between the level of business regulations and 
measures of entrepreneurship. However, other researchers have found a negative 
relationship between business regulations and entrepreneurship. Klapper, Laeven and 
Rajan (2006) examine the relationship between entry barriers and entrepreneurship using 
the Amadeus database, which contains firm-level data from more than five million firms 
in 34 European countries. They found that costly regulations are negatively related to the 
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creation of new firms, and this is even truer in industries that have naturally high entry 
barriers. Van Stel, Storey, and Thurik (2007) examine how business regulations impact 
nascent and young businesses, with regulatory variables taken from the World Bank 
Doing Business (WBDB) database. They found that hours rigidity (restrictions on 
expanding or contracting the number of working hours) and employment rigidity 
(difficulty of hiring and firing) negatively relate to the measures of entrepreneurship. 
Sobel, Clark, and Lee (2007) used the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) measure 
of total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) index to examine the relationship between 
institutions and entrepreneurship. Domestic entry restrictions were measured using a 
variable "administrative burden for startups" from The Global Competitiveness Report. 
Internal barriers to entry are negatively related to TEA, and this relationship is robust 
when other measures of governmental barriers are included in the analysis. Finally, 
Nystrom (2008) also found that low levels of business regulation are associated with high 
rates of self-employment in OECD countries. 
Direct regulations regarding starting and operating a business, as well as those 
involving the employment relationship, increase the cost of starting and operating a 
business. Thus, business regulations are likely to increase the cost of switching from 
wage employment to self-employment and may also lower the expected returns to self-
employment. 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the level of business regulation 
in the country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that he or she 
will be self-employed. 
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Freedom to Trade 
A country that lacks trade freedom will typically have high tariffs as well as non-
tariff barriers, such as quotas, subsidies, and bans on trade (Gwartney et aI., 2007). 
Although free trade has expanded greatly in recent history (Bergsten, 2001), many trade 
restrictions still exist (Gibson, Wainio, Whitley, & Bohman, 2001; Schnepf & Womach, 
2008). 
The impact that trade freedom has on self-employment is not obvious. In one 
sense, substantial trade restrictions may actually increase the opportunity for firms to 
produce goods and services for domestic consumption because protectionist measures 
may make it difficult for foreign firms to enter and operate in the market. This would 
allow domestic firms to charge higher prices or offer lower quality products (Dardis, 
Spivak, & Shih, 1985; Nguyen-Hong, 2000). Furthermore, firms that are new and/or 
small may not have adequate resources to take advantage of the opportunities that appear 
when trade barriers are minimized. Julien, Joyal and Deshaies (1994) found that 
globalization hurt small and medium sized firms because lower productivity makes it 
more difficult to compete in the global marketplace. Their limited resources make it 
difficult for them to exploit opportunities that arise in foreign markets due to the 
relaxation of tariffs. Campbell (1996) found that many small exporting firms are not 
positioned correctly to benefit from the increasing numbers of opportunities that come 
about as a result of increased trade freedom. Therefore, trade restrictions may actually 
encourage self-employment for some individuals. 
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However, substantial trade restrictions may also create fewer opportunities for 
domestic firms to have their product or service sold in another country. Trade 
agreements are often reciprocal in nature; when a country has extensive trade barriers that 
keep foreign firms from entering the domestic market, foreign countries will often place 
trade restrictions against products from the protectionist country (Anderson, 2002; 
Gawande & Hansen, 2003). Likewise, countries often agree to lower trade barriers 
simultaneously through free trade agreements, as can be seen with the North American 
Free Trade Agreement and various World Trade Organization agreements (What is the 
World Trade Organization?, 2009; Brown, Deardorff, & Stem, 1992). Therefore, 
substantial trade restrictions in a country will likely lead to other countries having 
substantial restrictions against that country. 
Trade allows markets for goods and services to expand, allowing firms to 
specialize (Smith, 1776). Free trade between countries allows firms to specialize in 
producing a product or service and export their product or service around the world. 
Firms that do businesses globally often start exporting early in their life (Moen & 
Servais, 2002), indicating that globalization may often be a part of the earliest plan for a 
new firm. The term "born global" has gained notoriety with researchers because 
empirical evidence suggests that many new firms are engaging in business beyond their 
home country as soon as they are open (Andersson & Evangelista, 2006; Moen, 2002). If 
these new ventures face substantial trade barriers when attempting to conduct business 
abroad, they will be at a cost disadvantage to domestic firms in those markets and may 
find doing business there unattractive. As doing business in foreign markets becomes 
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less attractive for domestic firms, the economic performance of these firms or the 
expected economic performance of prospective new firms is likely to fall. Additionally, 
extensive trade restrictions could make engaging in self-employment less economically 
beneficial in other ways. When trade restrictions are substantial, they increase the cost of 
products to consumers (Cox & Harris, 1985; Dardis et aI., 1985; Irwin, 2003; Langerfeld 
& Nieberding, 2005). Firms are consumers of many products, such as capital 
investments and inventory/raw materials that are likely to be more expensive when trade 
restrictions ar~ significant. 
Empirical research on the relationship between trade freedom and 
entrepreneurship has been mixed. Sobel, Clark, and Lee (2007) found that the average 
tariff rate is negatively related to total entrepreneurial activity and is robust when other 
measures of governmental barriers were included in the analysis. However, other 
research shows a non-significant relationship between trade freedom and measures of 
entrepreneurship (McMullen et aI., 2008; Nystrom, 2008). Although trade restrictions 
may increase the level of self-employment in a country by creating opportunities for 
producing items that are restricted, in other ways, such restrictions also may lead to the 
destruction of business opportunities and may make some business opportunities less 
profitable. Overall, freer trade gives the entrepreneur more opportunities to sell their 
products or services. Therefore, it is likely that trade freedom will increase the likelihood 
that individuals will be engaged in self-employment. 
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H3: There is a positive relationship between the level of trade freedom in the 
country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that he or she will 
be self-employed. 
Property Rights 
According to Demsetz (1967), "an owner of property rights possesses the consent 
of fellowmen to allow him to act in a particular way" (p. 347). Property rights are 
important because they structure the incentives in a manner that helps internalize 
externalities (Demsetz, 1967). Property rights is a rather broad term, but generally 
property rights are considered strong when the government protects private property, the 
court system enforces contracts, and there is little expropriation of property (Index of 
economic freedom, 2005). 
From an individual's perspective, well-defined property rights reduce the 
uncertainty regarding the use of property (Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1967). For example, a 
government seizing private property and failing to compensate the owner for it will 
impact the level of risk that property owner's face and will influence their behavior. As a 
result, property owners will tend to underinvest in improving their property. Besley 
(1995) found empirical support for the relationship between land rights and investment 
(measured by land improvements such as planting trees, irrigating, and mulching the 
land) in Ghana. Examining a sample of manufacturing firms in Eastern Europe, Johnson, 
McMillian & Woodruff (2002) found that investment is retarded by weak property rights. 
Claessens & Laeven (2003) found that stronger property rights leads to higher firm 
growth due to the fact that firms do a better job of allocating assets. 
33 
In many ways, the decision to become self-employed is a decision of how an 
individual should invest his or her time and resources. This investment decision will 
likely be influenced by the strength of the property rights in the location where the 
individual resides. When people become self-employed and start a new venture, they 
must invest capital in their business. When property rights are weak, business investment 
is deterred because those who are self-employed or thinking of becoming self-employed 
do not know whether they will be able to keep any profits they may obtain (Johnson et 
al., 2002). Therefore, it is expected that strong property rights protection in a country 
will increase the probability that people in that country will engage in self-employment. 
Bjomskov and Foss (2008) failed to find a significant relationship between the 
quality of the legal system and entrepreneurial activity. However, other researchers have 
found a positive relationship between measures of the strength of property rights and 
entrepreneurship. Nystrom (2008) found that secure property rights are positively related 
to the rate of self-employment. McMullen, Bagby, and Palich (2008) found that strong 
property rights are associated with higher levels of opportunity-motivated 
entrepreneurship but are not significantly related to rates of necessity-motivated 
entrepreneurship. 
H4: There is a positive relationship between property rights protection in the 




An economy is said to have sound money when the inflation rate is low and has 
little volatility (Gwartney & Lawson, 2003). Although there is often thought to be a 
positive relationship between the inflation rate and inflation volatility2, these two issues 
will be examined separately. 
It is important for future inflation rates to be known with some degree of 
certainty because, like property rights, inflation rates allow individual actors to have 
consistent expectations about what prices to expect in the future. High volatility in the 
inflation rate makes planning for the future and making investment decisions difficult 
because the actual net present value of future projects will be difficult to determine 
(Huizinga, 1993). Typically, when a contract is written, any inflation expectation is 
inferred in the terms of the contract (Holland, 1984). The most obvious example of this 
is the mortgage contract between a borrower and a bank. While the interest rate may be 
7%, the lending bank may only require a real 4% return but includes a 3% premium for 
expected inflation. Once a contract is agreed to, if actual inflation is higher than expected 
inflation, then those making payments (the borrowers) receive a gain while those 
receiving payments (the lending banks) receive a loss (Holland, 1984). Ifinflation 
uncertainty is high, writing contracts to account for this variable inflation will be more 
2 There has been some debate to what degree high inflation and inflation volatility are related. Although 
some research indicates a strong relationship between inflation rate and inflation uncertainty, Holland 
(1984) found somewhat more mixed results. However, the two concepts can be made conceptually distinct, 
even if they often occur together. 
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difficult. Firms and individuals will likely be hesitant to enter into contracts, and those 
entered into will likely be shorter term (Rich & Tracy, 2004). 
Although uncertain inflation rates can lead to problems in making investment 
decisions, consistent inflation rates also are problematic if they are excessively high. 
High levels of inflation have been found to lead to a number of negative economic 
outcomes, such as reduced common stock returns (Fama, 1981), low economic growth 
(Bruno & Easterly, 1998), and even high levels of unemployment (Friedman, 1977). 
High levels of inflation raise the rate of return required for business investments (Nelson, 
1976), therefore making starting or operating a business less attractive. 
Both a high rate of inflation and inflation volatility lead to an undesirable 
economic environment that becomes risky for those engaging in long-term transactions 
(Huizinga, 1993; Nelson, 1976). Being self-employed often requires that individuals 
agree to long-term contracts, and many business investments that are made by the self-
employed are long-term. It may seem that the self-employed would benefit from high 
inflation rates because they are often borrowing money and signing long-term lease 
agreements in which they would actually gain from high levels of inflation. However, if 
a country traditionally has a high level of inflation, it is likely to be priced into any loan 
or lease contract, which would make the agreement expensive (Holland, 1984). When a 
country suffers from high or uncertain levels of inflation, the inflation risk will raise the 
threshold level of performance required by those currently self-employed to remain self-
employed and will lower the attractiveness of pursuing opportunities in self-employment 
by those who are not currently self-employed. 
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Nystrom (2008), however, found no relationship between sound money and self-
employment, while McMullen et al. (2008) found mixed results. Conversely, Bjomskov 
and Foss (2008) found a positive relationship between sound money and (1) the 
opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship rate, (2) the necessity-motivated 
entrepreneurship rate, and (3) the total entrepreneurial activity rate. 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the soundness of money in the 
country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that he or she will 
be self-employed. 
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Figure 2.2: Hypothesized Relationships between Institutions and Likelihood of 
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2.5. INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF SELF -EMPLOYMENT: 
MODERATING EFFECTS 
The institutional environment of a country may interact with characteristics of 
individuals to influence the likelihood that they are self-employed. I examine two 
individual-level factors that are likely to interact with institutional factors to influence the 
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individual's choice between self-employment and wage employment: an individual's 
regulatory focus and their human capital leveL 
Regulatory Focus 
Regulatory focus theory argues that an individual can adopt two possible 
strategies when working to achieve a goal: a promotion focus or a prevention focus 
(Brockner, Higgins, & Low, 2004; Forster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998). When individuals 
have a promotion focus, they focus on pursuing possible gains and concern themselves 
little with possible losses. Individuals with a prevention focus emphasize minimizing 
possible losses even if doing so minimizes possible gains. If an individual is prevention-
focused concerning engagement in entrepreneurship, he or she will worry about the 
possibility of failure and will act in a way that minimizes this possibility, even at the cost 
of possible gains. Individuals use a promotion focus when they have a desire for 
accomplishment and progress and adopt a prevention focus when they desire security and 
safety (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). In the literature, there has been some debate to what 
degree an individual's regulatory focus is chronic (a long-lasting trait) or determined by 
context (McMullen & Zahra, 2006). 
The higher the psychic income an individual receives from being self-employed, 
the more likely that he or she is to enter self-employment (or remain self-employed if 
already self-employed; (Gimeno et aI., 1997). Because operating an independent 
business is risky and a substantial number of new firms do fail (Evans & Leighton, 1989; 
Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989), those who approach owning a business with a prevention 
focus will derive less psychic income from self-employment than those who have a 
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promotion focus. Thus, prevention-focused individuals will be less likely to become or 
to continue to be self-employed. 
Sound Money and Regulatory Focus 
A country has sound money when the inflation rate is low and has little volatility 
(Gwartney & Lawson, 2003). A sound currency allows those who are self-employed to 
make more certain investment decisions (Huizinga, 1993) such as whether to hire an 
employee or whether to purchase equipment. However, when the currency in a country is 
not stable, the long-term decisions that self-employed individuals must make are very 
risky because volatile inflation rates make it difficult to determine the financial returns to 
self-employment ex ante. 
When an individual is deeply concerned about the possibility of failure in self-
employment, he or she is less likely to be self-employed, and this is likely to be true 
regardless of the environment that he or she finds themselves in. If a person is 
prevention-focused with regard to a certain activity, he or she may be willing to take 
small, calculable risks but not willing to take large risks that are difficult to control for 
(Brockner et aI., 2004). Therefore, if an individual has a strong prevention focus when it 
comes to engaging in self-employment, he or she may still be willing to engage in self-
employment if environmental conditions make the risk associated with self-employment 
predictable and manageable. However, if environmental conditions are such that the risk 
of owning a business is magnified, then a prevention-focused individual may be even 
more likely to avoid or leave self-employment. The increased risk of operating a 
business that is present when a country's currency is not sound is likely to 
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disproportionally deter an individual who is prevention-focused from being self-
employment. Thus, if a prevention-focused individual resides in a country in which the 
money is not sound, he or she will be less likely to engage in self-employment than a 
prevention-focused individual that resides in a country that has a sound and stable 
currency. 
H6: The negative relationship between prevention focus and the likelihood 
of self-employment will be stronger for individuals in countries without 
sound money than individuals in countries with sound money. 
Property Rights and Regulatory Focus 
Strong property rights exist when courts are fair and efficient and when property 
is not expropriated without just cause and appropriate compensation (Index of economic 
freedom, 2005). Strong property rights protections are important because they shape 
incentives and reduce uncertainty (Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1967). Thus, strong property 
rights are essential to encourage investments (Besley, 1995). If individuals become self-
employed and start a new business, they will make substantial investments that may be 
lost if their country does not provide strong protection of their property rights (Johnson et 
aI., 2002). Weak property rights protection is likely to deter people from entering self-
employment and encourage those currently self-employed to exit. However, this effect 
will likely vary for differing individuals, depending on their personal characteristics. 
Like with sound money, the presence of strong property rights reduces the amount 
of risk in transactions and in conducting business (Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1967). 
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Individuals who are prevention-focused will be particularly sensitive to the level of 
property rights in their country when determining whether to become or continue to be 
self-employed. This is because weak property rights are likely to reduce the psychic 
income that prevention-focused individuals derive from self-employment because these 
individuals will be worried about the possible losses that they may incur and thus will 
seek less enjoyment from self-employment. As the psychic income derived from self-
employment decreases, individuals are more likely to leave self-employment for wage 
employment (Gimeno et aI., 1997). Thus, those who are prevention-focused will be less 
likely to engage in self-employment when property rights protections are weak than those 
who are not prevention-focused. 
H7: The negative relationship between prevention focus and the likelihood 
of self-employment will be stronger for individuals in countries with weak 
property rights than individuals in countries with strong property rights. 
Human Capital 
An individual's level of human capital influences the likelihood that he or she will 
engage in entrepreneurship (Bates, 1995; Davidsson & Honig, 2003). One component of 
an individual's general human capital is formal education (Becker, 1975). The 
relationship between education and self-employment is complex. Those with high levels 
of education are generally more likely than others to be self-employed (Caputo & 
Dolinsky, 1998; Fairlie, 1999; Rees & Shah, 1986; Reynolds, 2004). Many people with 
professional degrees work in areas where self-employment is common, such as in 
medicine or law. Also, a high level of education gives an individual certain skills that 
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may be helpful in starting and operating a business, such as writing, critical thinking, and 
management skills. Some empirical research suggests that those with higher levels of 
human capital are more successful as entrepreneurs than those with lower levels of 
human capital (Bates, 1990; Cooper, Gimeno-Gasc6n, & Woo, 1997). 
However, Blanchflower (2000) found that the relationship between education and 
self-employment is non-linear, that those with the lowest and highest levels of education 
were more likely to be self-employed than those with an average level of education. 
Those with a low level of education may be likely to be self-employed because they may 
have difficulty in finding ajob and are "pushed" into self-employment out of necessity. 
Although the opportunities that individuals with low human capital may pursue may be 
limited, their opportunity costs are limited as well. 
Government Sizeffaxation Levels and Human Capital 
Large governments tax their citizens more to pay for the services that they 
provide (Anderson, Wallace, & Warner, 1986; Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1987). High 
taxation also reduces the incentive to engage in certain activities that have the possibility 
of high returns, such as self-employment (FoIster, 2002). Although this generally 
reduces the incentives of individuals in a country to engage in entrepreneurship, it is 
likely to affect those with high levels of human capital the most adversely. For self-
employed people, business profits are often taxed at personal income rates (Carroll et al., 
2001), and individuals with higher levels of human capital are likely to have high 
earnings from their business (Evans & Leighton, 1989; Hundley, 2000). Therefore, these 
individuals will likely be taxed at a higher tax rate than those with less human capital, 
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who are likely earning less from self-employment. Typically, governments with high 
levels of taxation have tax rates that are quite progressive, taxing wealthy individuals at 
higher rates than less wealthy individuals. Thus, large governments with high tax levels 
can be particularly damaging to the incentives to be self-employed for those with high 
levels of human capital. 
Because of the disproportionate negative impact that high levels of taxation have 
on the expected return of self-employment for individuals with high levels of human 
capital, it is likely that high taxes and large governments will also disproportionately 
affect the likelihood that individuals with high levels of human capital will be self-
employed. Thus, there will be a larger difference in the likelihood of self-employment 
between those with high levels of education and those with moderate levels of education 
when the government is large verses when it is small. 
H8: The positive relationship between having a college education and the 
likelihood of self-employment will be stronger for individuals in countries 
with small governments/low taxation levels than individuals in countries with 
large governments/high taxation levels. 
Regulation of Business and Human Capital 
Government regulations can make the process of starting and/or operating a 
business more time-consuming and costly. Such regulations vary greatly among 
countries (Brunetti et aI., 1997; Djankov et aI., 2002; Gwartney et aI., 2007). Although 
the regulations placed on businesses by governments can negatively affect all those who 
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are engaged in or considering self-employment, their impact is likely to differ depending 
on an individual's level of human capital. When individuals have low levels of human 
capital, they are likely to have difficulty dealing with complex problems (Ucbasaran, 
Westhead, & Wright, 2008). Starting or operating a business is likely to be more difficult 
if business regulations are substantial (van Stel et aI., 2007). Thus, individuals with low 
levels of human capital may not possess the necessary knowledge to start and effectively 
operate a business in such an environment. Furthermore, they will likely not have 
sufficient resources to hire accountants and lawyers and, in some cases, pay the necessary 
bribes to help them through the process of starting a business. 
For those with higher levels of human capital, business regulations are likely to be 
less of a deterrent to starting and operating a business. This is because these individuals 
are likely to have the knowledge and resources necessary to start and operate business 
even when business regulations make doing so difficult. Thus, when government 
regulation of business is substantial, those with lower levels of human capital will 
disproportionately be less likely to start a new firm and more likely to leave an existing 
independent business than individuals with high levels of human capital. 
H9: The positive relationship between having a college education and the 
likelihood of self-employment will be stronger for individuals in countries 
with high levels of business regulation than individuals in countries with low 
levels of business regulation. 
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2.6. METHODS AND RESULTS 
Sample 
I obtained a sample of individuals from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) survey for the years 2001 to 2006. The GEM survey is a cross-country data 
collection project that surveys individuals about their engagement (or lack of 
engagement) in entrepreneurship (Reynolds, Bygrave, Autio, Cox, & Hay, 2004). The 
GEM data contains surveys of individuals from a number of countries (Minniti, Bygrave, 
& Autio, 2005). Each year, individuals were selected at random. Hence, the GEM 
survey is not longitudinal in the strict sense because the same respondents are not 
followed over time. Instead, it contains cross-sectional data for each year that are pooled 
together. 
The GEM data were collected using both phone and face-to-face interviews. 
Respondents were selected using either random digit dialing or random selection of 
geographical clusters (Reynolds et al., 2005). Random digit dialing was used in countries 
in which a large proportion of adults had a landline phone, and the interview was 
conducted over the phone. Geographic stratified sampling was used in areas in which 
landline phones were not owned by a large number of people in the population, and 
actual interviews were conducted face-to-face. Data were collected from individuals 
from a number of high-income countries, such as the United States, Sweden, and Ireland, 
as well as a number of middle-income countries, such as Romania, Brazil, and Turkey 
(Minniti et al., 2005). Generally, the sample included a minimum of2,000 individual 
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observations for each country for each year it was included in the sample, although there 
are many more observations for some countries (Reynolds et aI., 2005). 
The GEM data were collected from a random sample of individuals; the data was 
not collected from a random sample of known entrepreneurs. Surveyed individuals were 
asked a number of questions concerning how they perceive entrepreneurship, as well as if 
they were self-employed or were planning to become self-employed. If they were self-
employed, they were asked some basic question about their business, such as how long 
they had been in business and the number of people their business employed at the time. 
Therefore, from this data several measures of entrepreneurship, and several categories of 
entrepreneurs can be derived: (1) nascent entrepreneurs (those who were trying to start a 
business at the time of the survey), (2) owner-managers of new firms up to 3.5 years old, 
and (3) owner-managers of established firms that were more than 3.5 years old. 
Furthermore, the GEM questionnaire asked respondents whether their entrepreneurship 
motivated by economic necessity or if it arose to exploit a profitable opportunity; thus 
measures of necessity- and opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship are available 
(McMullen et aI., 2008). For a more detailed description of the data collection process 
used in the GEM surveys, see Reynolds et aI. (2005). 
For the years 2001 through 2006, there are 713,737 individual-level observations. 
However, only 472,243 observations are used in the analysis, due to missing data. For 
example, the following question, "Fear of failure would prevent you from starting a 
business?" was only answered by 540,539 respondents (173,198 cases had missing data). 
Likewise the question "Have the knowledge, skill, and experience required to start a new 
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business?" was only answered by 546,514 respondents (167,223 cases had missing data). 
Individuals were surveyed from 55 unique countries. Some countries were surveyed 
every year, while others were surveyed for only select years during the 2001-2006 
timespan. 
Dependent Variable 
Although several measures of entrepreneurship are available in the GEM dataset, 
I wish to examine the relationship that institutions have with an individual's choice to 
engage in self-employment. The dependent variable used in this analysis is whether the 
individual is self-employed, regardless of the age of the business. The GEM survey 
measured this by asking individuals if they were owner-manager of a firm. The response 
is coded as a 1 if the individual was an owner-manager at the time and 0 if the individual 
was not. 
Independent Variables 
Recently, there have been several empirical papers examining the relationship 
between institutions and the level of entrepreneurship in an economy (McMullen et aI., 
2008; Nystrom, 2008; Sobel, 2008). Measuring institutions is a difficult proposition 
because it often involves developing numerical measures for concepts such as the 
strength of property rights and the level of business regulation, which are not naturally 
represented by numerical values. Therefore, counts, such as the average number of days 
it takes to get a business license, are sometimes used, as well as indices which use some 
sort of scoring mechanism, such as in the economic freedom indices (Ayal & Karras, 
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1998; Dawson, 1998). Several indices are commonly used to measure economic 
freedom, including the Economic Freedom of the World index and the Index of 
Economic Freedom. I use both of these indices in the analysis. Both indices have an 
aggregate score that measures economic freedom, as well as individual components that 
measure different aspects of economic freedom. Each component in both indices is 
typically derived from multiple measures. 
Economic Freedom o/the World 
The Economic Freedom of the World index is published by the Fraser Institute 
(Gwartney et aI., 2007). Instead of scoring states/provinces on their level of economic 
freedom, this index scores individual countries. This index is made up of 23 measures 
aggregated into five components: (1) size of government, (2) legal structure and property 
rights, (3) access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation 
of credit, labor and business. Table 2.1 displays the measures making up the five 
components. 
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Table 2.1: Economic Freedom of the World Index Components 
Components Measures 
1. Size of Government: lA: General Government Spending as a Percentage of Total Consumption 
Expenditures, Taxes and IB: Transfers and Subsidies as a Percentage of GDP 
Enterprise lC: Government Enterprises and Investment 
ID: Top Marginal Tax Rate 
i: Top Marginal Income Tax Rate 
ii: Top Marginal Income and Pa~roll Tax Rate 
2. Legal Structure and 2A: Judicial Independence (GCR) 
Security of Property Rights 2B: Impartial Courts (GCR) 
2C: Protection of Property Rights (GCR) 
2D: Military Interference in Rule of Law and Political Process (ICRG) 
2E: Integrity of the Legal System (ICRG) 
2F: Legal Enforcement of Contracts (DB) 
2G: Regulatory Restrictions on the Sale of Real Property (DB) 
3. Access to Sound Money 3A: Money Growth 
3B: Standard Deviation of Inflation 
3C: Inflation Most Recent Year 
3D: Freedom to Own Foreign Currency Bank Accounts 
4. Freedom to Trade 4A: Taxes on International Trade 
Internationally i: Revenue from Trade Taxes 
ii: Mean Tariff Rate 
iii: Standard Deviation of Tariff Rates 
4B: Regulatory Trade Barriers 
i: Non-tariff Trade Barriers (GCR) 
ii: Compliance Cost ofimporting and Exporting (DB) 
4C: Size of Trade Sector Relative to Expected 
4D: Black-Market Exchange Rates 
4E: International Capital Market Controls 
i: Foreign Ownership/Investment Restrictions (GCR) 
ii: Capital Controls 
5. Regulations of Credit, 5A. Credit Market Regulations 
Labor and Business i: Ownership of Banks 
ii: Foreign Bank Competition 
iii: Private Sector Credit 
iv: Interest Rate Controls/Negative Real Interest Rates 
5B: Labor Market Regulations 
i: Minimum Wage (DB) 
ii: Hiring and Firing Regulations (GCR) 
iii: Centralized Collective Bargaining (GCR) 
iv: Mandated Cost of Hiring (DB) 
v: Mandated Cost of Worker Dismissal (DB) 
vi: Conscription 
5C: Business Regulations 
i: Price Controls 
ii: Administrative Requirements (GCR) 
iii: Bureaucracy Costs (GCR) 
iv: Starting a Business (DB) 
v: Extra Payments/Bribes (GCR) 
vi: Licensing Restrictions (DB) 
vii: Cost of Tax Compliance (DB) 
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Index 0/ Economic Freedom 
The Index of Economic Freedom was developed by the Heritage Foundation 
(2005). This index measures economic freedom at the country level of analysis, and 
higher values indicate more freedom. This index is made up of a number of measures 
making up 10 components: (1) business freedom, (2) trade freedom, (3) fiscal freedom, 
(4) government size, (5) monetary freedom, (6) investment freedom, (7) financial 
freedom, (8) property rights, (9) freedom from corruption, and (10) labor freedom. Table 
2.2 displays the measures making up these 10 components. 
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Table 2.2: Index of Economic Freedom Components 
Components Measures 
1. Business Freedom Starting a Business- procedures (number)- from the Doing Business survey (DB) 
Startin~a Business- time (days) (DB) 
Starting a Business- cost (% of per capita income) (DB) 
Starting a Business- minimum capital (% of income per capita) (DB) 
Obtaining a License- procedures (number) (DB) 
Obtaining a License- time (days) (DB) 
Obtaining a License- cost (% of income per clll'ita) (DB) 
Closing a Business- time (years) (DB) 
Closing a Business- cost (% of estate) (DB) 
Closing a Business- recovery rate (cents on the dollar) (DB) 
2. Trade Freedom Trade-Weighted Average Tariff Rate 
Non-Tariff Barriers (qualitative penalty) 
3. Fiscal Freedom Top Tax Rate on Individual Income 
Top Tax Rate on Corporate Income 
Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP 
4. Government Size Government Expenditures: (100-.03 *(Expenditures/GDp)L) 
5. Monetary Freedom Weighted Average Inflation for Past Three Years 
Price Controls (qualitative penalty) 
6. Investment Freedom Restrictions on Foreign Investment (qualitative) 
7. Financial Freedom Banking Security and Independence From Government (qualitative) 
8. Property Rights Certainty of the Legal Protection of Property (qualitative) 
9. Freedom From Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI)*( 1 0) 
Corruption 
10. Labor Freedom Ratio of Minimum Wage to Average Value Added Per Worker (DB) 
Hindrance to Hiring Additional Workers (DB) 
Rigidity of Hours (DB) 
Difficulty of Firing Redundant Employees (DB) 
Legally Mandated Notice Period (DB) 
Mandatory Severance Pay (DB) 
The components from the IEF and EFW index are measures of very similar 
concepts. Most studies using economic freedom indices make use of components from 
one of these indices. However, in this essay, I will perform separate analyses, one using 
measures from the IEF and another using measures from the EFW. Therefore, the 
robustness of the relationship between the institutional measures and self-employment 
can be tested. If the relationship is robust between one of the institutional measures and 
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self-employment, then it should not be significant whether the component is taken from 
the IEF or EFW index. 
One issue in using these two indices in separate analyses is that they need to be 
modified so that the individual index components used in the analysis are approximately 
the same between the two indices and so that they both measure the hypothesized 
constructs. Although the various components of these indices measure similar concepts, 
these components do not match up perfectly and thus limit the degree to which they are 
comparable. For example, in the Economic Freedom ofthe World (EFW) index, one 
component is Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises. In the Index of 
Economic Freedom (IEF), there is, one component called Government Size and another 
called Fiscal Freedom (representing the overall tax burden). Therefore, to compare the 
measures from the different indices, some of the components need to be modified in 
order for them to be measuring approximately the same construct. Due to this, the 10 
components of the IEF are combined to make them directly comparable to those in the 
EFW index. The combined IEF components will be referred to as the modified Index of 
Economic Freedom components. Table 2.3 displays how the IEF components are 
combined to create the modified IEF components and how these new components match 
with the components of the EFW index (as well as the hypothesized constructs). The 
modified IEF components are constructed by simply averaging the scores of the 
components from which they are made. The correlations between the components of the 
EFW index and the modified IEF can be seen in Table 2.4. The high correlation between 
the EFW index components and the modified IEF components provides evidence of 
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convergent validity between these measures, indicating that they are measuring the same 
underlying construct. All of the correlations were significantly different from zero (p < 
.01). 
Table 2.3: Institution Measures Modified 
Components of EFW index Corresponding Components 
in the IEF 
1. Size of Government: Government Size 
Expenditures, Taxes and Fiscal Freedom 
Enterprise 
2. Legal Structure and Property Rights 
Security of Property Rights Freedom From Corruption 
3. Access to Sound Money Monetary Freedom 
4. Freedom to Trade Trade Freedom 
Internationally Investment Freedom 
5. Regulations of Credit, Business Freedom 
Labor and Business Labor Freedom 
Financial Freedom 
Table 2.4: Correlation between EFW Components and Modified IEF Components 
Corresponding Modified IEF Components 
EFW Components 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Size of Government: .758 
Expenditures, Taxes 
and Enterprise 
2. Legal Structure and .910 
Security of Property 
Rights 
3. Access to Sound .692 
Money 
4. Freedom to Trade .673 
Internationally 
5. Regulations of .734 
Credit, Labor and 
Business 
Correlations are from the countries included III the GEM survey for years 2001-2006. All 




An economy's wealth influences the level of self-employment. Generally, in 
poorer countries, people enter self-employment out of lack of other options (McMullen et 
aI., 2008). More opportunities for self-employment may exist because there is a lack of 
capital-intensive firms that rely on economies of scale. Conversely, in wealthier, more 
developed countries, people do not need to enter self-employment to survive because 
there are other employment options. Many studies have found a negative relationship 
between gross domestic product and the level of entrepreneurship in a country 
(Noorderhaven et aI., 2004; Torrini, 2005; Wong, Ho, & Autio, 2005). In this analysis, I 
use a measure of country-level gross domestic product per capita corrected for purchasing 
power parity (PPP) from the World Bank World Development Indicators for each year 
(The World Bank, 2010). 
Similarly, unemployment rates may influence self-employment (Blanchflower, 
2000; Tervo, 2006). High unemployment may be a proxy for a poorly performing 
economy, thus making self-employment a less attractive option for individuals. On the 
other hand, high unemployment may lead to individuals entering self-employment due to 
a lack of other employment options. Country unemployment rates are included for all 
years (International Labour Organization, 2010). 
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Individual Level 
Several individual-level control variables are likely to have an impact on the 
likelihood that an individual is self-employed. One variable that has been predictive of 
this is gender. Research has documented that males are more likely to be self-employed 
than females (Carter & Brush, 2004; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996; Reynolds, 2004). 
Explanations for gender differences in the likelihood that an individual is self-employed 
include differences in human and financial capital between males and females, 
differences in intentions, as well as differences in risk propensity (Carter & Brush, 2004). 
Gender is a dichotomous variable coded for the analysis with 1 =male and O=female. 
Past research also finds a relationship between an individual's age and his or her 
propensity to engage in entrepreneurship, with the probability of being self-employed 
usually increasing as a person ages (Blanchflower, 2000; Evans & Leighton, 1989; Lindh 
& Ohlsson, 1996). There are several possible explanations for this. As people age, their 
level of human capital often increases, possibly making them more likely to discover 
opportunities as they get older. Furthermore, many people's preferences change as they 
get older, and older people may get more psychic income from self-employment than 
those that are younger. Age is included as a control variable. Likewise, I created an age 
squared control variable in order to capture a possible nonlinear relationship between age 
and self-employment, since both the very young and very old may be less likely to be 
self-employed. 
An individual's level of human capital influences the likelihood that they will 
engage in entrepreneurship as well (Bates, 1995; Davidsson & Honig, 2003). One 
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common measure of human capital is the level of education that an individual has 
obtained. Some evidence has shown that the relationship between education and self-
employment is non-linear, with the lowest and highest educated more likely to be self-
employed than those with an average level of education (Blanchflower, 2000). Education 
is measured as an ordinal measure in the GEM with the following categories: (1) no 
secondary schooling, (2) some secondary schooling, (3) secondary school degree, (4) 
post-secondary degree, and (5) graduate experience. In order to control for this and 
examine the moderation hypotheses, I recode these into two categories: no college 
education and college education. Those with no secondary schooling, some secondary 
schooling, or a secondary school degree are considered to have no college education, 
while those with a post-secondary degree or graduate experience are considered to have a 
college degree. 
Although an individual's level of education may certainly influence the 
probability that he or she is self-employed, this is a general measure of human capital. In 
addition to formal schooling, human capital is developed by an individual through work 
experience and non-formal sources of training (Davids son & Honig, 2003), and some of 
the human capital developed through these avenues may be particularly useful in self-
employment. As an indicator of human capital specific to self-employment, I included 
the response from an item asking the respondent if he or she "has the knowledge, skill, 
and experience required to start a new business?" Yes responses were coded as 1, no 
responses as O. 
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One possible determinant to an individual being self-employed is whether he or 
she approaches self-employment with a prevention focus. If an individual is prevention-
focused about entrepreneurship, he or she will worry about the possibility of failure and 
will act in a way that minimizes this possibility, even ifhe or she risks possible gains. A 
substantial number of new firms fail (Mata & Portugal, 1994; Phillips & Kirchhoff, 
1989); therefore, given their desire for safety and security, individuals who approach 
entrepreneurship with a prevention focus are likely to find becoming self-employed too 
risky. I control for individual's prevention focus by including the following item: "Fear 
of failure would prevent you from starting a business?" Yes responses, indicating a 
prevention focus, were coded as 1; no responses, indicating a promotion focus, were 
coded as O. 
Dummy variables are entered for each year (except 2001). This allows the 
intercept to vary across years (Wooldridge, 2003). 
Analysis 
The GEM survey data used in this analysis are individual-level responses, which I 
combine with country-level measures of institutions, unemployment, and economic 
development. Thus, the GEM data contains a number of individual responses nested 
within various countries. To perform this analysis, random coefficient multilevel 
modeling is performed. Much of the past research concerning the relationship between 
institutions and entrepreneurship has involved performing regressions using country-level 
measures of institutions to predict country-level rates of self-employment or nascent 
activity (Bjornskov & Foss, 2008; McMullen et aI., 2008; Sobel et aI., 2007). In contrast, 
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a random coefficient multilevel modeling approach can be used to predict the probability 
that any individual will engage in self-employment, using individual-level as well as 
country-level characteristics. This allows for individual-level control variables, such as 
individuals' beliefs and perceptions about themselves, educational level, and gender to be 
added to the model (Luke, 2004). Furthermore, multilevel modeling allows for the 
testing of cross-level interactions. Although in a purely country-level analysis individual-
level variables can be aggregated to the country-level, such aggregation may lead to 
inflated relationships and misinterpretation if interpreted at the individual level (Luke, 
2004; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). 
The analysis is performed using the lmer and glmmPQL packages in R. 
Specifically, I used the commercial 64-bit version ofR known as Revolution R Enterprise 
developed by Revolution Analytics. While a number of packages, such as HLM 6 and 
will perform this type of analysis, the 64-bit version of Revolution R allows a multi-level 
analysis to be performed even with a substantial number of independent variables and an 
extremely large sample size. Using multi-level modeling software, the researcher can 
model randomly-varying intercepts and slopes, and with the appropriate link function, 
can model various types of outcome variables. In all of the hypotheses, the dependent 
variable is dichotomous; therefore, a logit link function is used for all the regressions. To 
test the developed hypothesis, I followed a model-building process recommended by 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). When the random coefficient model is estimated, it is 
tested to see what random effects are significant and should be kept random in the final 
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model. Finally, a model containing the variables of interest is estimated so that the 
developed hypotheses can be tested. 
Individual-level dichotomous variables are left uncentered, while continuous 
variables (such as age) are grand-mean centered. The use of grand-mean centering is 
recommended when the influence of level-2 variables on the dependent variables are of 
primary interest (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). 
The estimation equations for the hypothesized model are presented in the 
following paragraphs, beginning with the level-l equation and then a series of level-2 
equations. 
(1) Yij = logistic (~Oj + ~lGenderi + ~2Agei + ~3AgeSquaredi + ~4EntSkillsi + ~sjCollegei 
+ ~6jPreF OCUSi) 
Equation 1 is known as the level-l equation in a multilevel model (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2006). In equation (1), Yij is the probability that individual i from country j is 
self-employed. ~Oj represents the intercept term for country j, and the intercept term is 
allowed to vary by country. In the hypothesized mode several control variables are 
individual-level variables, including gender, age, college education, entrepreneurial 
skills, and prevention focus. The terms ~l through ~4 represent the slopes for individual-
level variables with coefficients that do not vary by country. Only the slopes for college 
(~Sj) and prevention focus (~6j) are allowed to vary by country. 
(2) ~Oj = Yoo +yOl GovSizej + Y02BusinessReguiationsj + Y03 TradeFreedomj + 
Y04PropertyRightsj + YosSoundMoneYj + Y06GDPPerCapitaj + Y07UnemploymentRatej+ UOj 
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In equation 1, BOj represents the intercept term which is allowed to vary across 
countries. Equation 2, the level-2 equation for the intercept, shows how BOj is determined. 
Country characteristics for country j are used to predict BOj. The terms YOI through Y07 
represent the slope coefficients for these variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). UOj 
represents the error term for the intercept, or the variation of BOj from its mean that is not 
explained by the variables in the equation. 
(3) B5j=Y50 + Y51GovSizej + Y52BusinessReguiationsj +U5j 
Equation 3 is the level-2 equation that shows how the random slope coefficient 
~5j, is determined. ~5j is the slope coefficient for the level-l dummy variable for college 
education. Government size/taxation levels and the level of business regulations are used 
to predict ~5j. The terms Y51 and Y52 represent the slope coefficients for state j that 
displays the relationship between their associated level-2 predictors and ~5j. U5j represents 
the variance in ~5j from its mean that remains unexplained by government size and the 
level of business regulations. 
Equation 4 is the level-2 equation that shows how the random slope coefficient 
~6j, is determined. ~6j is the slope coefficient for the level-l dummy variable representing 
prevention focus. The level of property rights and soundness of money in state j are used 
to predict ~6j. These include the overall tax burden as well as the level of government 
regulations. The terms Y61 and Y62 represent the slope coefficients for these variables. U6j 
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represents the variance in ~6j from its mean that remains unexplained by property rights 
and the soundness of money. 
For all other level-1 variables, the slope coefficients will be fixed (will not be 
allowed to vary by country). 
Results 
The means and standard deviations of all the variables can be seen Table 2.5. 
The correlation matrix can be seen in Table 2.6. Due to the large sample size, many of 
the correlations are significant at .001 (***), .01 (**) or .05(*). 
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation N 
OwnerlManager .1462 .3533 473,243 
Gender .4841 .4998 473,243 
Skill .4547 .4979 473,243 
Prevention Focus .3469 .4760 473,243 
Age 42.96 15.82 473,243 
Age Sguared 2,096 1,490 473,243 
College Education .3342 .4717 473,243 
GDP per Capita PPP 21,620 9,945 194 
Unemployment Rate 7.79 4.97 194 
Government Size (EFW) 4.21 1.50 194 
Business Regulations 3.46 .926 194 
(EFW) 
Trade Freedom (EFW) 7.51 .805 194 
Prope!!y Rights (EFW) 7.20 1.69 194 
Sound Money (EFW) 8.86 1.08 194 
Government Size (IEF) 43.12 19.17 194 
Business Regulations 30.63 12.93 194 
(IEF) 
Trade Freedom (IEF) 70.84 11.39 194 
Property Rights (IEF) 67.97 21.65 194 
Sound Money (IEF) 82.68 7.02 194 
Startup and Operating 3.83 1.25 194 
Regulations (EFW) 
Labor Regulations (EFW) 4.55 1.37 194 
Credit Regulations (EFW) 1.71 1.10 194 
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Variable I 2 3 4 
1) Self Employment 1 
2) Gender .110'" I 
3) Skill .302'" .173'" 1 
4) Prevention Focus -.090'" -.070'" -.133 , •• I 
5) Age .009'" -.033'" -.035'" -.040'" 
6) Age squared -.017'" -.030'" -.OSS'" -.049'" 
71 College .043'" .022'" .IIS'·' -.041'" 
S) GOP per Capita PPP -.062'" -.013'" -.052'" -.011'" 
91 Unemplovment Rate -.022'" .016'" .010'" .023'" 
10) Government Sizerraxation -.073'" .003'" -.096'" -.004" 
EFW) 
II) Property Rights (EFW) -.050'" -.021'" - 061'" -.020'" 
12) Sound Money (EFW) -.061'" -.009'" -.031 '" .014'" 
1:3) Trade Freedom (EFWl -.OS4'" -.016'" -.OSI'" .004" 
(14) Business Regulation .011'" .016'" -.024'" .036'" 
EFW) 
15) Government Sizerraxation -.OS2'" .000 -.062'" .014'" 
IEF) 
16) Property Rights (JEF) -.066'" -.015'" -.050'" -.005'" 
17) Sound Money (IEF) -.037'" -.OOS·'· -.041'" .021'" 
IS) Trade Freedom (IEF) -.079'" -.016'" -.040'" .029'" 
19) Business Regulation (lEF) .035'" .019'" -.012'" .036'" 
Table 2.6: Correlations 
5 6 7 S 9 10 
1 
.97S··· I 
-.04S'·' -.061'" I 
.152'" .152'" .149'" I 
-.074'" -.06S·" -.101'" -.470'" I 
.023'" .02S·" -.014'" .ISS'" -.090'" I 
.139'" .142'" .IIS·" .S03·" -.432'" .234'" 
.OSS'" .OS6'·' .076'" .702'" -.315'" .220'" 
.077'" .OS3'" .040'" .4IS'" -.293'" ISS'" 
-.OS2'" -.079'" -.154'" -.554'" .376'" .2S4'" 
.OSS··' .057'" .032'" .504'" -.155'" .776'" 
.130'" .131'" .115'" .S70··· -.463'" .177'" 
.OS4'" .OS6'·' .091'" .545'" -.255'" .060'" 
.099'" .103'" .04S'·' .666'" -.203'" .146'" 
-.097'" -.100'" -.140'" -.615'" .40S·'· .163'" 
11 12 13 14 
I 
.591'" I 
.544'" .4S3'" I 
-.571'" -.352'" -.274'" I 
.451'" .521'" .217'" -.033'" 
.S9S·" .679'" .SSO·'· -.607'" 
.546'" .604'" .404'" -.337'" 
.641'" .675'" .647'" -.3S6·'· 
















The need for using random coefficient modeling (RCM) can be assessed by 
calculating interclass correlations (ICCs). Intraclass correlations are calculated to see 
how variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the different levels of 
analysis in the proposed multilevel model. It represents the correlation between two 
randomly chosen level-l units within the same level-2 unit cluster. To obtain the needed 
information to calculate an ICC, I first run an unconditional (null) model in which the 
variability in the dependent variable is partitioned to the different levels. With a 
continuous dependent variable, the ICC is calculated by dividing the variance in the 
dependent variable at level-2 by the total variance of the dependent variable (which is the 
sum of the level-2 and level-l variances). However, with a binary outcome the total 
variance of the dependent variable cannot really be estimated. However, Hox (2010) 
recommends calculating a pseudo-ICC by dividing the variance at level-2 by the sum of 
the level-2 variance and the variance of the logistic distribution. 3.29 is the variance of a 
logistic distribution with a scale factor of 1 (Hox,2010). I calculate the ICC using this 
method. The intraclass correlation can be seen in Table 2.7. I obtain these by running 
the lmer procedure in Revolution R. The intraclass correlation shows how the variability 
in the dependent variable is partitioned into the two levels: countries and individuals. 
The ICC of 0.1156 indicates that 11.56% of the variance in the likelihood of being self-
employed is due to country differences. This correlation is substantial enough that failure 
to account for this clustering could inflate the standard errors of the parameter estimates 
(Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998), indicating that random coefficient multilevel modeling is an 
appropriate analysis technique in this circumstance. 
65 
Table 2.7 Intraclass Correlation 
Country Variance .4294 
Variance of the Logistic Distribution 3.2865 
Intraclass Correlation .1156 
The next step is to run the random coefficients model. In the random coefficients 
model, both the intercept and the level-1 slope coefficients that are predicted to vary are 
allowed to vary based upon country. This estimation is performed so that these models 
can be compared with the random slope model, to see if the additional random slopes 
substantially increase model fit. I have hypothesized that the slope coefficient for both 
college education (high human capital) and fear prevention focus will vary based upon 
country. 
To determine which model has the best fit, I examine the AIC and BIC indices. 
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is a general fit index that can be used to compare 
non-nested models (Hox, 2010). Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is a similar index 
used to assess model fit, but the BIC tends to place more of a penalty on complex models 
than the AIC. When comparing models, the model with the lower AIC and BIC is 
preferred. Both measures become smaller as the deviance of the model goes down, as 
well as when the number of parameters in the model goes down. BIC is calculated using 
the number of individual observations as the sample size (instead of the number of 
countries). In Table 2.8, the AIC and BIC for three models are displayed: the null model 
(random country intercept only); a model with a random intercept and prevention focus 
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slope; and a model with a random intercept, prevention focus, and college education 
slope. 
Table 2.8: Random Effects & Model Fit 
Model Deviance AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Difference Difference 
Null Model (Random 490,488 490,492 490,515 
Intercept) 
Random Intercept & 427,983 427,991 428,036 62,501 62,479 
Prevention Focus 
Slope 
Random Intercept, 406,731 406,745 406,823 21,246 21,213 
Prevention Focus & 
College Slope 
As can be seen in Table 2.8, adding the prevention focus slope to the model 
improves fit substantially, according to both AlC and BlC measures of fit. Likewise, 
adding a random slope for college education improves fit substantially as well. However, 
these substantial differences seem likely due to the extremely large sample size, and thus 
should be interpreted with caution. 
To examine the hypothesized fixed effects, I run the analysis on the several 
models using the glmmPQL procedure from the MASS package in R. This procedure is 
similar to the lmer procedure used to examine the null and random effects models but is 
capable of better estimating more complex models. The lmer procedure had difficulty 
converging with the more complex models. The disadvantage to using the glmmPQL 
procedure is that it works somewhat different mathematically, and deviance scores, 
which are often used to assess model fit in multi-level models are not provided. Thus, the 
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discussion of these models will focus on the significance of the hypothesized variables 
instead of model fit. 
The first model includes only a random intercept and control variables. I then 
estimate a direct effects model containing all of the hypothesized and control variables. I 
estimate separate models using the Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney et aI., 
2007) index and the modified Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2005) 
as the institutional variable measures. The last model contains all control and 
hypothesized variables, as well as interaction terms. Again, I estimate separate models 
using the EFW index and the modified IEF. 
The results for the control model can be seen in Table 2.9. Many ofthe 
individual-level control variables are significant predictors ofthe whether an individual is 
engaging in self-employment. These include gender (0.4153;p < .0001), entrepreneurial 
skills (1.7237; p < .0001), prevention focus (-0.3636;p < .0001), age (O.l462;p < 
.0001), age squared (-0.0015;p <.0001). Surprisingly, having a college education 
(0.0168; p = .0998) was not a statistically significant predictor of self-employment. It is 
important to remember, given the sample size as well as the fact that the control variables 
included are ones that have been found to significant predictors of self-employment in the 
past, it is to be expected that many of the individual-level variables would be statistically 
significant. At the country-level, gross domestic product statistically significantly 
predicted self-employment (-0.017;p = .0005) while unemployment rates did not (-
0.0064;p = .2429). 
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Table 2.9: Control Model 
Modell 
Variable Coefficient SE t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.0918 0.0890 -1.03 0.3023 
Gender 0.4153 0.0095 43.52 <0.0001 
Skill 1.7237 0.0114 150.89 <0.0001 
Prevention Focus -0.3636 0.0475 -7.65 <0.0001 
Age 0.1462 .0021 70.81 <0.0001 
Age Squared -0.0015 0.000023 -67.35 <0.0001 
College 0.0168 0.0102 1.65 0.0998 
GDP per Capita -0.017 0.005 -3.50 0.0005 
(thousands) 
Unemployment -0.0064 0.0055 -1.17 0.2429 
Rate 
Year 2002 0.1328 0.0216 6.14 <0.0001 
Year 2003 0.6473 0.0231 28.04 <0.0001 
Year 2004 0.5166 0.0230 22.50 <0.0001 
Year 2005 0.6820 0.0239 28.55 <0.0001 
Year 2006 0.4897 0.0243 20.19 <0.0001 
Table 2.10 displays Model 2 and Table 2.11 displays Model 3. Model 2 is the 
direct effects model using institutional measures from the Economic Freedom of World 
index (Gwartney et al., 2007) while Model 3, uses institutional measures from the Index 
of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2005). Italicized variables are the variables 
that were added to these models. However, my discussion will focus on the Models 4 & 
5. 
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Table 2.10: EFW Direct Effects Model 
Model 2 
Variable Coefficient SE t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.1910 0.1019 -1.87 0.0609 
Gender 0.4158 0.0096 43.52 <0.0001 
Skill 1.7229 0.0114 150.63 <0.0001 
Prevention Focus -0.3612 0.0470 -7.68 <0.0001 
Age 0.1470 0.0021 71.0509 <0.0001 
Age Squared -0.0016 0.000023 -67.60 <0.0001 
College 0.0151 0.0102 1.48 0.1382 
GDP per Capita -0.0248 0.0062 -4.01 <0.0001 
(thousands) 
Unemployment Rate 0.0067 0.0061 1.11 0.2691 
T axationiGovernment 0.1119 0.0186 6.00 <0.0001 
Size 
Property Rights 0.0677 0.0202 3.35 0.0008 
Sound Money 0.0707 0.0198 3.57 0.0004 
Trade Freedom 0.1005 0.0300 3.35 0.0008 
Business Regulation 0.1833 0.0226 8.10 <0.0001 
Year 2002 0.1552 0.0224 6.94 <0.0001 
Year 2003 0.7043 0.0242 29.15 <0.0001 
Year 2004 0.6837 0.0282 24.26 <0.0001 
Year 2005 0.8725 0 .. 0321 27.17 <0.0001 
Year 2006 0.7217 0 .. 0337 21.39 <0.0001 
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Table 2.11: IEF Direct Effects Model 
Model 3 
Variable Coefficient SE t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.1194 0.0863 -1.38 0.1664 
Gender 0.4155 0.0095 43.52 <0.0001 
Skill 1.7228 0.0] 14 150.73 <0.0001 
Prevention Focus -0.3635 0.0474 -7.67 <0.0001 
Age 0.1462 0.0021 70.78 <0.0001 
Age Squared -0.0015 0.000023 -67.32 <0.0001 
College 0.0167 0.0102 1.64 0.1006 
GDP per Capita -0.023 0.0068 -3.29 0.0010 
(thousands) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0121 0.0063 -1.94 0.0525 
Taxation/Government 0.0021 0.0019 1.07 0.2841 
Size 
Property Rights 0.0041 0.0029 1.42 0.1568 
Sound Money 0.0104 0.0022 4.82 <0.0001 
Trade Freedom -0.0030 0.0016 -1.89 0.0594 
Business Regulation 0.0052 0.0017 3.11 0.0019 
Year 2002 0.1691 0.0230 7.35 <0.0001 
Year 2003 0.6836 0.0250 27.34 <0.0001 
Year 2004 0.5604 0.0255 21.96 <0.0001 
Year 2005 0.7171 0.0270 26.52 <0.0001 
Year 2006 0.5405 0.0293 18.43 <0.0001 
Results from the full model, which includes the hypothesized cross-level 
interaction effects, can be seen in Table 2.12 and Table 2.13. Italicized variables are the 
variables that were added to these models (not in previous models). In Model 4, I use the 
EFW institution measures, for Model 5, I use the measures from the IEF. Adding the 
interaction terms not only adds additional significance tests, but this also slightly changes 
the parameter estimates for the direct effects. However, the results for the full models are 
very similar to the direct effects models. Thus, my discussion of the hypotheses tests will 
be based upon the results from both of the full models. When I ran the full model, the 
software would not converge on a solution when the college slope was allowed to vary by 
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country. Hence, this random slope was removed, and hypotheses 8 and 9 were not tested. 
Because that the model would not converge with a random college slope, it is likely that 
there is very little variation in this relationship by country and thus unlikely that any sort 
of significance would have been found for hypotheses 8 and 9. 
Table 2.12: EFW Full Model 
Model 4 
Variable Coefficient SE I-value p-value 
Intercept -0.2238 0.1021 -2.19 0.0283 
Gender 0.4158 0.0096 43.51 <0.0001 
Skill 1.7230 0.0114 150.63 <0.0001 
Prevention Focus -0.4158 0.0448 -9.21 <0.0001 
Age 0.1469 0.0021 71.03 <0.0001 
Age Squared -0.0016 0.000023 -67.58 <0.0001 
College 0.0152 0.0102 1.49 0.1350 
GDP per Capita -0.0297 0.0064 -4.65 <0.0001 
(thousands) 
Unemployment Rate 0.0070 0.0060 1.17 0.2431 
Taxation/Government 0.1111 0.0185 6.01 <0.0001 
Size 
Property Rights 0.0819 0.0203 4.03 <0.0001 
Sound Money 0.0527 0.0209 2.51 0.0119 
Trade Freedom 0.0943 0.0299 3.15 0.0016 
Business Regulation 0.1852 0.0226 8.20 <0.0001 
Pre Focus*Property -0.0982 0.0208 -4.72 <0.0001 
Rights 
Pre Focus*Sound 0.0516 0.0270 1.91 0.0564 
Money 
Year 2002 0.1545 0.0224 6.91 <0.0001 
Year 2003 0.7061 0.0242 29.23 <0.0001 
Year 2004 0.6860 0.0281 24.38 <0.0001 
Year 2005 0.8801 0.0321 27.40 <0.0001 
Year 2006 0.7304 0.0337 21.64 <0.0001 
In the EFW (using Economic Freedom ofthe World) full model, 
taxation/government size is a statistically significant predictor of entrepreneurship 
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(0.1111; P < .0001) although in a different direction than hypothesized in hypothesis 1. 
Likewise, the business regulation coefficient is statistically significant (0.1852; p < 
.0001), but in a different direction than hypothesized in hypothesis 2. The coefficient for 
trade freedom is positive and statistically significant (0.0943;p = .0016), which is 
consistent with hypothesis 3. Property rights is positively related to self-employment 
(0.0819;p < .0001) which supports hypothesis 4. Finally, sound money is positively 
related to self-employment (0.0527;p = :0119), which is consistent with hypothesis 5. 
The interaction between prevention focus and sound money is statistically non-significant 
(0.0516;p = .0564). No support is found for hypothesis 6. The interaction between 
prevention focus and property rights is statistically significant, but in the direction 
opposite of what is hypothesized (-0.0982;p < .0001). Thus, there is no support for 
hypothesis 7. 
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Table 2.13: IEF Full Model 
ModelS 
Variable Coefficient SE t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.1739 0.0882 -1.97 0.0486 
Gender 0.4156 0.0095 45.52 <0.0001 
Skill 1.7225 0.0114 150.69 <0.0001 
Prevention Focus -0.4471 0.0473 -9.45 <0.0001 
Age 0.1462 0.0021 70.78 <0.0001 
Age Squared -0.0015 0.000023 -67.33 <0.0001 
College 0.0164 0.0102 1.61 0.1082 
GDP per Capita -0.029 0.007 -4.09 <0.0001 
(thousands) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0100 0.0063 -1.60 0.1104 
Taxation/Government 0.0019 0.0019 0.97 0.3297 
Size 
Property Rights 0.0029 0.0029 1.01 0.3145 
Sound Money 0.0108 0.0023 4.65 <0.0001 
Trade Freedom -0.0027 0.0016 -1.68 0.0938 
Business Regulation 0.0053 0.0017 3.16 0.0016 
Pre Focus*Property -0.0077 0.0019 -4.11 <0.0001 
Ri~hts 
Pre Focus*Sound Money 0.00036 0.00365 0.10 0.9225 
Year 2002 0.1680 0.0230 7.30 <0.0001 
Year 2003 0.6811 0.0250 27.25 <0.0001 
Year 2004 0.5642 0.0255 22.09 <0.0001 
Year 2005 0.7240 0.0271 26.73 <0.0001 
Year 2006 0.5519 0.0294 18.74 <0.0001 
In the full model using the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) institution 
measures, the coefficient for taxation/government size is not statistically significant 
(0.0019;p = .3297). Thus, there is no support for hypothesis 1. The level of business 
regulation has a statistically significant effect of the likelihood of being self-employed 
(0.0053;p = .0016); however, the relationship is positive, and the opposite of what was 
hypothesized in hypothesis 2. Trade freedom is not statistically significantly related to 
74 
self-employment (-0.0027; P = .0938), which is not consistent with hypothesis 3. 
Property rights are not statistically significantly related to self-employment (0.0029; p 
=.3145), thus this is not consistent with hypothesis 4. Sound money is positive and 
statistically significant (0.0108; p < .0001), supporting hypothesis 5. The interaction 
between prevention focus and sound money was statistically nonsignificant (0.0004;p = 
.9225). Thus, no support is found for hypothesis 6. The interaction between prevention 
focus and property rights was statistically significant but in the direction opposite of what 
was hypothesized (-0.0077; p < .0001). Hypothesis 7 is therefore not supported. A 
summary of the hypothesized variables and their significance in models 4 and 5 can be 
seen in Table 2.14. 
Table 2.14: Results Summary 
Hypothesized Relationship Results- EFW Results- IEF Measures 
With Self-Employment Measures 
HI Taxation/Government Size Not supported Not supported 
H2 Business Regulation Not supp0l1ed Not supported 
H3 Trade Freedom Supported Not supported 
H4 Property Rights Supported Not supported 
H5 Sound Money Supported Supported 
H6 Prevention Focus* Sound Not supported Not supported 
Money 
H7 Prevention Focus *Property Not supported Not supported 
Rights 
H8 College*T axation/Government Not supporteda Not supporteda 
Size 
H9 College*Business Regulation Not supporteda Not supporteda 
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aThese effects were not tested in the full model because the model would not converge 
with both a random college and prevention focus slopes. However, the college variable 
itself was not statistically significant, and a separat~: analysis (without a random 
prevention focus slope) failed to find statistically significant moderation effects. 
Post Hoc Analysis 
In some ofthe analyses, both taxation/government size as well as business 
regulation were positively related to self-employment, even though a negative 
relationship was predicted. For taxation/government size, there is good theoretical 
rational for why this relationship might be positive. As discussed earlier, there are tax 
benefits to self-employment, which will tend to increase as tax rates go up (Bruce & 
Schuetze,2004). Also, large governments can provide certain services (education, police 
protection) infrastructure (roads and bridges) and basic research that may be beneficial to 
entrepreneurs (Audretsch et aI., 2005; Kirchhoff et aI., 2007; Kreft & Sobel, 2005). 
However, the positive relationship found between the level of business regulation is more 
difficult to explain. Why would individuals in countries with more business regulation be 
more likely to be self-employed? Business regulations would seem to impede small 
entrepreneurs while being less of an impediment to large and established firms. The 
measure of business regulation used in both the EFW and IEF included not only direct 
regulations to businesses regarding startup and price controls, but also regulations of 
labor and credit markets. In order to examine this in a little more detail, I break down the 
business regulation measure into the three sub-components: business startup and 
operating regulations, labor regulations, and creditlbank regulations. I use only the EFW 
index, since the IEF does not have labor regulations for all years. I then run an analysis 
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using these three subcomponents in place of the aggregated business regulations measure. 
The results can be seen in Table 2.15. 
Not surprisingly, business and operating regulations is now a non-significant 
predictor of self-employment (-0.0087;p = .6464). However, labor regulations (0.0881; 
p < .0001) and credit regulations (0.1115; p < . 0001) are positively related to self-
employment. In countries with greater labor regulations, firms may be reluctant to hire 
workers since the labor costs are high. Since workers cannot be hired, they may be more 
likely to become self-employed as they are pushed into this type of work because of the 
regulations. It may be the case that credit regulations have a larger impact on bigger 
businesses and thus make small business more the norm. As a consequence, these 
countries may have more self-employment. It makes sense that business and operating 
regulations would not be positively related to self-employment. This helps explain the 
counterintuitive findings found in the main analysis. 
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Table 2.15: Post Hoc Test- Multiple Regulation Measures 
Model 6 
Variable Coefficient SE I-value p-value 
Intercept -0.2350 0.1016 -2.31 0.0207 
Gender 0.4171 0.0096 43.58 <0.0001 
Skill 1.7227 0.0114 150.48 <0.0001 
Prevention Focus -0.4145 0.0445 -9.30 <0.0001 
Age 0.1468 0.0021 70.84 <0.0001 
Age Squared -0.0016 0.000023 -67.40 <0.0001 
College 0.0140 0.0102 1.37 0.1710 
GDP per Capita -0.0279 0.0065 -4.30 <0.0001 
(thousands) 
Unemployment Rate 0.00211 0.00614 0.34 0.7314 
Taxation/Government 0.1068 0.0186 5.75 <0.0001 
Size 
Startup and Operating -0.0087 0.0190 -0.46 0.6464 
Regulations 
Labor Regulations 0.0881 0.0124 7.11 <0.0001 
Credit Regulations 0.1115 0.0179 6.21 <0.0001 
Property Rights 0.0356 0.0219 1.62 0.1048 
Sound Money 0.0856 0.0222 3.86 <0.0001 
Trade Freedom 0.0642 0.0293 2.19 0.0284 
Prevention -0.1071 0.0213 -5.02 <0.0001 
Focus * Property 
Rights 
Prevention 0.0505 0.0277 1.82 0.0682 
Focus*Sound Money 
Year 2002 0.1390 0.0227 6.13 <0.0001 
Year 2003 0.6893 0.0247 27.85 <0.0001 
Year 2004 0.6549 0.0277 23.57 <0.0001 
Year 2005 0.8952 0.0353 25.33 <0.0001 
Year 2006 0.7315 0.0381 19.22 <0.0001 
2.7. DISCUSSION 
The results are informative in how formal institutions predict the likelihood that 
an individual is self-employed. Several previous studies have examined how institutions 
influence entrepreneurship, with many of them using economic freedom indices to 
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measure institutions (Bjomskov & Foss, 2008; McMullen et aI., 2008; Sobel, 2008;). 
One large difference in this essay is that I do not try to predict country-level 
entrepreneurship rates, but instead examine individual decisions to engage in 
entrepreneurship (measured by whether they are self-employed). Although results 
similar to previous research would not be surprising, such agreement is not necessarily 
expected either. There does appear to be some similarities in results I found and previous 
analyses performed solely at the country-level. 
I found a positive relationship between government size/taxation levels and the 
likelihood of self-employment with the EFW measure, and a non-significant relationship 
with the IEF measure. Past empirical research on the relationship between government 
size/taxation levels and levels of entrepreneurship has found mixed results, with some 
finding negative (Nystrom, 2008) and other studies finding positive relationships (Aidis, 
Estrin, and Mickiewicz, 2009; Bjomskow & Foss, 2008; Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik, 
and Reynolds, 2005). This may explained to different measures of entrepreneurship, for 
example, Aidis, Estrin and Mickiewicz predict entrepreneurial entry instead of self-
employment. Also, many of the studies do not predict the likelihood that an individual 
will be an entrepreneur through the use of multi-level modeling, but instead look at 
aggregate self-employment rates at the country or state level. 
While some studies have found a non-significant relationship between measures 
of business regulation and measures of entrepreneurship (Bjomskow and Foss 2008; 
McMullen, Bagby, and Palich 2008) others have found a negative relationship (Klapper, 
Laeven and Rajan, 2006; Sobel, Clark, and Lee, 2007; Nystrom, 2008, Van Stel, Storey, 
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and Thurik, 2007). However, I found a positive relationship between the level of 
business regulations and the likelihood of self-employment. This is somewhat explained 
by the post hoc analysis which reveals that it is labor and credit regualtions that tend to be 
driving this relationship, while startup and operating regullations are not significantly 
related. Again, these differences may be due to the use of different methodoligies and 
measures. 
Trade freedom is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of self-
employment with the EFW measure, while non-significant for the IEF measure. Past 
research has been mixed as well. Sobel, Clark, and Lee (2007) found that the average 
tariff rate is negatively related to total entrepreneurial activity, however, other research 
has shown a non-significant relationship between trade freedom and measures of 
entrepreneurship (McMullen et aI., 2008; Nystrom, 2008). 
I found a positive relationship between property rights and the likelihood of self-
employment with the EFW measure, but a non-significant relationship with the IEF 
measure of property rights. The positive relationship seems fairly consistent with the past 
literature, generally strong property rights have been found to encourage investment 
(Besley, 1995; Johnson, McMillian & Woodruff, 2002) and certain types of 
entrepreneurship (McMullen, Bagby, and Palich, 2008; Nystrom 2008). The relationship 
between sound money and the likelihood of being self-employed was the most robust 
relationship of any of the hypothesized variables- it significantly predicted self-
employment in all model specifications in which it was included as a variable. This is 
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consistent with findings of Bjomskov and Foss (2008) but not with the findings of 
Nystrom (2008) 
Besides the ability to control for a number of individual level factors, another 
advantage to using a multi-level analysis is the ability to test cross-level interactions. 
There were four cross-level interactions hypothesized. However, the results from the 
interaction test did not generally support the hypothesized interactions. 
2.8. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several limitations to this research. Although the GEM survey allows 
access to a large number of cross-country respondents, this survey does not include many 
countries, and seems to contain a disproportionate number of European countries. Africa 
in particular is underrepresented, containing only observations from Uganda and South 
Africa. This is a problem because the determinants of entrepreneurship in Europe are 
likely to be much different than those in Africa. Thus, my results may have limited 
generalizability. Another limitation with the GEM survey is the crudeness of some of the 
measures. Entrepreneurial skills and prevention focus (fear of failure) are measured by 
dichotomous variables. These sorts of measures may make sense in a large cross-country 
survey such as this, since questions with responses on a Likert-type scale may be difficult 
to translate accurately for all of the countries in which individuals are surveyed. 
Nevertheless, the crude nature of the measures means that they are subject to a substantial 
amount of measurement error. Measurement error lowers the bivariate correlation 
between two variables, weakening the bivariate relationship (Chen & Popovich, 2002) 
and making it less likely that a significant relationship will be found. However, with a 
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statistical analysis containing multiple independent variables, it is impossible to know 
how the measurement error will impact the relationship between two variables. Also, 
when examining how country-level differences influence entrepreneurship, there is 
always the possibility of omitted variable bias. Countries vary on an almost infinite 
number of variables, many of which are unobservable and immeasurable. 
Examining measures of entrepreneurship- such of self-employment, new startups, 
etc. give us an idea about the prevalence and predictors of entrepreneurship. Allowing 
individuals the choice to become entrepreneurs is not only a basic liberty, but it is also 
important to economic outcomes like job creation and economic growth (Carree, van 
Stel, Thurik, & Wennekers, 2002; F61ster, 2000). However, saying that all 
entrepreneurship is desirable, and that more entrepreneurship is always good, is simply 
wishful thinking. This study does not fully capture how institutions influence the type of 
entrepreneurship that people engage in. Baumol (1990) argues that even if institutional 
forces do not change the level of entrepreneurship in an economy, they certainly do 
change the type of entrepreneurship that occurs. Thus, institutions may influence the 
relative ratio of productive entrepreneurship to unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship. In the early middle ages, institutions encouraged "entrepreneurship" 
that involved developing innovative weapons to aid in making warfare - likely due at 
least partially to the economic gains that could be eaptured through warfare (and perhaps 
the lack of other ways to gain wealth). Thus, although entrepreneurship existed, it was 
not focused on developing new consumer products or efficient production systems. 
Likewise in modem society, high levels of taxation may in fact encourage people to 
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become self-employed (Bruce & Schuetze, 2004), so they can take advantage of certain 
tax benefits (both legal and illegal) that self-employed individuals can take advantage of. 
These individuals may not particularly desire to be self-employed, and they may be less 
productive as self-employed than if they were working for some other firm. Likewise, 
with larger governments, individuals may become self-employed to perform consulting 
work for government. They may have incentives to lobby for special rules or regulations 
that might increase the demand for their services. However, in this study, due to the 
nature of the data, I am not able to separate productive entrepreneurship from 
unproductive and destructive versions. 
Attempting to measure productive entrepreneurship and using institutional 
variables to predict productive entrepreneurship may be the logical next step in this 
research stream. One notable paper already attempts to make a distinction between 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship and examines what institutional factors 
predict each (Sobel, 2008). In this paper, the distinction is made by using firm births, 
patenting activity, etc. as measures of productive entrepreneurship, and using the number 
oflobbying firms and the quality of the state's liability system. However, some new 
firms that come about are unproductive if not downright destructive. Attempts should be 
made to examine new firms on a number of criteria to determine whether they are to be 
considered productive, unproductive, or destructive. 
Another fruitful area of future research may be examining the interactions 
between country-level institution measure and individual-level characteristics. Many 
factors that commonly predict engagement in entre:preneurial activities, such as risk 
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perception, risk tolerance, and overconfidence and may have their effects moderated by 
institutional factors. While none of the hypothesized moderators in this study were 
supported, that does not mean that other moderating relationships do not exist. 
2.9. CONCLUSION 
In this essay, I examined the relationship between the formal institutions of a 
country and the likelihood of individuals being self~employed. Two sets of institutional 
measures, the Economic Freedom of the World index and the Index of Economic 
Freedom are used in the analysis to measure govemment size, the level of business 
regulation, trade freedom, the strength of property rights, and soundness of money. Some 
support is found for a positive relationship between trade freedom, property rights, and 
sound money in the country in which an individual resides and the likelihood that they 
are engaged in self-employment. Govemment size/taxation levels and the level of 
business regulations do not predict engagement in self-employment in the hypothesized 
manner. 
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CHAPTER 3: LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND NEW FIRM 
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Labor market institutions include the taxes on labor, minimum wages, 
employment regulations, social security taxes and benefits, and laws governing 
unionization in an economy (Nickell 1998). Labor market institutions develop over time, 
often as a result of various social movements and economic shocks (Thelen, 2004) and 
vary widely across countries and sometimes even among regions or states within a 
country. Because these institutions set the rules for both employees and employers, they 
ultimately influence the cost of labor and affect hiring, firing, and other employment 
decisions within the firm. For example, labor market institutions have been shown to 
influence a number of economic outcomes, such as the variance in pay levels (Freeman, 
1998), unemployment rates (Ljungqvist & Sargent, 1998; Nickell, 1997) and job creation 
(Cahuc & Postel-Vinay, 2002). 
Existing research has focused on using labor market institutions to predict 
economy-level outcomes, such as the level of unemployment (Belot & Van Ours, 2001) 
and variation in wages (Siebert, 1997). For these economy-level outcomes to arise, 
institutions need to change the behavior of firms and individuals. However, how labor 
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market institutions specifically influence the behavior of new firms is not well 
understood. New firms often are resource-constrained and have less access to capital 
than more established firms (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & 
Rosen, 1994), yet they require substantial increases in employment in order to grow. 
Often they operate in "hypercompetitive" industrit:s with small profit margins (Jones, 
Ram, & Edwards, 2004; Ram, Edwards, & Jones, 2007). New firms may be more 
sensitive to labor market institutions that increase the cost of labor, since they may lack 
access to capital and compete in very competitive industries. Alternatively, new firms 
may be less sensitive to some labor market institutions such as those that encourage 
unionization because their initial small size may reduce their chances of being unionized. 
In addition, new firms may be able to effectively avoid the impact of high minimum 
wages by informally hiring people "off the books" or by renegotiating other details of the 
employment contract to compensate for having to pay high wages (Arrowsmith, Gilman, 
Edwards, & Ram, 2003). However, current research has not rigorously examined how 
labor market institutions such as minimum wages, unionization protections, and labor 
taxes influences new firms. 
In this essay, I examine the following research question: Do labor market 
institutions influence employment growth in new firms? New firms are often small, and 
small firms are said to suffer from the liability of smallness3 (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990) 
because they often lack the necessary resources needed to survive (Holtz-Eakin et aI., 
3 New fIrms are said to suffer from the liability of newness because they lack legitimacy and must learn 
new routines, which raises their mortality rate (Stinchcombe, 1965). However, new fIrms are most often 
small and, therefore, suffer from the resource constraints associated with the liability of smallness as well. 
Although conceptually different, many new fIrms arguably have both types of liabilities. 
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1994). Labor market institutions may exacerbate this liability by increasing the labor cost 
of new firms. Thus, answering this question will build on previous findings suggesting 
that the institutional environment may have a profound impact on emerging firms 
(Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Sobel et aI., 2007). Furthermore, this paper examines how 
firm attributes, such as whether a firm has a comp~:titive advantage, moderate the 
relationship between labor market institutions and firm employment. Because new firms 
are often considered significant creators of new jobs (Birch, 1987; Birley, 1986; 
Davidsson, Lindmark, & Olofsson, 1998; Van Praag & Versloot, 2007; Van Stel & 
Suddle, 2008), an understanding of to what extent their labor market policies influence 
employment growth in these firms can aid decision making by policymakers. 
This essay is organized as follows. First, I develop several hypotheses concerning 
the relationship between various labor market institutions and employment growth in new 
firms. I examine several aspects of labor market institutions: minimum wages, union 
densities, and the structure of unemployment insurance. I then test these relationships by 
combining state-level measures of labor market institutions with firm-level measures 
from the Kauffman Firm Survey. 
3.2. LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
Siebert (1997) notes, "any labor market is surrounded by an array of institutional 
arrangements that form a complex web of incentives and disincentives on both sides of 
the market" (p. 39). Labor market institutions include the taxes on labor, minimum 
wages, employment regulations, social security taxes and benefits, and laws governing 
unionization in an economy (Nickell 1998). The rules that regulate the labor market 
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influence the supply and demand for labor (Freemlll, 1998; Siebert, 1997). These rules 
and regulations differ greatly among countries, with different countries developing 
several distinct models with varying results. As noted by Freeman (1998), the U.S. 
model entails relatively low union protection, low minimum wages compared to the 
average wage, and a weak social safety net. The U.S. has experienced rather low 
unemployment and high growth but has experienced low inflation-adjusted wage 
increases relative to many European countries. Conversely, many European countries are 
characterized by relatively high levels of unionization, high minimum wages, and 
extensive social safety nets, although differences do manifest themselves among 
European countries. During the 1980s and 1990s, many European countries had 
substantially higher unemployment rates than the U.S., although there was generally less 
variance in pay levels (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; Freeman, 1998; Ljungqvist & 
Sargent,1998). The differences between European countries and the U.S. in 
unemployment rates persisted into the 2000s, until the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 
when the rates converged (Schmitt, Rho, & Fremstad, 2009). The differences in 
economic outcomes among these countries are to some degree a result of differences in 
labor market institutions (Belot & Van Ours, 2001; Freeman & Nickell, 1988; Siebert, 
1997). 
In addition to labor market institutions varying widely by country, substantial 
variation in these institutions also occurs between the various states or provinces inside 
some countries. This can clearly be seen in countries with a federalist system, which 
grants substantial governing power to individual states or provinces, such as in the U.S. 
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and Canada (Karabegovic et aI., 2005). For example, in the U.S., states can enact their 
own minimum wage laws4, set right-to-work laws, determine acceptable firing practices, 
and determine on what basis firms may discriminate in employment (Colvin, 2000; 
Karabegovic et aI., 2005). 
3.3. LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND NEW FIRMS 
As discussed, labor market institutions have a broad impact on labor market 
outcomes, affecting working conditions, employee wages (Freeman, 1998), firm 
profitability (Voos & Mishel, 1986), unemployment levels (Siebert, 1997), and worker 
productivity (Addison & Barnett, 1982). Labor market institutions have a substantial 
impact on firms, and new firms are no exception. However, labor market institutions 
may playa greater role in influencing hiring and firing in new firms for several reasons. 
New firms also are generally small, lack resources., and do not have as easy access to 
capital as more established firms (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994). 
Furthermore, new firms have a substantial need for additional resources in order to grow. 
New firms are often not yet profitable and cannot use their profits to fund expansion; 
therefore, they often must rely on external resources to operate and grow. Due to these 
resource constraints, increased labor cost of any sort may lead to new firms be less 
willing to hire workers and more willing to layoff workers than older firms. 
4 Although states do enact minimum wage laws, they are not able to enact a minimum wage lower than the 
federal minimum wage in the United States. Thus, fIrms in states that have no minimum wage laws or 
minimum wages below the federal minimum wage must pay the federal minimum wage. 
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To examine how labor market institutions impact new firms, I examine how 
minimum wages, as well as unionization levels and unemployment tax policies, influence 
the employment levels of new firms. 
Minimum Wages 
The first national minimum wage in the u.s. of25 cents per hour was enacted by 
the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938 (Grossman, 1978). Some individual states adopted a 
minimum wage prior to the Fair Labor Standard Aet, but often these rules only applied to 
children and/or female workers (Leonard, 2000). Even though a national minimum wage 
is in effect in the u.S. today, many states have their own minimum wage rates as well 
(Karabegovic et ai., 2005). In 2009, all but five states had their own minimum wages, 
although some had rates below the federal minimum wage. Washington state had the 
highest minimum wage at $8.55 per hour, while the federal minimum wage was 
increased to $7.25 that year (United States Department of Labor, 2009). 
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that all else being equal, a higher 
minimum wage will lead to lower levels of employment and higher levels of 
unemployment (Stigler, 1946). Increases in the minimum wage raise the marginal cost of 
each additional employee; as a result, firms reduce the number of employees. Most 
empirical studies have found a negative relationship between increases in the minimum 
wage and employment (Baker, Benjamin, & Stanger, 1999; Neumark & Wascher, 2000). 
Generally, a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment 
between zero to three percent (Brown, Gilroy, & Kohen, 1982). 
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A few studies have found insignificant or positive relationships between 
minimum wages and employment levels (Card & Krueger, 1994; Card & Krueger, 1995; 
Dickens, Machin, & Manning, 1999). Explanations include monopsony labor markets, or 
countervailing forces that could minimize or eliminate a negative relationship between 
minimum wages and employment. These include possible "shock effects" in which 
employers react to increases in the minimum wage by raising their workers' productivity 
to compensate for the increased minimum wage (Brown et aI., 1982) as well as the 
possibility that firms reduce employee compensation in other ways (Brown & Crossman, 
2000). Finally, the "hungry teenager" hypothesis notes that increases in the minimum 
wage will lead to increased earnings among teenagers (Kennan, 1995; Zavodny, 1998). 
Because teenagers often spend their money at places such as fast food restaurants that 
employ workers at the minimum wage, the demand curve for low skilled labor is shifted 
right (Antonova & Tudoreanu, 2009). Thus, employment levels do not change or change 
very little because of minimum wage increases. 
Several researchers have questioned the findings of the studies by Card and 
Krueger (1994, 1995) and have reexamined these studies empirically. Card and Krueger's 
(1995) study of the 1990-1991 minimum wage increase found no relationship between 
minimum wages and teenage employment. However, Wessels' (2007) replication of the 
analysis applying the Card and Krueger (1995) model to the 1996-1997 federal minimum 
wage increase found that the higher minimum wage is associated with lower teenage 
employment in states that were more affected by the minimum wage increase. Neumark 
and Wascher (2000) suggest that econometric and measurement issues may have led to 
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an incorrect conclusion in the analysis by Card and Krueger (1994) on the impact of the 
New Jersey minimum wage increase on employment levels in the fast food industry. 
They replicated the analysis using payroll data instead of telephone surveys and generally 
concluded that the minimum wage increase did reduce employment. 
In addition to econometric and measurement issues, one possibility for the 
differing findings in some of the minimum wage n::search is that increases in the 
minimum wage may not affect all firms the same way regarding their hiring and firing 
activities. Rama (2001) examined the case of the minimum wage doubling in Indonesia 
and found that while small firms decreased their employment substantially, large firms 
actually increased employment. Therefore, if minimum wages affect firms with varying 
attributes in different ways, then perhaps the differing results that have been found 
regarding the relationship between minimum wages and employment may be due to 
heterogeneous samples. 
Minimum Wages and New Firms 
Minimum wages are likely to increase a finn's labor cost for unskilled employees 
(Gregg, 2000). If the minimum wage rate rises above the marginal revenue generated by 
workers, then they are likely to be laid off (if working for a firm) or not hired (if not 
working for a firm) (Leonard, 2000). Thus, high minimum wages in a state are likely to 
lead to lower levels of employment relative to firms in low minimum wage states. 
Newer firms are likely to behave differently in response to high minimum wages 
than older firms. New firms differ from established firms in that they may not currently 
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be generating much revenue from their employees and thus may not have access to 
needed capital, even if it can be invested productively. When firms are new, employees 
may be working on activities that may not necessarily be profitable for the firm in the 
short-term, but may be in the long-term. For example, a new restaurant may be paying 
employees a wage (marginal cost) that exceeds the additional revenue that employee 
actually generates for the firm (marginal revenue). That is because firm may have few 
initial customers, but wants to keep a sufficient number of employees on the payroll to 
ensure that customers receive prompt service. Doing so may allow the firm to be 
successful in the future, as satisfied customers become repeat customers of the business 
and tell their acquaintances about the positive expt:rience they had. 
Although the marginal revenue generated by an employee may exceed their 
marginal cost, the cost is realized immediately while the revenue may not be realized 
until far into the future. This would not be particularly problematic if capital markets 
worked efficiently; the new firm would simply bOITOW the money they needed to hire 
such workers and pay it back later. However, given evidence that small and new firms 
face liquidity constraints (Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994:; Johansson, 2000), increased labor cost 
may lead to new firms limiting the number of people that they employ, even when 
employing a greater number of people would be profitable in the end. 
Several other factors may make high minimum wages particularly problematic for 
new firms as well. New firms are typically small, and small firms typically pay lower 
wages than large firms (Brown & Medoff, 1989; Idson & Feaster, 1990; Morissette, 
1993; Winter-Ebmer, 2001). Therefore, these fimls are likely to have a larger percentage 
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of their workers earning the minimum wage, making high minimum wages more costly to 
these firms. Small, new firms often operate in markets that are known as 
"hypercompetitive," and firms in these types of markets have low profit margins, making 
their ability to deal with high labor cost difficult (Jones et aI., 2004; Ram et aI., 2007). 
Although traditional economic theory prediicts that a number of negative 
consequences may result from high minimum wages, others argue that the actions that 
firms take in responding to increased minimum wages may be hard to predict 
(Arrowsmith et aI., 2003). Despite the fact that high minimum wages may be a major 
burden for new firms, sometimes they may be able: to respond to high minimum wages in 
creative ways and avoid having to reduce the number of workers that they employ. 
Contracts between employers and employees can be renegotiated to avoid or minimize 
the impact ofthe minimum wage on the firm (Arrowsmith et aI., 2003). One way this is 
done is through circumventing the law. For example, informal arrangements may be 
made in which employees work "off the books," that is, are not registered as employees, 
and receive wages paid in cash. Employers could pay these workers' wages below the 
minimum wage. Employees may agree to such arrangements when they are threatened 
with termination, if they receive other benefits (such as tax benefits) from the 
arrangement, or have few alternatives for employment (such as in the case of illegal 
immigrants). Furthermore, ties between the employer and employees, especially in 
groups of ethnic minorities, may serve to enforce these sorts of arrangements (Jones et 
aI., 2004; Ram et aI., 2007). Because new firms are typically small and lack formal 
human resources practices (Cardon & Stevens, 2004; Wager, 1998), informally 
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renegotiating such contracts, even when technically illegal, is likely to be much easier 
than in more established firms that have formal human resource procedures. Even if 
employers agree to pay a high minimum wage, they may change other parts of the 
employment contract to compensate for the extra payment. For example, firms may 
require employees to work harder and be subject to more critical employee reviews 
(Arrowsmith et aI., 2003). Firms can cut employee pay in other ways, such as offering 
fewer vacation days, less paid overtime, and fewer employee discounts and making 
breaks unpaid (Brown & Crossman, 2000). 
Although new firms certainly may adapt substantially to high minimum wages 
using a number of techniques, it seems unlikely that new firms will be able to adapt to 
minimum wages so well that their employment levels will not be affected. Thus, high 
minimum wages are likely to exert a negative impact on employment levels in new firms. 
HI: New firms operating in states with higher minimum wages will have 
lower employment growth than new firms operating in states with lower 
minimum wages. 
Union Protections and Union Density 
Union density, the percentage of workers that are represented by unions, varies 
dramatically among U.s. states. In 2008, the percentage of employees represented by 
unions in the U.s. ranged from a low of 4.6% of workers in Georgia to 26.6% of workers 
in New York, with an average of 12.9% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). 
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The level of unionization in a region is likely influenced by statutory laws, such 
as legal protections, cultural acceptance of unions, as well as the type of industries in the 
region. One way it is thought that state governments can influence the prevalence of 
unionization in their states is through enacting (or failing to enact) right-to-work laws. 
Right-to-work laws remove the requirement to join a union to get or maintain a job 
(Lumsden & Petersen, 1975). The Taft-Hartley act passed in 1947 allowed individual 
states in the u.s. to pass right-to-work laws if they chose. As of2009 22 states had right-
to-work laws (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010). 
Some research has found little or no relationship between right-to-work laws and 
unionization levels (Wessels, 1981), while others have found a negative relationship 
(Ellwood & Fine, 1987; Moore, 1998). Even when a relationship is observed between 
union density and the presence of right-to-work laws, it is difficult to say that the 
presence of right-to-work laws causes union density to decrease. The relationship may be 
endogenous because many of the states that have enacted right-to-work laws are states in 
which unions were not strong to begin with (Farber, 1984; Moore & Newman, 1985) and 
therefore have less political power. Conversely, states with traditionally high levels of 
union membership and union power, such as Pennsylvania and Michigan, have not 
enacted right-to-work laws. Thus, a simultaneity bias problemS seems to exist in which it 
is not clear whether right-to-work laws lead to lower levels of unionization or whether 
low levels of unionization leads to less opposition to right-to-work laws, making their 
5 A simultaneity bias (or reverse causality) is a form of endogeneity in which the dependent variable may 
also influence the independent variable. Endogeneity may also occur due to an omitted variable that 
influences the dependent variable and also is correlated with one or more of the independent variables 
(Verbeek, 2008). 
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enactment more likely. However, Davis and Huston (1995) and Moore (1998) both 
found that right-to-work laws are associated with lower union densities even when 
accounting for the simultaneity bias problem. 
Another factor likely to influence the level of unionization is a region's culture. 
Culture not only influences how favorably a socie~y views unions but also affects the 
enactment of laws that may be beneficial (or not) to unions. Cultural measures of 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and power distance are significant 
predictors of union density, with cultures that value masculinity and accept inequity 
displaying low union densities (Singh, 2001). Public support for unionization may relate 
to union density as well. Lower public support for unions during the 1980s occurred 
during a period of substantial decline in private sector union density (Palley & 
Lajeunesse, 2007). In addition to formal institutions and culture, the level of 
unionization in a region is influenced by the types of industries and industry structure that 
are prevalent in the region. Unionization has generally been higher in areas associated 
with manufacturing, such as the Northeast and Midwest regions of the U.S. 
(Kokkelenberg & Sockell, 1985). Conversely, areas with traditionally low levels of 
manufacturing, such as the Southeast and Great Plains regions, have had lower union 
densities. 
Researchers have examined the effects of unionization on firms as well. 
Unionization tends to lead to higher wages (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; K woka Jr, 1983; 
Stewart, 1990), and higher wages provide incentives for firms to substitute capital in 
place oflabor, raising productivity (Addison & Barnett, 1982). However, any 
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relationship between unionization and worker productivity is likely confounded by a 
selection effect. Because firms that are unionized pay more for workers, they likely will 
only select the highest quality workers to hire (Addison & Barnett, 1982). 
It is often argued that unionization of a firm's workforce will have a negative 
impact on firm profitability. Unionized workers tc:::nd to get paid more than non-
unionized workers (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 1983; Stewart, 1990), which 
could lead to firms either raising prices or having lower profits. Voos and Mishel (1986) 
find that unions in the supermarket industry substantially reduce profits of supermarkets 
and this effect is more pronounced when there is a high level of concentration in local 
markets. Likewise, evidence from Britain suggests that unions have a negative impact on 
firm profitability (Menezes-Filho, 1997). A study of U.S. firms found that unionized 
firms had profitability that was 10%-15% lower than firms that were not unionized 
(Hirsch, 1991). High levels of unionization also have a strong negative impact on the 
level of new business activity within states (Bartik, 1985). 
Union Density and New Firms 
Because unionized workers typically are paid more than non-unionized workers 
are, a firm's cost are likely to be higher if its workforce is unionized (Bratsberg & Ragan 
Jr, 2002; Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Thus, unionization leads to more expensive workers 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1987), and firms that hire unionized 
workers tend to hire fewer workers and to substitute capital for labor (Clark, 1984). This 
effect may be particularly pronounced in new firms that become unionized because these 
firms are often small and weak and yet may have to negotiate with an established labor 
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union (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). However, when firms start, typically their workforce 
is not unionized, even if the firm operates in an industry or geographical region that is 
heavily unionized. This is because it is difficult for workers to unionize in small, new 
firms (Acs & Audretsch, 1989; Miller & Mulvey, 1996), which typically have few 
employees, a large percentage which are part-time (Belanger & Murray, 1994; Galarneau, 
1996). Even if the new firm is located in a state that has labor institutions favorable to 
union organizing, it is unlikely that the firm's employees will unionize until the firm has 
grown larger. 
However, the presence of high union densities in the state in which a firm 
operates could affect a new firm in a couple of ways. As a firm grows, there may be 
more pressure for the employees to unionize. In comparison to non-unionized workers, 
unionized workers typically earn higher salaries for similar jobs (Christie, 2007; Freeman 
& Medoff, 1984; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1987; Komfeld, 1993). Therefore, this pressure 
may cause the owner(s) to avoid growing too large, keeping the firm small to avoid 
unionization. A high level of unionization in the firm's region can hurt new firms in 
other ways even if the firm's employees are not unionized and cannot realistically 
threaten organizing. Because unionized firms must pay higher wages anyway, they are 
likely to hire the highest quality workers (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Mellow, 1981). 
Unionized firms are likely to pay these highly qualified workers well, thus new firms 
may have more difficulty obtaining high-quality workers at a reasonable cost in states 
that have high union densities. 
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Alternatively, high union densities in a stat,e could be favorable to new firms 
because they are unlikely to be unionized due to their size and youth; whereas, larger 
established firms in the state more likely will be (Acs & Audretsch, 1989; Miller & 
Mulvey, 1996). Thus, when union densities are high, many existing firms in the state 
may have labor costs that are relatively high in comparison to new firms operating in the 
state, which are likely not unionized. Also, if unions are successful in negotiating high 
wages for their employees, firms that are unionized will tend to hire fewer employees 
than they otherwise would (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). However, nonunionized firms 
will not have this disincentive to hire. 
It has been observed that small firms typically pay lower wages than larger firms 
(Brown & Medoff, 1989; Idson & Feaster, 1990; Morissette, 1993; Winter-Ebmer, 2001). 
Although there are several reasons for this, the fact that small firms are often not 
unionized may contribute to this observed difference. The higher labor cost experienced 
by some incumbent firms that are unionized will likely lead to limited hiring of 
employees due to the high cost of hiring well-paid unionized workers, while new firms 
that are not unionized will not be forced to limit their hiring due to high union wages. 
Because new firms that are not unionized will not have to pay a high wage for labor, they 
will likely increase employment levels as they are able given their capital, revenue, and 
need for labor. 
Compared to new firms in regions in which union densities are relatively low, 
new firms in areas of high union densities may tend to hire more employees. New firms 
will likely have an advantage in labor cost relative to existing firms that are likely to be 
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unionized (Clark, 1984). Therefore, new finns will be able to grow and expand their 
employment at the cost of existing incumbent finns. New finns in states with low union 
densities will have no such advantage. 
H2: New firms operating in states with higher union densities will have 
higher employment growth than new firms operating in states with lower 
union densities. 
Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment insurance is insurance that pays workers a portion of their wages 
in the event that their job is involuntarily tenninated6. The "premium" for this insurance 
is paid for by the finn for which an individual works. Unemployment insurance 
programs are joint federal-state programs, and states set their own unemployment tax 
schedules that they collect from employers (Anderson & Meyer, 1993). Unemployment 
insurance taxes are often levied on finns based upon the number of employees they have 
(Padgitt, 2009). This is essentially a tax on employment, which increases the cost of 
labor for finns. In addition to affecting incentives to seek employment, unemployment 
insurance is also likely to influence the hiring and firing behavior of finns, especially 
because they are forced to pay the insurance premiums. Therefore, high premiums may 
work as a disincentive for finns to hire workers because it makes each employee more 
expensive. However, the incidence of the tax may be borne by workers. Anderson and 
Meyer (1993) found that high unemployment insurance premiums are absorbed by 
workers in the fonn of lower wages, minimizing any negative impact on hiring. 
6 Generally, the termination cannot be due to a disciplinary action to receive unemployment insurance. 
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Unemployment Insurance and New Firms 
Because states' policies regarding unemployment insurance vary (Anderson & 
Meyer, 1993), the level and structure of unemployment insurance taxes in a state may 
influence the employment levels of new firms. Typically, firms must pay unemployment 
insurance taxes for every worker that they employ. The structure of how these taxes are 
calculated tends to vary from state to state, and their determination can be complicated. 
The actual rates charged are a function of the statutory ranges that each state sets, the 
amount of money in the state unemployment fund, the industry in which the firm 
competes, and the firm's past experience with regards to worker layoffs (Padgitt, 2009). 
States make several choices when determining unemployment tax rates and these 
rates may have a substantial financial impact on firms. First, policymakers decide the 
maximum and minimum rates that firms can be charged (Padgitt, 2009). States also 
determine the degree to which employee layoffs will affect the insurance premiums. 
When unemployment insurance benefits are successfully collected by a worker, the 
benefits that they receive are charged to the worker's former employer(s) using a formula 
determined by the state. Thus, the amount that a fiirm pays is somewhat dependent on the 
frequency in which its former employees have qualified for unemployment benefits. In 
some states, a firm that terminates an employee is charged for the benefits that worker 
receive, thus penalizing firms when they downsize: their workforce. Other states charge 
all of the worker's former employers over some span of time (such as the past year) or 
charge all of the former employers of the worker over a span of time in proportion to the 
amount of wages that that the worker earned from each employer (Padgitt, 2009). 
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Unemployment tax structures that heavily penalize downsizing films make labor 
cost a quasi-fixed cost. Thus, when making employment decisions, firms will not only 
consider current marginal revenue and marginal cost but also will consider future 
production levels (Oi, 1962). An unemployment tax structure in which charges for all the 
unemployment benefits when layoffs occur will be particularly burdensome (Padgitt, 
2009) and is likely to reduce the incentive of firms to hire employees if they think that 
they will have to layoff these workers in the future:. Likewise, new firms will be 
discouraged from hiring workers when the unemployment tax rates are high, due to their 
lack of capital and the difficulty they have obtaining it (Blanchard & Tirole, 2008). 
H3: New firms operating in states with unemployment taxes that are high 
and that penalize firms for worker layoffs will have lower employment 
growth than new firms operating in statf:S with unemployment taxes that are 
low and that do not penalize firms for worker layoffs. 
3.4. METHODS AND RESULTS 
Sample 
Firm data are obtained from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), which is a 
longitudinal survey of new firms. To find firms to participate in the KFS, firms are 
randomly selected from Dun and Bradstreet's database of new businesses started in 2004 
(Fairlie & Robb, 2009). To be eligible to participate in the KFS, firms had to perform at 
least one the following activities in 2004 and could not have performed any of these in 
the previous year (2003): 
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o Payment of state unemployment taxes. 
o Payment of FICA taxes. 
o Presence of a legal status for the business. 
o Use of an Employer Identification Number 
o Use of Schedule C to report business income on a personal tax return. 
These criteria were adopted to assure that firms selected to participate in the KFS were 
actually new firms that were beginning operations. 
Data for the baseline survey were collected from July 2005 to July 2006 from 
principals representing 4,928 new firms that were started in 2004 (DesRoches et aI., 
2009). Respondents were paid $50 to complete th(~ survey to ensure a high response rate. 
Approximately 77% of respondents completed the survey using Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing (CAT!) while 23% completed the internet survey. Plans were 
made to collect multiple waves of data after the baseline survey, and to date, four 
subsequent waves have been collected and are used in the analysis. In subsequent waves, 
respondents also had a choice whether to use CAT! or the internet to complete the survey 
and were paid an additional $50 for each wave of data collection in which they 
participated. Thus, firm-level data for years 2004,2005,2006,2007 and 2008. The 
numbers of surveys completed each year are as follows: 2004 = 4,928; 2005 = 3,998; 
2006 = 3,390; 2007 = 2,915 and 2008 = 2,606 (Ka.uffman Foundation, 2011). This totals 
to 17,837 observations. Thus, 18.9 % of initial respondents were lost for wave 2, 15.2% 
for wave 3, 14.0% for wave 4, and 10.6% for wave 5. A cumulative loss of 47.12 % of 
initial firms was experienced by wave 5. 
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One limitation to the Kauffman Firm Survey data for this research is that it 
contains an oversample of high-technology firms. High-technology firms are quite 
different from low-technology firms in that that they have a need for workers that have 
high levels of human capital and these firms spend significant resources further 
developing the human capital of their employees (Baldwin & Gellatly, 1998; Darby, Liu, 
& Zucker, 1999). Conversely, many low-technology firms, such as retailers and 
restaurants, tend to hire many workers with lower levels of human capital. For low-
technology firms hiring lower-skilled workers, substantial minimum wages are likely to 
have a large impact on the cost of hiring additional employees (Partridge & Partridge, 
1999). Conversely, in high-technology firms, high minimum wages are not likely to 
substantially increase the cost of labor because the types of employees they typically hire 
are earning wages far in excess of the minimum wage. Growth in employees for high-
technology firms will likely be driven by firm needs, with minimum wages having little 
impact on decisions to hire additional employees. Thus, the high-technology firms are 
removed from the data. Additionally, firms in the medical, insurance and finance 
industries are removed as well. Specifically, all firms in industries starting with "5" in 
their NAICS codes are removed (51 = information; 52 = finance and insurance; 53 = real 
estate and rental leasing; 54 = professional, scientific, and technical services; 55 = 
management of companies and enterprises; 56 = administrative and support and waste 
management and remediation services. Industries starting with 61 (educational services), 
62 (health care and social assistance), and 90 (public administration) were also removed. 
For a count of firms remaining in the sample by industry, see Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Observations by '~ave & Industry 
Industry Baseline Follow Up 1 Follow Up 2 Follow Up 3 Follow Up 
(NAICS) 4 
11 40 34 31 28 28 
21-23 391 311 270 234 210 
31-33 703 590 510 453 394 
42-49 884 659 550 461 402 
71 200 153 125 110 106 
81 444 360 316 264 251 
Total 2,662 2,107 1,802 1,550 1,391 
This leaves 2,662 observations in the baseline wave, 2,107 observations in the 
first follow up wave, 1,802 observations in the second follow up wave, 1,550 
observations in the third follow up wave, and 1,391 in the fourth follow up wave. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable 
The KFS dataset contains data on the number of employees the firm has in each 
of the waves in which data were collected. In the baseline wave, only about 40% of all 
firms had employees, although this increases in subsequent waves. In addition to the 
baseline wave, data on employment were collected on the four follow-up waves; 
therefore, employment data will be available for 21004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 
(DesRoches et aI., 2009). Because the number of lemployees is highly right skewed, a 
natural log transformation is used to make the distribution more normal. 
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Independent Variables 
The independent variables of interest are the labor market institutions of the state 
in which a firm resides. Three state-level labor market measures are used for each year: 
(1) the minimum wages, (2) union densities, and (3) and an index that reflects how 
burdensome the unemployment tax systems are for firms. I obtained minimum wage data 
for u.s. states from the u.s. Department of Labor (2010). I then calculated the 
difference between the state minimum wage and the federal minimum wage. I obtained 
union densities values from the Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Census Bureau (2010). Union densities are based on 
union coverage, not union membership. This provides a better measure of what 
percentages of workers receive the benefits of unionization, regardless of whether they 
are union members. I obtained unemployment tax data from the Tax Foundation, which 
provides an index that scores how costly the unemployment tax is on businesses for each 
state (Padgitt, 2009). The score takes into account the range of the possible tax rates as 
well as how the taxes are allocated to firms. High scores represent states with 
unemployment taxes that are low and that do not overly penalize employers for laying off 
workers. States with high values on this index have unemployment insurance 
"premiums" or taxes that are less costly to firms than states with low values. 
Control Variables 
The industry in which a firm competes will determine how fast a firm grows as 
well as its need for labor (Farinas & Moreno, 2000; Hall, 1987). Service firms, which 
include restaurants and retailers, rely on large amounts of cheap, unskilled labor more 
107 
likely to be earning the minimum wage (Card, 1992; Kim & Taylor, 1995). To control 
for the firm's industry, I created a series of dummy variables to represent the NAICS 
code for the firm's industry using the first digit of the NAICS code. The omitted NAICS 
code is industry 4 (retail trade, wholesale trade, and transportation and warehousing) I 
used a measure for competitive advantage taken from the following question in the KFS 
survey: "Businesses often have to compete with other businesses. A competitive 
advantage is something unique or distinctive a business provides that gives it an 
advantage compared to competitors. In calendar year __ , did name of business have a 
competitive advantage over its competitors?" The dummy variable representing 
competitive advantage is coded as follows: 1 = competitive advantage; 0 = no 
competitive advantage. 
High state unemployment rates may also influence a firm's level of employment 
because high unemployment may signifY poor economic conditions that may make it 
unprofitable to hire and maintain a high number of employees. Thus, I controlled for 
state-level unemployment rates using the state-level unemployment rate obtained from 
the U.S. Department of Labor for the years 2004-2008. 
Analysis 
I hypothesize that state-level labor market factors will influence the employment 
level in new firms located in those states. The firms in the sample are clustered in states; 
thus, state-level factors may influence how quickly firms grow. This creates a problem 
for regular OLS regression because the firm observations are not independent and errors 
are likely to be correlated among firms within the same state (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
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2002). Furthennore, these data are longitudinal; data collected over time from the same 
finns are likely to be correlated as well (Bliese, 20(9). Thus, the repeated observations 
are nested within finns, and finns are nested within state. Thus, to perfonn these 
analyses, random coefficient multilevel (RCM) growth modeling is used (Bliese & 
Ployhart, 2002; Holcomb, Combs, Sinnon, & Sexton, 2010). I perfonn the analysis in 
SAS using the PROC GLIMMIX procedure. 
There are several advantages to using RCM growth modeling over other 
approaches of dealing with nested data. This allows finn-level control variables to be 
added to the model (Luke, 2004), such as the finn's line of business or presence of a 
competitive advantage. Although finn-level attributes could be aggregated for each state, 
aggregation can be problematic (Luke, 2004; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). When 
aggregation is used, much of the variability for the dependent variable is lost, leading to 
the relationships between variables possibly to be substantially over- or under-estimated. 
Several previous studies in the management literature have used RCM to test both levels 
and time (Holcomb, Combs, Sinnon, & Sexton, 2010; Short, Ketchen Jr, Bennett, & du 
Toit, 2006). Short et al. (2006) examined how industry- and finn-level factors influence 
finn perfonnance over time. Likewise, Holcomb et al. (2010) used RCM to examine 
how industry factors and growth strategies affect the perfonnance of post-I PO finns. The 
model that I propose similarly contains three levels: within-finns (repeated measures over 
time), between-finns within-states, and between-states. 
To test the hypotheses, I follow a model-building process similar to that 
recommended by Bliese & Ployhart (2002). This first involves running an unconditional 
109 
(null) model in which the variability in the dependent variable is partitioned to the 
different levels (time, firm, and state). Once the variance is partitioned among the levels, 
interclass correlations (ICCs) can be calculated to determine if the higher levels (firms 
and states) have a meaningful level of variability. The second step involves determining 
the fixed function for time. I test a linear, quadratk, and cubic trend to see what trend 
best describes employee growth in the new firms for the sampled period. The third step 
involves determining the variability in growth parameters; in other words, determining 
which of the growth parameters selected in step two should have random coefficients. 
Fourth, different error structures are compared, and the one that has the least amount of 
model misfit is selected. This is an important step because longitudinal data may have 
error structures that are correlated and heterogeneous. Finally, the independent variables 
of interest are added, and the analysis is performed so that the hypothesized relationships 
can be tested. 
To allow for the comparison of model fit among models, full information 
maximum likelihood estimation (FIML) is used to estimate the fixed and random effects 
(O'Connell & McCoach, 2007). All dichotomous variables are uncentered while the 
continuous variables are grand-mean centered. 
The need for using RCM modeling and how many distinct levels are needed in the 
analysis can be assessed by calculating intraclass correlations (ICCs). Intraclass 
correlations are calculated to see how variance in the dependent variable can be explained 
by the different levels of analysis in the proposed multilevel model. I first run an 
unconditional (null) model in which the variability in the dependent variable is 
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partitioned to the different levels. The intraclass correlations can be seen in Table 3.2. 
The intraclass correlations show how the variability in the dependent variable is 
explained by the three proposed levels: states, firm within states, and time points within 
firms. For states, it is around 0%. This indicates that substantially none of the variance 
in firm employment is due to state differences. The intraclass correlation for firms is 
.7067 indicating that 70.67 % of the variance in number of employees is at the firm level. 
The remaining 24.83% of the variance is within firms across time. The intraclass 
correlation for firms is substantial enough that failure to account for this clustering could 
inflate the standard errors of the parameter estimates (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998), 
indicating that random coefficient multilevel modeling is an appropriate analysis 
technique in this circumstance. However, because there is no variability among states 
with regard to firm employment, I do not model this level in the multi-level model. Thus, 
a model is used consisting of only two-levels: (1) firms and (2) time. 
Table 3.2 Intraclass Correlations 
Covariance Parameter Estimate Percentage of Total 
Variance 
Among States .0000 0% 
Among Firms within States .7067 74% 
With Firms Over Time .2483 26% 
Total .9550 
The next step is to determine the fixed function for time (Bliese & Ployhart, 
2002). In RCM growth modeling, there a number of possible growth trajectories that the 
dependent variable can take. Using theory and examining the data can help determine the 
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proper growth trajectory that should be modeled. Common growth trajectories include 
linear, quadratic, and cubic. Linear trends are the simplest type of growth trajectory and 
involve growth that follows a straight line over time. The slope of the growth trajectory 
is constant over time. Modeling this type of growth involves only including a linear 
"wave" term in the level-l model. A quadratic growth trend is one in which the slope 
(rate of growth) changes over time, leveling off and then becoming negative (Singer & 
Willett,2003). Modeling quadratic growth trends require including both a linear term as 
well as the linear term squared. A cubic growth trend is a higher- order growth trend that 
has two stationary points, such as a peak and a trough (Singer & Willett, 2003). I 
examine the growth trajectory of the firm employment variable by the use of significance 
tests. The average growth trajectory for all firms included in the KFS survey can be seen 
in Figure 3.1 
Figure 3.1: Average Firm Employment by Wave 
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Visually, the growth trend appears to be approximately quadratic. I run the model 
as a linear, quadratic and cubic growth models. The results can be seen in Table 3.3. In 
the linear model, the linear term coefficient is .0891 is significantly different from zero (p 
< .0001). In the quadratic model, both the coefficient for the linear term is .2767 and 
significantly different from zero (p < .0001). The coefficient for the squared term is-
.0509 is also significantly different from zero (p < .0001). In the cubic model, the linear 
term (.3912;p < .0001) squared term (-.1352;p < .0001) and cubed term (.0144;p < 
.0001) are significantly different from zero. Also, the cubic model has the lowest AIC 
(18,201) and BIC (18,242) ofthe three models. This indicates the cubic model offers the 
best fit. Thus, I model employment growth as a eubic growth curve. 
Table 3.3: Growth Trends 
Linear Model Quadratic Model Cubic Model 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept .5433 <.0001 .4733 <.0001 .4615 <.0001 
Linear .0891 <.0001 .2767 <.0001 .3912 <.0001 
Quadratic -.0509 <.0001 -.1353 <.0001 
Cubic .01442 <.0001 
Fit Statistics 
-2 Log 18583.13 18219.75 18187.14 
Likelihood 
Generalized 1575.41 1466.57 1458.27 
Chi-Square 
Gen. Chi- .17 .15 .15 
Square/ DF 
AIC 18593.13 18231.75 18201.14 
BIC 18622.58 18267.10 18242.37 
In addition to determining what growth tn~ectories should be included in the 
model, there is also the decision to which growth terms should be allowed random 
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coefficients. The linear, quadratic, and cubed terms are allowed to vary randomly by 
firm. However, the random effects of the quadratic and cubic term did not substantially 
improve fit. However, the fit is improved when the linear term was allowed to vary by 
firm, and hence it is allowed to vary by firm in the model. 
The next step is to determine the error structure of the model. With longitudinal 
data, errors are likely to be correlated, and if this is not accounted for, significance test 
may be inaccurate (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). I ran models with two different types of 
error structures: autoregressive and unstructured. The results can be seen Table 3.4. 
Comparing the autoregressive model to the previous model, which did not have 
the error structure modeled, the autoregressive model actually has worse fit. The Chi-
Square increased from 1,458 to 1,534, the AIC from 18,201 to 20,371, and BIC from 
18,242 to 20,426. Thus, the autoregressive model does not appear to be an improvement 
to not modeling the error structure. The unstructured model did have superior fit 
compared to the previous model without a modeled error structure. While the Chi-Square 
increased from 1,458 to 1,481, the AIC decreased from 18,201 to 18,183 and BIC 
decreased from 18,242 to 18,230. Thus, the unstructured error model is used. 
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Table 3.4: Error Structures 
Autoregressive Model Unstructured Model 
Cov. Parameter Estimate SE Cov. Parameter Estimate SE 
Variance .2870 .2870 UN(1,I) .6043 .0198 
AR(I) Residual .0794 .0794 U1-.J(2,1) .0206 .0044 
Residuai .1621 .1621 UN(2,2) .0312 .0019 
Rt:sidual .1565 .0033 
Fit Statistics Fit Statistics 
-2 Log 20370.81 -2 Log Likelihood 18166.70 
Likelihood 
Generalized 1533.60 Generalized Chi- 1481.08 
Chi-Square Square 
Gen. Chi- .16 Gen. Chi-Square/ .16 
Square/ DF DF 
AIC 20384.81 AIC 18182.70 
AICC 20384.82 AICC 18182.71 
BIC 20426.04 BIC 18229.82 
The final step is examining the hypothesized relationships. Originally, I planned 
to build a three-level model consisting of levels for time, firms, and states. However, 
because there was not a substantial amount of variance accounted for by the, it was 
dropped in favor a of a two-level model. Below, equations 1-3 display the equations 
associated with this model. 
(1) LNEMPLOYEESti = 1tOi + 1tliW A YEti + 11:2 W A VE2ti + 1t3 W A VE3ti + 
1t4MINWAGEti + 1tsUNEMPLOYMENTRATEti + 1t6GDPPCti + 
LNEmployeesti represents the natural log of the number of employees in time t for 
firm i. 1tOi represents the initial employment level of firm i (the employment level of firm 
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i in year 0). 7tli represents the slope coefficient for variable W A YEti. which is the slope 
of the change trajectory for firm i, holding all else constant. The variable WAVE is 
coded 0 for 2004, 1 for 2005, 2 for 2006, 3 for 2007 and 4 for 2008. The term W A VE2ti 
is the wave term squared and WAVE3ti is the linear term cubed, which together with the 
W A YEti term models the cubic growth in employment among the new firms in the 
sample. 
Also included in equation 1 are the state-level variables that vary across time. 
These include the minimum wage, union density, unemployment insurance index, gross 
domestic product per capita, and unemployment rate. 
There are two level-two equations, one for the intercept term (7ro;) and one for the 
slope term for the linear growth term (7rli) of the Ievel-1 equation. 
(2) 7tOi = ~OOk +rOi 
In equation 2, ~oo represents the mean initial level of employment for firms. rOi 
represents how firm i deviates from this mean. This equation contains no predictors 
because the initial level of employment is not of interest. However, this value is allowed 
to vary for each firm because firms will have different starting levels of employment. 
In equation 3, ~1O represents the mean annual employment growth, holding all 
else constant. This equation contains the firm-level variables that may predict a firm's 
employment growth, such as competitive advantage and industry dummy variables, and 
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their corresponding slope values. These variables should be constant throughout time, 
thus are specified as time invariant using the value from time o. 
Results 
The descriptive statistics for all variables are displayed in Table 3.5. The 
correlations between these variables are displayed in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
LN(Number of 9,326 .6907 .9904 
Employees) 
Industry 11 9,326 .0167 .1283 
Industry 21-23 9,326 .1488 .3559 
Industry 31-33 9,326 .2824 .4502 
Industry 42-49 9,326 .3073 .4614 
Industry 71 9,326 .0727 .2597 
Industry 81 9,326 .1720 .3774 
Competitive Advantage 9,326 .6471 .4779 
Unemployment Rate 250 4.798 1.126 
GDP Per Capita 250 35,806 6,400 
Union Density 250 12.624 5.544 
Unemployment 250 4.998 .8961 
Insurance Burden 
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Next, I perform an analysis on two models: (1) control model containing only 
control variables, (2) and a model examining the hypothesized state-level effects. 
The results for the control model are displayed in Table 3.7, and the results for the full 
model are in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.7: Control Model 
Variable Coefficient SE DF I-value p-value 
Intercept .4686 .01781 2630 26.31 <.0001 
Linear Trend .3937 .02568 6684 15.33 <.0001 
Quad Trend -.1442 .01578 6684 -9.14 <.0001 
Cubic Trend .01658 .00283 6696 5.87 <.0001 
Unemployment -.01684 .01209 6684 -1.39 .1635 
Rate 
GDP Per Capita -.000001 -.000003 6684 -.58 .5611 
Competitive -.00780 .01092 6684 -.71 .4750 
Advantage 
Industry 1 -.03869 .04025 6684 -.96 .3365 
Industry 2 .02102 .01648 6684 1.28 .2021 
Industry 3 .04081 .01355 6684 3.01 .0026 
Industry 7 -.00856 .02150 6684 -.40 .6905 
Industry 8 -.03828 .01563 6684 -2.45 .0143 
Fit Indices 





Table 3.8: Full Model 
Variable Coefficient SE DF t-value p-value 
Intercept .4969 .01792 2629 26.21 <.0001 
Linear .3906 .02576 6682 15.16 <.0001 
Quad -.1409 .01610 6682 -8.75 <.0001 
Cubic .01581 .00291 6682 5.43 <.0001 
Unemployment -.00850 .01278 6682 -.66 .5061 
Rate 
GDP Per Capita .000002 .000004 6682 .57 .5676 
Competitive -.00761 .01092 6682 -.70 .4857 
Advantage 
Industry 1 -.03857 .04027 6682 -.96 .3382 
Industry 2 .02095 .01648 6682 1.27 .2039 
Industry 3 .04076 .01355 6682 3.01 .0026 
Industry 7 -.00833 .02151 6682 -.39 .6986 
Industry 8 -.03852 .01564 6682 -2.46 .0138 
Minimum Wage -.00841 .01580 6682 -.53 .5943 
Union Density -.00558 .003258 6682 -1.71 .0869 
Unemployment .00216 .02197 6682 .10 .9216 
Insurance Burden 
Fit Indices 




In addition to the linear, quadratic and cubic trend variables, the control model 
includes industry dummy control variables, as wdl as controls for the unemployment 
rate, GDP per capita, and competitive advantage. 
In the full model in Table 3.8, the results for the hypothesized relationships can be 
seen. In hypothesis 1, a negative relationship is hypothesized between minimum wages 
and firm employment growth; however this hypothesis is not supported (-.0084;p = 
.5943). In hypothesis 2, a positive relationship is predicted between union density and 
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employment growth. A marginally significant relationship is found, but in the opposite 
direction as hypothesized (-.0056;p =.0869). The final hypothesis predicted that an 
unemployment insurance system that is costly and that penalizes firms for worker layoffs 
will lead to less employment growth. However, a significant relationship is not observed 
(.0022;p = .9216). 
Table 3.9: Results Summary 
Hypothesized Relationship Results 
HI New firms operating in states with higher minimum wages Not supported 
will have lower employment growth than new firms 
operating in states with lower minimum wages. 
H2 New firms operating in states with higher union densities Not supported 
will have higher employment growth than new firms 
operating in states with lower union densities. 
H3 New firms operating in states with unemployment taxes Not supported 
that are high and that penalize firms for worker layoffs will 
have lower employment growth than new firms operating 
in states with unemployment taxes that are low and that do 
not penalized firms for worker layoffs. 
3.5. DISCUSSION 
The hypothesis between minimum wages and firm employment did not receive 
support. There are several reasons why a relationship was not observed. First, there has 
been some research indicating that this relationship is not negative (Card and Krueger 
(1994) and there are some theoretically reasons proposed in the literature to why this 
might be (Brown & Crossman, 2000; Kennan, 1995; Zavodny, 1998). Secondly, the 
sample consisted of new firms. One of the justifications of this study is that minimum 
wages may have different effects of new and small firms than incumbent and large firms. 
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Perhaps, as suggested in some of the literature, small firms (which most of the new firms 
in the sample are) have the ability to adapt to changes in minimum wages in a more 
flexible manner than larger firms. Research suggest that they might be able to do this by 
hiring workers "off the books" and paying them a wage below the legal minimum wage 
(Arrowsmith et ai., 2003), or cutting other benefits or vacation time (Brown & Crossman, 
2000). 
The relationship between union density in states and new firm employment 
growth was negative and marginally significant, while a positive relationship was 
hypothesized. This is not particularly surprising however, as a theoretical case can be 
made for either direction. For example, much research has shown that unionization is 
associated with high employee wages (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 1983; 
Stewart, 1990) and lower firm profitability (Voos and Mishel (1986; Hirsch, 1991; 
Menezes-Filho, 1997). Perhaps when new firms are in areas of high unionization, they 
are not immune from threats of unionization, especially as they grow larger. New firms 
may have to pay a higher wage when unioinizationzation is high . They may have to do 
this because their workers have become unionized, or to keep their workers from 
unionizing (Freeman, 1984). Also new firms in regions of high unionization may to pay 
a high wage in order to attract high-quality employees away from unionized jobs. Also, 
strong unionization may reflect other pro-labor institutions that raise the cost of hiring 
additional workers. 
The unemployment insurance burden had a non-significant effect on employment 
growth, even though a negative relationship was hypothesized. This may be due to the 
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fact that paying unemployment insurance premiums may ultimately be a small burden for 
new firms, and therefore may not have a noticeable effect on a firm's hiring behavior. 
Also, while certain aspects of unemployment insurance- such as how firing an employee 
influences the firm's premiums may deter a firm from hiring, it may also deter a firm 
from firing. The measure of the unemployment insurance burden is higher in states in 
which when a firm terminates an employee, they are charged a high unemployment 
insurance premium (Padgitt, 2009). Since such a penalty may deter both hiring and 
firing, there may ultimately be little net effect on firm employment growth. 
3.6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several limitations to this analysis. First of all there is the possibility of 
alternative explanations accounting for the observed relationships. There are a large 
number of variables that vary by geographic regions and states that might be the 
underlying driver of employment growth. While some control variables are used in the 
analysis, many possible confounding variables may not be easily measured. Thus, they 
cannot be controlled for since they cannot be added as independent variables into the 
analysis. 
Also, sample heterogeneity may have affected the results as well. A number of 
industries were excluded in which minimum wagl~s, unionization, and the unemployment 
insurance burden should have little or no impact on hiring and firing decisions. These 
include firms in the real estate and leasing, finance and insurance, information, 
management of companies and enterprises, professional scientific and technical services, 
and health care and social assistance, and educational services industries. However, the 
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sample may still include firms that are not particularly sensitive to minimum wages, 
unionization, or the unemployment insurance burden. Narrowing the sample to industries 
most affected by these labor market variables might lead to different results. For 
example, examining the effects of minimum wages only using food service firms would 
have made a much narrower sample, and perhaps a negative relationship would have 
been found. While the sample could have been made narrower, doing so has the 
undesirable effect of reducing our sample size, giving the analysis less power. Since any 
effect is likely to be small, having adequate power is essential. Furthermore, any finding 
of such a narrow sample is only valid for firms similar to those in the sample. Finding an 
effect in a very narrow sample may not be of particular importance. 
Like many longitudinal studies, sample attrition is a problem in this study. In the 
baseline year, there were 2,662 firms in the sample, but this was reduced to 1,391 by the 
fourth follow-up wave. If this attrition is not random this could be problematic. It is 
reasonable to suspect that firms dropping out of the sample were disproportionally poor 
performers. The results may have been different had these firms been included in the 
analysis. 
The data also suffer from the fact that we only observe firms that actually came 
into existence. The variables examined may reduce the likelihood of an entrepreneur 
starting a business to begin with. However, since the data do not include nascent 
entrepreneurs, this issue cannot be addressed. 
I examined how labor market institutions influence employment growth in new 
firms. Most of the research on entrepreneurship and institutions has focused on how they 
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influence the prevalence of self-employment well as the births and deaths of firms. 
Little research has examined the impact that institutions have on firm growth, and this 
would be a fruitful are for future research. Formal institutions such as taxation, property 
rights, and sound money may influence the performance of the venture, such as how fast 
it grows. 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
New firms in the United States operate in labor markets with different 
characteristics; in particular they can differ dramatically in their labor market institutions. 
In this essay I examined the influence of state-level labor market factors, such as the level 
of unionization, minimum wage rates, and the structure of unemployment insurance, on 
employment in new firms. I made use of data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), a 
longitudinal survey of new firms to test how labor market institutions affect employment 
growth in new firms. Unionization is found to have a negative effect on firm employee 
growth. I found no relationship between both minimum wages and the unemployment 
insurance burden and employee growth in new firms. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF TAXES AND REGULATIONS ON NEW FIRM 
BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN STATE BORDER COUNTIES 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Gartner (1988) and Vesper (1982) define entrepreneurship as the creation of a 
new organization. In addition to individual attributes of entrepreneurs, many 
environmental factors influence if, where, and what type of entrepreneurial activity 
occurs (Baumol, 1990; Shane, 2003). Many environmental factors influence the rate of 
new firm entry and exit in an economy. The size of the local market is a strong predictor 
of regional new firm formation (Davids son, Lindmark, & Olofsson, 1994). Exploiting 
opportunities requires that firms have certain levels of human capital and knowledge 
(Audretsch, Lehmann, & Warning, 2005; Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998). A close 
proximity to universities and their associated knowledge spillovers increases firm birth 
rates (Audretsch et aI., 2005; Kirchhoff, Newbert" Hasan, & Armington, 2007). Labor 
markets with high levels of college graduates, income growth, and population growth 
also have high rates of new firm formation (Armington & Acs, 2002). Institutions, or the 
rules of the game in an economy, playa role in predicting firm births and deaths as well. 
Individuals are more likely to start new firms in areas in which taxes are low (Kreft & 
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Sobel, 2005; Papke, 1991) and economic freedom is high (Campbell & Rogers, 2007; 
Sobel, 2008). 
Although informative, the existing research on how environments influence the 
births and deaths of firms has several limitations. Although some research focuses on 
how institutions influence firm births and deaths (Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Ovaska & 
Sobel, 2005; Sobel et aI., 2007), to what degree these effects vary by industry is 
unknown. Certain types of firms, such as laundromats and retail outlets, provide services 
in which production and consumption occur simultaneously. Thus, they need to be 
located near the relevant customer base and may not have much choice in determining 
where to locate. However, many types of manufacturing firms have wide latitude in 
where to locate, and therefore, institutions may have a different impact on the births and 
deaths of these types of firms. Furthermore, a limitation of the current research is that 
although institutions have been found to influence: firm births in U.S. states (Campbell & 
Rogers, 2007; Kreft & Sobel, 2005), U.S. states are heterogeneous with regards to 
demographics, human capital, and culture. Thus, these results may be due to 
confounding factors, some of which cannot be easily observed and measured. 
This essay examines the following research question: Do taxes and regulations 
influence the birth and death rates of service and manufacturing firms in an economy? 
Counties located on state borders are used so that confounding variables such as culture 
and demographics can be controlled for. Measure:s used to predict firm births and deaths 
include taxation levels, government size, unionization, and minimum wages. In addition, 
I examine separately if the birth rates of manufacturing and services firms are influenced 
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differently by the level of taxation. Policy makers have become increasingly concerned 
with encouraging entrepreneurship (Holtz-Eakin & Rosen, 2004; Peterson, 1988). This 
essay should give policy makers some more refim:d ideas about how regulatory factors 
and taxation levels can influence new firm births and deaths. 
This essay is structured as follows. First, I examine what factors influencing an 
individual's choice to enter and exit self-employment. Then, I develop hypotheses 
concerning how government size, taxation level, lmionization, and minimum wages 
influence the birth and death of firms. Next, I test these hypotheses using firm birth and 
death data from the EBD (establishment births and deaths) tabulations. These tabulations 
consist of data on establishment births and deaths for each county in the U.S. by industry 
code from 1989-2005 (Plummer & Headd, 2008). I merge these data with institutional 
measures at both the state- and county-level from the Economic Freedom of North 
America index and the U.S. Census of Governments. I test these hypotheses using a 
matching technique that matches contiguous counties located on state borders. 
4.2. OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE 
Firm Deaths (Exit) 
Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo's (1997) model explains the decision to exit 
self-employment. In their model, the threshold level of performance is compared to the 
actual expected economic performance of the business to determine whether to continue 
the venture. The threshold level of performance is the minimum level of performance 
needed for a self-employed person to continue operating the firm and remaining self-
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employed (Gimeno et ai., 1997). The threshold level of performance is a function ofthe 
opportunity cost associated with other forms of employment, the cost of switching 
occupations (from self-employment to the new oc,;;upation), and the difference in psychic 
income between continuing self-employment and alternative sources of employment. 
When the expected economic performance of a venture is higher than the threshold level 
of performance, an individual will continue to be self-employed. When the expected 
economic performance falls below the threshold level of performance, the firm is 
abandoned, and the individual leaves self-employment for alternative employment. 
Following Gimeno et ai., (1997), an individual will discontinue the business when 
the expected utility of operating the entrepreneurial venture (UE) is less than the utility of 
alternative employment (U A) minus the associated cost of switching from self-
employment of alternative employment (SCEA): 
(1) 
The UE is determined by the expected economic performance of the venture (EPE) 
plus the psychic income that the individual obtains from operating the venture (PIE)' EPE 
is a function ofthe entrepreneur's general human capital (Xl) and his or her human 
capital specific to the current firm (X2). PIE is a fUnction of a number of individual 
characteristics (~). 
The expected utility of alternative employment (U A) is determined by the 
expected economic performance of alternative employment (EPA) plus the psychic 
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(2) 
income that the individual obtains from alternativ(: employment (PIA)' EPA is a function 
of the entrepreneur's general human capital (Xl) and his or her human capital specific to 
alternative employment (X3). PIA is a function of a number of individual characteristics 
(Xs). 
U A = EPA (Xl, X3) + PIA (Xs) 
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) yields: (4) 
(3) 
Thus, an entrepreneur will close a firm when the expected utility gained from 
operating the venture becomes less than the expected utility of alternative employment 
minus the cost of switching from entreprneuership to alternative employment. The 
expected utility the entrepreneur recieves from the venture is a derived from both the 
economic performance ofthe venture as well as the psyhic income of operaing the 
venture. Likewise, the expected utility of alternative employment is due to both the 
economic performance and psychic income of alternative employment. 
Firm Births (Entry) 
Although the model developed by Gimeno et al. (1997) is used to predict whether 
a self-employed individual will switch to an alternative form of employment, it can be 
modified to predict if an individual who is currently engaged in alternative employment 
will switch into self-employment. Mathematically, an individual will discontinue wage 
employment and start a venture when the utility of alternative employment (U A) is less 
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than the utility of self-employment (UE) minus the cost of switching from alternative 
employment to self-employment (SCAE): 
(5) 
UA and UE are the same as above and SCAE is the switching cost from alternative 
to self-employment. This switching cost can include the cost of education and training 
needed to start a business, as well as the cost of buying assets for the new business. 
Often such costs may be sunk and not recoverable. For example, the cost of taking a 
course on how to write a business plan is a cost that might be incurred by someone 
switching from alternative employment to self-employment. 
Equation 8 displays the combined equation: 
(6) 
The expected performance of the venture CEPE), the expected performance of 
alternative employment (EPA), and switching costs (both SCEA and SCAE) are likely to be 
influenced by taxation levels, government size, and labor market regulations. 
4.3. TAXES, REGULATIONS, AND FIRM BIRTHS AND DEATHS 
North (1990) argues that a country or region accumulating factors of production 
has less influence on economic growth than the incentive structure or institutional 
environment (Henrekson, 2007). Institutions set the "rules of the game" in an economy, 
determining incentives, reducing uncertainty, and influencing transaction costs (North, 
1987). Institutions are often classified as formal or informal, with formal institutions 
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being the rules that are developed by human beings, such as constitutions and statutory 
law (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Conversely, informal institutions include norms, 
customs, traditions, and religion (Williamson, 2000). Baumol (1990) applies institutional 
theory to the field of entrepreneurship, stating that formal institutions influence how 
entrepreneurs allocate their time and resources between productive, unproductive, and 
destructive activities. Productive entrepreneurship, according to Baumol & Caves (1993) 
is "any activity that contributes directly or indirectly to net output of the economy or to 
the capacity to produce additional output" (p. 30). Activities such as engaging in 
frivolous lawsuits, avoiding taxes, and lobbying have been described as unproductive 
forms of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Foss & Foss, 2002; Sauka & Welter, 2007). 
In the United States, the federalist system of government gives individual states a 
wide range of powers as specified in the U.S. constitution (US Const. amend. X), 
although there are a few powers that are explicitly prohibited (US Const. Art 1, sec 10). 
While institutions are often examined at the country level (Bj0mskov and Foss, 2007; 
Nystrom, 2008) formal institutions and factors influenced by institutions (such as 
unionization levels) often vary at lower levels of analysis, such as states (Karabegovic et 
aI., 2005). This can be seen in the state differences in taxation levels, business 
regulations, total government spending, allocation of state funds, minimum wages, etc. I 
will specifically discuss how state difference in the level of taxation, government size, 
unionization, and minimum wages may influence the birth and death rate of businesses. 
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Taxation 
The impact of high taxes on entrepreneurship has been strongly debated. 
Governments often levy a number of taxes against individuals and firms, and those taxes 
may influence the behavior of the individuals and firms. These include sales taxes, 
personal income taxes, business incomes taxes, inheritance and gift taxes, and user fees. 
Income Taxes 
Income taxes represent a substantial portion of all taxes paid by those operating a 
business. Business profits are often taxed at personal income tax rates (Carroll et aI., 
2001), reducing the expected returns from self-employment when taxes are high. This 
may discourage entry into self-employment, espec:ially among high-income individuals 
when the tax system is highly progressive7 (Gentry & Hubbard, 2005). 
In addition to reducing incentives, high levels of taxation may discourage entry 
into self-employment by limiting the amount of self-funded assets available to 
prospective entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may suifer from liquidity constraints, meaning 
a lack of capital sometimes keep them from starting or expanding their business even in 
the presence of profitable opportunities (Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994; Johansson, 2000; Lindh 
& Ohlsson, 1996). If those contemplating entering self-employment have difficulty 
obtaining financing from third parties, they may have to rely on their own limited funds. 
High taxes, especially those on income, may redUl:;e the funds available to individuals 
wanting to start a business (FoIster, 2002). 
7 A progressive tax rate is one in which the tax rate becomes higher as the taxable base (often income) 
becomes higher. Thus, when an income tax is progressive, those with high incomes are subject to higher 
tax rates than those with lower incomes. 
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Although high taxes may discourage entry into self-employment due to lower 
incentives and liquidity constraints, it has been suggested that high income taxes actually 
may encourage entry into self-employment for several reasons. The self-employed are 
typically allowed to deduct any business expenses when computing business income 
taxes, allowing some of their income to be sheltered from taxes (Lang, NohrbaB, & Stahl, 
1997; Schuetze, 2000). Wage earners have a more difficult time deducting job expenses 
relative to the self-employed because their deductions are subject to more limitations 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2010). When taxes ar(: high, the business expense deduction 
may serve to encourage those with risky business ideas to start a new firm. Even if failure 
of the business does occur, those who are self-employed do not bear the full cost of the 
failure (Bruce & Schuetze, 2004; Domar & Musgrave, 1944) because some ofthe costs 
are recovered through the tax deduction. 
High tax rates may encourage individuals to enter self-employment if they can 
more easily avoid paying all of the legally required taxes when they are self-employed 
(Bruce & Schuetze, 2004). Firms in the U.S. are required to report the annual income 
earned by their employees to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). However, self-
employed individuals have no third party reporting their income to the IRS (Schuetze, 
2002). Furthermore, if a business conducts mainly cash transactions, the IRS may have a 
difficult time identifying and proving tax evasion. In addition to underreporting income, 
those who are self-employed may benefit by reporting personal expenses as business 
expenses so that they can deduct them from their income for tax purposes (Bruce & 
Gurley-Calvez, 2008). Thus, although high taxes are likely to lower the expected return 
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to self-employment, they may lower the expected returns to alternative employment even 
more. This may make entering self-employment the utility-maximizing choice. 
Some studies have shown a positive relationship between income tax rates8 and 
rates of self-employment and entry into self-employment. See Table 4.1 for a summary 
of these studies. Schuetze (2000) found a positive relationship between the average 
income tax rates and self-employment rates in the U.S. and Canada. Parker (1996) uses 
co-integration analysis to test the long-run relationship between self-employment and its 
determinants and found a positive relationship between marginal income tax rates and 
self-employment. Long (1982) found that increasing the marginal income tax rate 10% is 
associated with a 6.4% increase in the self-employment ratio in metropolitan areas. 
Robson and Wren (1999) examined the relationship between both marginal and average 
tax rates and their impact on self-employment. While higher marginal income tax rates 
are associated with lower levels of self-employment, higher average income tax rates are 
associated with higher levels of self-employment. However, Gentry and Hubbard (2003) 
found that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 lowered the probability that 
those in upper-middle income households would become entrepreneurs by up to 20%. 
This act raised the top marginal income tax rate from 36% to 39.6% (Auerbach & 
Feenberg, 2000). For a comprehensive review of empirical findings concerning the 
relationship between income taxes and self-employment, see Bruce and Schuetze (2004). 
8 These studies make use of various measures of taxation, including average income tax rates, marginal 
income tax rates, marginal effective income tax rates, and overall tax burdens. The average income tax 
rate is the total amount of tax that an individual pays divided by their total income. The marginal income 
tax rate is the tax rate that an individual pays on their highest dollar of income. The effective marginal 
income tax rate is the marginal tax rate paid on the highest dollar of income, controlling for any decrease in 
transfer payments that the additional dollar of income causes. Measures of overall tax burdens, such as 
those from the Economic Freedom of North America index, combine several measures of taxation to 
develop a proxy of the overall tax burden. 
135 
Table 4.1: Studies on Taxes and Firm Entry/Entrepreneurship 
Study Findings 
Wasylenko Negative relationship between property taxes and firm location in 
(1980) the manufacturing and wholl~sale industries in the Milwaukee 
metropolitan area. 
Long (1982) Positive relationship between marginal income tax rate and self-
employment rate in SMSAs. 
Bartik (1985) Negative relationship betwel~n overall tax burden and new 
business activity in u.s. states. 
Papke (1991) Negative relationship between marginal tax rate and firm births in 
the publications, communication, and apparel industries in the 
U.S. 
Parker (1996) Positive relationship between marginal tax rates and self-
employment rates in the United Kingdom. 
Robson & Wren Negative relationship betwe,en marginal tax rates and self-
(1999) employment; positive relationship between average tax rates and 
self-employment in 15 OECD countries. 
Schuetze (2000) Positive relationship between average income tax rate and self-
employment rates in U.S. & Canada. 
Gentry & Negative relationship between top marginal tax rate and 
Hubbard (2000) probability of upper-income individuals becoming self-employed 
in the U.S. 
Kreft & Sobel Negative relationship between overall tax burden and sole 
(2005) proprietor growth rate in U.S. states. 
McMullen, Negative relationship between overall tax burden and necessity-
Bagby, & Palich motivated self-employment rates in GEM countries. 
(2008) 
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Overall Tax Burden 
Although high income taxes may reduce the expected returns to self-employment, 
they may also reduce the returns to alternative employment even more. However, other 
forms of taxation do not typically allow special deductions for the self-employed and 
may even be more burdensome. For example, property taxes are levied on real estate and 
other assets, which often are owned by the self-employed for use in operating their 
business. However, those in alternative forms of e:mployment may not have these assets 
(or at least not to the same extent), resulting in lower property taxes. Thus, relative to 
income tax rates, the overall tax burden in an economy may have a larger effect on the 
decision to become self-employed. 
A number of studies found a negative relationship between taxation levels and the 
entry of new firms when using measures of taxation other than the income tax rate. 
Papke (1991) examined how state and local taxes influence the number of firm births 
using U.S. Census data. Five industries were examined: women's outerwear, household 
furniture, book printing, communication equipment, and electronic components. 
Although results varied by industry, a high marginal effective tax rate in a state was 
generally associated with fewer firm births in that state. Kreft and Sobel (2005) examine 
how institutions impact the sole proprietor growth rate from 1996 to 2000 in U.S. states, 
using the measure of overall tax burden from the Economic Freedom of North America 
(EFNA) index. They found a negative relationship between overall tax burdens and sole 
proprietor growth rates. Wasylenko (1980) examined how property taxes impact firm 
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relocation. In manufacturing and wholesale trade tirms, low property taxes are 
significant in determining firm relocation. Howev1er, the relationship is not significant for 
firms in the construction, retail trade, finance, and service industries. Bartik (1985a) 
examined how existing firms make decisions concerning where to locate a new 
manufacturing plant. High taxes were negatively associated with new business activity. 
Thus, high overall tax burdens are likely to make the returns of self-employment 
lower than that returns of alternative employment. High taxes will deter individuals from 
switching into self-employment. 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the matched overall tax burden 
and the matched firm birth rate. 
Taxation and Firm Deaths 
When taxes are high, firms will retain a smaller percentage of their pre-tax profits. 
When profits are low, they are more likely to fall below the threshold level of 
performance required by firm owner(s) to keep th~: firm operating (Gimeno et aI., 1997). 
As a result, firm closure becomes more likely. High taxes also may lead to firm closure 
by lowering the amount of capital that the firm has for operations and investment. When 
taxes are high, firms are likely less profitable, giving them less money to invest in 
operating and expanding the business (FoIster, 2002). These reasons suggest that high 
levels of taxation may lead to high firm death rates. 
However, there are other reasons that high levels of taxation may be associated 
with lower rates of firm deaths. The self-employed typically are allowed to deduct any 
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business expenses on their tax return, allowing some of their income to be sheltered from 
taxes (Lang et aI., 1997; Schuetze, 2000). If income taxes are high, then the ability to 
deduct expenses becomes more valuable, leading to greater self-employment. Another 
reason why higher tax rates may discourage firm closure is that individuals can more 
easily avoid paying all of the legally required taxes when they own a business (Bruce & 
Schuetze, 2004). Although high taxes will decrease the expected return to self-
employment, they may decrease the expected return from alternative forms of 
employment even more. Thus, high taxes actually may lead to fewer firm deaths. 
As discussed previously, a high level of taxation may serve as a barrier to entry to 
self-employment as well. Because high taxes are likely to deter entry, existing firms may 
face fewer competitors when taxes are high. A lack of competition allows firms currently 
operating to charge higher prices for the goods and services that they offer. This allows 
them to be more profitable. As this occurs, few self-employed individuals will close their 
businesses. Conversely, low levels of taxation may lead to more individuals entering 
self-employment (Aidis et aI., 2009; Kreft & Sobel, 2005). If this occurs, existing firms 
face more competition. As more firms compete for resources and customers, more firms 
are likely to fail (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1993). 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the matched overall tax burden 
and the matched firm death rate. 
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Government Size 
Governments are needed to provide certain goods and services in an economy. 
Public goods, such as defense, police protection, roads, court systems, and basic research, 
would likely be underinvested in without government action and funding (Comes & 
Sandler, 1996; Nelson, 1959). When governments fail to provide these goods, 
entrepreneurship is likely to falter (Audretsch et ai., 2005; Kirchhoff et ai., 2007; Kreft & 
Sobel, 2005). However, much debate exists about the impact that governments have on 
economic growth and entrepreneurship when the government goes beyond these basic 
functions and moves into providing private goods and redistributing wealth. Large 
governments typically provide extensive social safety nets and income redistribution, 
which may influence the attractiveness of entering into self-employment. 
Social Safety Nets 
Large governments often provide significant social safety nets to their citizens. 
Generous old-age pensions, medical care, disability payments, and unemployment 
insurance are some of the types of programs that large governments may provide to their 
citizens (Henrekson, 2005). Although much of the variation in entitlement programs is at 
the national level, significant variation exists among states in the level of benefits offered 
(Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004b; Howard, 1999). For example, programs such as 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)9 are partially funded by the states with 
substantial differences in funding and benefit levels (McKinnish, 2007). In one sense, 
extensive social safety nets may serve to limit exposure to risk and, therefore, encourage 
9 T ANF was formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 
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additional risk-taking (Sinn, 1995, 1996). Starting a new firm possibly may be the kind 
of risky action that these safety nets stimulate. 
However, these safety nets generally offer limited protection against business 
failure. This is because most social programs are providing assistance to low-income 
individuals with children and those who are unemployed (Henrekson, 2005). They 
generally do not provide protection for the costs that an entrepreneur may incur when 
their business fails. Furthermore, when states provide generous social safety nets, the 
state's safety net provides an incentive for individuals not to enter self-employment, and 
the returns to self-employment must be sufficiently high relative to the benefits provided 
by government programs (Henrekson, 2005). Thus, extensive social safety nets may 
provide another alternative to self-employment: unemployment. 
As social safety nets become more comprehensive, individuals may be less likely 
to enter self-employment if they can earn an adequate return by exploiting the safety net. 
Individuals often enjoy free time (Hornberger & Knauth, 1993) and thus obtain a high 
degree of psychic income from being unemployed. Even if individuals earn substantially 
less from exploiting the social safety net than from self-employment, they may still 
obtain more utility from exploiting the social safety net due to the high psychic income 
that unemployment offers. Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2000) found a negative 
relationship between the generosity of the social safety net, measured by the replacement 
ratio lO, and the level of entrepreneurship in OEeD countries. 
\0 The replacement ratio refers to the ratio of benefits received from not working (such as welfare payments 
and unemployment insurance payouts) and the amount ofinl~ome received from working (Nickell, 1979). 
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Rent-Seeking Opportunities 
Large governments generally are involved in more aspects of the economy, 
increasing opportunities for rent-seeking (Goel & Nelson, 1998; Scully, 1991). Rent-
seeking refers to the resource-wasting activities involved in competing for artificially 
contrived wealth transfers (Tollison, 1982). An individual or firm may engage in rent-
seeking by lobbying for regulations that thwart competition, by bribing public officials 
for monopoly rights, or by instigating frivolous litigation (Krueger, 1974; Murphy, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993). Rent-seeking activities are an alternative to self-employment; 
thus, as rent-seeking opportunities increase, the return of alternative employment 
increases. Fewer individuals will engage in entrepreneurial activities as more individuals 
are drawn into rent-seeking (Scully, 1991). 
Furthermore, when a substantial amount of rent-seeking activities takes place, 
productive entrepreneurs are likely to be preyed upon. As an increasing number of 
individuals engage in rent-seeking activities and abandon productive entrepreneurship, 
those currently self-employed may be forced out of the market as their businesses are 
preyed upon by an increasing number of rent-seekers (Baland & Francois, 2000; Murphy 
et aI., 1993) and as returns to productive entrepreneurship fall (Acemoglu, 1995). Rent-
seekers may crowd out productive entrepreneurs in several ways, such as through 
frivolous lawsuits, wealth transfers, or lobbying fi)r the passage of restrictive regulations 
that hurt competitor firms. 
Thus, a large number of rent-seeking opportunities are likely to occur when 
governments grow leading to fewer individuals switching into self-employment. This is 
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because: (1) rent-seeking opportunities provide a profitable alternative to self-
employment and (2) a high level of rent-seeking may lower the expected performance of 
self-employment, especially for owners of new fimas. 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the matched state government 
size and the matched firm birth rate. 
Government Size and Firm Deaths 
The size of the government may influence the decision of those currently self-
employed to exit or to remain self-employed. As governments grow larger, rent-seeking 
activities become more attractive (Goel & Nelson, 1998). Rent-seeking activities are 
often directed at businesses, which may lower the expected returns to self-employment 
for some individuals. For example, rent-seekers may engage in pursuing frivolous 
litigation against medical doctors, causing some of them to exit self-employment and 
seek alternative employment. Even when rent-seekers are not successful in winning their 
case and making doctors pay damages, they may leave medical doctors with substantial 
legal fees (Dippolito et aI., 2008). 
However, operating businesses may also btmefit from the large number of rent-
seeking opportunities that are likely to arise as governments become large. Existing 
firms may take advantage of these rent-seeking activities as a way to protect and expand 
their business (Krueger, 1974). Existing firms may have the necessary funding and 
associations needed to lobby effectively and to obtain favors from legislators and 
government leaders that new, less-organized entrants are likely to lack. Firms often 
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engage in rent-seeking by lobbying for regulations that protect existing incumbent firms 
at the expense of new firms or potential startups (Oal Bo, 2006; Hardy, 2006; Stigler, 
1971). During the development of the trucking industry, for example, some states limited 
the weight of trucks specifically on routes that competed with railroads. The shorter the 
average railroad haul distance, the lower the weight limit that some states allowed for 
freight trucks ll (Stigler, 1971). These regulations favored incumbent railroad firms over 
new entrants in the trucking industry. 
It is likely that rent-seeking opportunities that large governments provide are 
more likely to be exploited by existing firms, increasing their financial performance. 
Thus, when governments are large, fewer individuals will exit self-employment for 
alternative forms of employment. 
H4: There is a negative relationship between the matched state government 
size and the matched firm death rate. 
Minimum Wages and Firm Births 
High minimum wages increase labor costs for firms that require high amounts of 
low-skilled labor. In some cases, firms may be able to minimize the effects of minimum 
wages through increasing prices to increase revenue (Aaronson, 2001) or by hiring 
employees "off the books" so that they can pay a lower wage (Arrowsmith et aI., 2003). 
However, when firms are in a competitive industry, they may not be able to raise prices. 
Also hiring employees "off the books" is illegal and typically not appealing to workers, 
lIGenerally, trucks competed more with railroads on routes of relatively short distances. Railroads had 
more of an advantage over trucks on longer routes. Thus, it was thought that the longer the average 
railroad haul in a state, the less that railroads would lobby against trucking (Stigler, 1971). 
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thus making it difficult to do. Some studies suggest that firms respond to high minimum 
wages by hiring fewer employees (Baker et aI., 1999; Brown et aI., 1982; Neumark & 
Wascher, 2000). 
High minimum wages and are likely to inerease the labor cost of firms. This will 
make the expected returns of self-employment lower than they would be otherwise. 
Many new firms plan to hire employees fairly early in their life (Human & Matthews, 
2004). Thus, labor costs are likely considered when an individual is deciding whether to 
start a new firm. When a firm is first started, employees must be paid immediately even 
though the revenue those employees generate may not be realized until further in the 
future. This may be particularly burdensome for new firms because they are liquidity-
constrained (Holtz-Eakin et aI., 1994; Johansson, 2000) and often operate in competitive 
industries that have low profit margins (Jones et aI., 2004; Ram et aI., 2007). 
Additionally, new firms are typically small, and small firms often pay their employees 
relatively low wages (Brown & Medoff, 1989; Idson & Feaster, 1990; Morissette, 1993; 
Winter-Ebmer,2001). Because small and new firms are likely to pay a larger percentage 
of their workers low wages, high minimum wages that increase the labor cost of low-
wage workers may have a disproportionate impaet on these types of firms. 
H5: There is a negative relationship between the matched minimum wage 
and the matched firm birth rate. 
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Unionization and Firm Births 
High union densities in a region may be due to the types of industries in the 
region, to the culture (Singh, 2001), and to the laws that protect and encourage 
unionization (Moore, 1998). When union densities in a region are high, firms are more 
likely to be unionized. Unionized workers tend to get paid more than non-unionized 
workers (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 1983; Stewart, 1990), making it more 
costly for unionized firms to operate. Several empirical studies support the idea that 
unionization can lead to decreased firm profitability (Hirsch, 1991; Menezes-Filho, 1997; 
Voos & Mishel, 1986). New firms typically are not unionized however. Although 
unionization may generally lead to higher wages and lower profitability for most 
businesses, firms that are new and small are unlikely to be unionized even in a highly 
unionized region. Therefore, they may actually have an advantage over existing firms, 
since they will be able to obtain labor at a lower eost. Acs and Audretsch (1989) found 
that industries with high levels of unionization had higher levels of new firm entry than 
those with lower levels of unionization. Thus, high levels of unionization in a region 
may increase the returns of self-employment for owners of new firms entering the 
market. 
H6: There is a positive relationship between the matched union density and 
the match firm birth rate. 
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Minimum Wages and Firm Deaths 
High minimum wages increase the labor costs of existing firms (Gregg, 2000). If 
the minimum wage rises above the marginal revenue that the employee(s) generate, then 
firm employment levels are likely to fall (Leonard, 2000). In addition to lowering firm 
employment levels, high minimum wages may even cause some firms to go out of 
business if they lower the expected performance of the firm below the threshold level. 
However, high minimum wages may also serve as an entry barrier (Kreft & Sobel, 2005). 
If high minimum wages deter new firms from entl~ring the market, competition will be 
limited. A lack of competition may allow existing firms to have more flexibility in 
setting prices, which may partially compensate for the higher labor cost. This will likely 
improve the economic performance of existing films, leading to fewer self-employed 
individuals switching to alternative employment. Furthermore, many existing firms have 
been operating for some time, giving them a steady cash flow that can be used to pay for 
high labor costs if necessary, Waltman, McBride & Camhout, (1998) found that high 
minimum wages are associated with lower business failure rates. 
H7: There is a negative relationship between the matched minimum wage 
and the matched firm death rate. 
Unionization and Firm Deaths 
Unionized workers typically earn more money than equivalent non-unionized 
employees (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 1983; Stewart, 1990), making it more 
expensive for unionized firms to operate. Unionization has been associated with lower 
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firm profitability (Hirsch, 1991; Menezes-Filho, 1997; Voos & Mishel, 1986). Although 
a high level of unionization in a state may negatively affect the profitability of firms 
(since they are more likely to be unionized), it is less likely to affect the profitability of 
new firms, which are unlikely to be unionized. High levels of unionization likely 
encourage new firm entry, and new firms that enkr the market will tend to have lower 
labor cost than existing firms (Acs & Audretsch, 1989). Thus, existing firms, at least 
those that are unionized, will be at a competitive disadvantage compared to newer firms. 
New firms will have the ability to still earn an adequate return while charging lower 
prices than existing unionized firms, decreasing the profitability of existing unionized 
firms. When returns to a business become low, owner(s) are more likely to discontinue 
operations because returns from the business may fall below the owner(s) opportunity 
costs (Gimeno, et aI., 1997). Thus, high levels of unionization are likely to lead to a high 
rate of existing firms going out of business. 
H8: There is a positive relationship between matched union density and the 
matched firm death rate. 
Nature of the Opportunity and Firm Births 
The impact that institutions have on firm entry is likely to vary depending on the 
nature of the opportunity, such as whether it involves performing a service or 
manufacturing a product. Services are unique from products in that the offering is 
intangible and that production and consumption often occur simultaneously (Carman & 
Langeard, 1980; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Gohmann et aI., 2008; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, 
& Berry, 1985; Regan, 1963). Starting a firm that offers a service is likely to be much 
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more location dependent than starting a firm to manufacture a product (Bowen & Jones, 
1986). Manufacturing firms are able to build their product in one location and sell their 
product in a different location (Keesing, 1983), while service firms often cannot. 
Taxation 
Individuals starting firms involved in manufacturing can start their firm in a 
location in which the institutional environment is most favorable, such as an environment 
with a relatively low tax burden (Bartik, 1985). However, service firms often do not have 
this luxury, as the geographical range in which the firm can be started is limited. For 
example, a prospective entrepreneur may discover that there is strong demand for pizzas 
but few pizzerias in Salisbury Massachusetts, while there is weak demand but many 
pizzerias nearby in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. New Hampshire may have a much 
lower tax burden, but the entrepreneur does not have the option of opening his or her 
pizzeria in Portsmouth unless he or she is willing to accept having few customers and/or 
charging a low price. However, a prospective entrepreneur who discovers that there is 
strong demand for a special type of surfboard among costal inhabitants could locate their 
manufacturing operations in a state with a low overall tax burden, such as South Dakota, 
and then transport the finished products to coastal areas where there is customer demand 
for them. 
H9: A high matched overall tax burden will have a stronger negative impact 
on the matched birth rate of manufacturing firms than service firms. 
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4.4. METHODS AND RESULTS 
Sample 
The data used to test these hypotheses come from a set of custom tabulations from 
the U.S Census Bureau's Company Division. Known as the EBD (establishment births 
and deaths), these tabulations contain data on establishment births and deaths for each 
county in the U.S. from 1989-2005 (Plummer & Headd, 2008). More specifically, they 
contain for each county in the U.S., the total single-unit, multi-unit, and total 
establishment firm births and deaths. I only use only data from 1992, 1997, and 2002 
because of limited data availability of the independent variables. 
In the EBD data, firm births and deaths are collected by industry and contain the 
firm's North American Industry Code System (NAICS) codes reported to five digits. An 
establishment is considered "born" in a year in which it first reports payroll. Conversely, 
an establishment death occurs when no payroll was reported in the current year but was 
reported sometime in the previous year. The U.S. Census Bureau defines an 
establishment as "a single physical location at which business is conducted or services or 
industrial operations are performed" (Plummer & Headd, 2008: p. 8). The birth of a 
single-unit establishment represents the birth of a new venture; whereas, a multi-unit 
establishment birth represents the geographic expansion of an already existing firm 





I perform the analysis with both matched firm births and firm deaths of single-
establishment firms. Although the EBD tabulations contain data on both single- and 
multi-unit establishments, the single-unit births and deaths are a better measure of 
entrepreneurship and not merely firm expansion. The ratio of firm births and deaths to 
the county's population are used as the dependent variables, representing the firm birth 
rate and the firm death rate for each county respec:tively. Therefore, county birth and 
death rates 
Birth rate: (total county firm birthst/county populationt) 
Death rate: (total county firm deathst Icounty populationt) 
These rates are then matched to the rates of contiguous counties by dividing them 
by the average rate found in the contiguous counties (this is discussed in the "county 
matching technique" section). 
Independent Variables 
Measures of several state-level variables come from the Fraser Institute's 
Economic Freedom of North American (EFNA) index (Karabegovic et aI., 2005). These 
measures have been used as measures of institutions in several previous studies 
(Campbell & Rogers, 2007; Gohmann et aI., 2008; Kreft & Sobel, 2005; Sobel, 2008) 
and are available for all needed years. Developed by the Fraser Institute, EFNA index 
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rates economic freedom for states/provinces in the: U.S. and Canada. This index includes 
of three components: (1) size of government, (2) takings and discriminatory taxation, and 
(3) labor market freedom. Each of these components is consists of several individual 
measures, which can be seen in Figure 4.2. The labor market freedom is disaggregated 
into two of its measures: minimum wages as a percentage of GDP and union densities. 
All measures are transformed into a score ranging from 1-10, with 10 being consistent 
with high levels of economic freedom (and 1 associated with low levels). For example, 
states with a small government size have a score close to ten on that measure. The same 
is true with taxation level (takings and discriminatory taxation) as well as unionization 
and minimum wages. 
To make the results easier to interpret, I reverse code these four variables by 
subtracting them from ten. This makes previously large values small and previously 
small values large. For example after the reverse coding, a high score on the size of 
government measure means that the state has a relatively large government, while a low 
score means it is relatively small. 
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Table 4.2: Economic Freedom of North America Index Components 
Components Measures 
1. Size of lA: General Consumption Expenditures by Government as 
Government a Percentage of GDP 
IB: Transfers and Subsidies as a Percentage ofGDP 
1 C: Social Security Payments as a Percentage of GDP 
2. Takings and 2A: Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP 
Discriminatory 2B: Top Marginal Income Tax Rate and the Threshold at 
Taxation Which it Applies 
2C: Indirect Tax Revenue as a Percentage ofGDP 
2D: Sales Tax Collected as a Percentage of GDP 
3. Labor Market 3A: Minimum Wage Legislation 
Freedom 3B: Government Employment as a Percentage of Total State 
EmQloyment 
3C: Union Density 
Control Variables 
Although the matching technique naturally controls for many confounding 
variables, I control for several county level variables: population density, county tax 
burden, median income and lagged birth and death rates. 
The urbanization of the county is likely to have an effect on the level of 
entrepreneurship as well. Urban environments may offer more opportunities for 
entrepreneurship because they have access to larger markets and to suppliers leading to 
increased firm birth rates (Guesnier, 1994; Keebl(~ & Walker, 1994). In rural 
communities, agriculture may dominate the economy instead. Urbanization is measured 
by population density, which is calculated by taking the county's population divided by 
its area in square miles. 
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In addition to state-level taxes, local-level taxes are likely to influence the 
location choice as well. Counties and cities often have their own tax rates, especially 
property tax rates. Therefore, high births of new firms in a border county could be due to 
favorable property taxes in the county compared to the neighboring county, not due to 
state-level factors. Thus, I also must control for the burden of taxes at the county-level. 
To do this, I use data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Census of Governments. The 
Census of Governments is taken every 5 years, and data are used from 1992, 1997 and 
2002. The Census of Governments collects data from county governments, and data are 
collected on both expenditures and sources ofrev,enue (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009b). For 
each county, data are available for the various sources of county revenue, such as income 
tax and property tax receipts. 
I combine the Census of Governments revenue data with Census data on the 
population in each county (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011b) and the median income in each 
county (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011a). From this data, an estimate of the tax burden per 
capita for the county is calculated as follows: 
County Tax Burden = County Tax Per Capita/Median income. 
Median income is controlled for as well, since the wealth of an area is often a 
significant predictor of entrepreneurship levels (Parker and Robson, 2004; Noorderhaven 
and Thurik, Wennekers, and van Stel, 2004). 
Finally, I control for lagged birth and death rates. For the analysis with the 
matched birth rate as the dependent variable, I control for matched lagged death rates. 
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Likewise, for the dependent variable matched firm deaths, I included a lagged matched 
birth rate. The lags are three year lags. 
County Matching Technique 
I match counties with counties that are contiguous with one another and that lie 
across a state border. These counties will have access to similar customers, sources of 
human capital (Porter, 2000; Rauch, 1991), as well as a similar culture and climate 
(Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a). Thus, this method is a good way to control for factors, 
even those that are unobservable and immeasurable, that may vary based on location. 
This makes it more likely that any observed relationship between the state-level variables 
and firm births or deaths is not due to confounding factors. For these reasons, matching 
techniques have been used in a number of studies in the economics literature (Bronars & 
Lott, 1998; Card, 1992; Dube, Lester, & Reich, 2007; Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a, b; 
Holmes, 1998). 
The data on contiguous counties come from the 1991 Contiguous County file 
from the U.S. Census. This file contains data on contiguous counties for every county in 
the U.S. (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1991). The file 
contains each pair of counties that are contiguous to one another, as well as a code that 
represents in what way the two counties are contiguous. In this essay, I consider counties 
contiguous if they meet any ofthe following three conditions: (1) they share a border, (2) 
they lie across a body of water but are connected by a bridge of ferry, or (3) they share a 
comer. I eliminate county pairs in which both counties are in the same state, only leaving 
pairs of contiguous counties that are on different sides of a state border. Counties vary 
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drastically by their area. San Bernardino County, California, is 20,052 square miles in 
size (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009a), larger than nine U.S. states, all which contain multiple 
counties. The state of Maryland is only 9,774 square miles in size, yet contains 24 
individual counties and equivalents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009c). Typically, counties in 
the Western U.S. are far larger than counties in the Eastern U.S. Therefore, any border 
effect is likely to be less pronounced in large counties, which may stretch far from the 
border (Holmes, 1998). However, the county size: that is "too large" has not been well 
defined in the literature. Holmes (1998) handles this issue by ignoring states located in 
the western U.S. which are likely to have larger counties. Others have simply performed 
the analysis using all available counties, such as Holcombe and Lacombe (2004a, b). To 
account for this issue, the main analysis is performed by eliminating counties that have a 
land area of over 1,200 square miles. Eliminating these extremely large counties leaves 
952 counties. 
Because data from the Census of Governments are only available for 1992, 1997, 
and 2002, I construct three panels that coincide with these years. However, the variables 
are not used in their raw form; they are matched with those of bordering counties. I 
perform the analysis similarly to that of Holcombe and Lacombe (Holcombe & Lacombe, 
2004a, b). For example, I construct the dependent variable, matched firm birth rate, by 
taking the new firm birth rate in counties located on state borders and dividing that rate 
by the average birth rate of the counties that are (:ontiguous to it but that are located in 
another state. Often, a county shares a border with at least two counties in the 
neighboring state, thus the average birth rates of these counties must be calculated and 
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used in the denominator of the matched birth rate formula. The formula can be written 
as: 
(1) 
MBRi is the matched birth rate for county;/. BRi is the birth rate of new firms in 
border county i, and BRj represents the birth rates of new firms in the contiguous counties 
on the other side of the state border (but all within the same state). n represents the 
number of contiguous counties on the other side of the state border. MBRi, the matched 
birth rate for county i, is obtained by taking the birth rate of new firms in county i and 
dividing this value by the average birth rate of contiguous counties that are on the other 
side of the state border. For example, let us say that county i is in state Yand county i 
borders countiesji andj2, which are located in state Z. Given that the firm birth rate in 
county i =.06, county j i =.08 and county j 2 =.10, then the matched birth rate for county i 
would be = (.06/((112)/(.08+.10)) = (.06/.09) = .667. The matched birth rate represents 
the county's new firm birth rate as a percentage of the average new firm birth rate of 
contiguous counties across the state border. 
Counties that share borders with counties in two different states are included in 
the analysis twice so that the variables associated with both states can be examined 
separately. This leads to a small increase in the sample size from 952 tol101. In 
addition to performing this matching for total new firm births in counties, 
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I also perform the analysis separately for both the birth rate of manufacturing 
firms and the birth rate of service firms in order to test hypothesis 9. 
(2) 
Formula 2 is used to test the hypotheses predicting firm deaths. Formula 2 is 
identical to formula 1, except that it represents death rates. MDRi is the matched death 
rate for county i. DRi is the death rate of new fimls in border county i, and DRj 
represents the death rates of new firms in the contiguous counties on the other side of the 
state border (all within the same state). n represents the number of contiguous counties 
on the other side of the state border. MDRi, the matched death rate for county i, is 
obtained by taking the death rate of firms in county i and dividing this value by the 
average death rate of contiguous counties that are on the other side of the state border. 
All independent variables, including control variables, are matched in the same manner. 
Statistical Technique 
I predict county-level firm birth and death rates using both county- and state-level 
predictors. The matching of border counties creates a unique nesting problem: counties 
located on a state border are likely to have similar birth and death rate to other counties in 
the state because firms in those counties will have similar tax rates and regulations. For 
example, a county located along the Kentucky border with Indiana (such as Jefferson 
County) is likely to have more similar firm birth and death rates with another Kentucky 
counties along the Indiana border (such as Oldham County) than a county located on the 
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Kentucky-Tennessee border (such as Wayne County). Thus, the border counties on a 
particular state line are nested within a border area. Border areas are counties within a 
state that share a common border with a certain adjacent states. There are 174 border 
areas in the sample with an average of 4.99 counties in each with a standard deviation of 
3.54. 
Additionally, border regions are themselvt~s nested within states. The state of 
Kentucky, for example, shares borders with Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, 
Virginia, Tennessee, and Missouri. If a state has favorable institutions conductive to the 
creation of new firms, that state is likely to have high relative new firm birth rates in all 
border areas. Therefore, the model is developed as a three-level model. An example of 
this can be seen in Figure 4.2, which shows an example of Jefferson County, Kentucky. 
Jefferson County is nested within the Kentucky-Indiana border area, which itself is 
nested within the state of Kentucky. There are 45 states included in the sample. 
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Figure 4.1: Nested Data Example: Jeffersonville County Kentucky 
State (level 3): Kentucky 
Indell.endent Variables: None 
Border Area (level 2): Kentucky Counties on 
Kentucky-Indiana Border 
Independent Variables: Matched State Taxation Burden, 
Matched State Government Size, Matched State Minimum 
~ 
County (Ievell): Jefferson County 
Independent Variables: Controls 
Dependent Variables: Matched County Firm 
Birth and Death Rates 
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I perform multilevel modeling using the hne procedure in R to test the proposed 
hypotheses and to account for the multilevel structure of the data. With this type of 
analysis, higher-level independent variables can be used to predict county-level outcomes 
and different intercepts can be fitted for each border area as well as each state. To test 
the developed hypotheses, I follow a model-building process like that recommended by 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). This first involves running an unconditional (null) model 
in which the variability in the dependent variable is partitioned into the different levels 
(i.e., county, border area, state). Once the varianc,e is partitioned among the levels, 
interclass correlations (lCCs) can be calculated to determine if the higher levels (border 
area and state) have a meaningful level of variability. To allow for the comparison of 
model fit among models, full information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML) is used 
to estimate fixed and random effects (O'Connell & McCoach, 2007). 
The county-level equation is the level-l equation because counties are the lowest 
level of analysis. The level-l (county-level) equation is displayed below: 
(1) Yijk = 1tOjk + 1t1PopulationDensitYi + 1t2CountyTaxBurdeni + 1t3MedianIncomei + 
1t4LaggedRatei + eijk 
In equation (1), Yijk is the matched birth rate (or death rate) for county i. 1tOjk 
represents the matched intercept term for border area}. Yijk is predicted by county-level 
measures of population density, county tax burden, median income, and lagged rate (birth 
or death). In this analysis, I allow the intercept term, 1tOjk, to vary based upon the border 
area in which the county is located. However, tht: slope coefficients for the level-l 
equation are not allowed to vary based upon the county. Thus, this simplifies the model, 
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leaving only one level-2 equation which uses matc:hed state-level variables (which are 
unique to each border area) to predict the intercept term, 1tOjk. 
(2) 1tOjk=POOk + POljSizeofGovernmentj + P02jTaxBurdenj + p03jUnionizationj+ 
p04jMinimum W agej + rOjk 
Equation 2 shows how 1tOjk is determined. POOk represents the intercept term, 
which I allow to vary by state. This is the mean matched birth (or death) rate for the state 
that the border lies in, all else held constant. 1tOjk is predicted by the matched size of 
government, tax burden, unionization, and minimum wages. 
(3) POOk = 'YOOO + !lOOk 
As represented in equation 3, POOk is allowed to vary based upon the state. Thus, 
'YOOO represents the mean birth (or death) rate for each state, while !lOOk represents the 
variation of border area k from the state mean. 
Results 
The descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis and their 




(I) Birth Rate Ratio 1.00 
(2) Death Rate Ratio 0.57*** 
(3) Lagged Birth Rate Ratio 0.56*** 
(4) Lagged Death Rate Ratio 0.53*** 
(5) County Tax Burden 0.15*** 
(6) Government Size 0.02 
(7) Tax Burden -0.08*** 
(8) Median Income 0.24*** 
(9) Minimum Wage 0.03 
(10) Population Density 0.13*** 
(11) Unionization 0.11*** 
Mean 1.0526 
Standard Deviaton 0.4595 
-_.-
Table 4.3: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.00 
0.56*** 1.00 
0.5*** 0.52*** 1.00 
0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 1.00 
O,ol 0.02 0.01 -0.14*** 1.00 
-0.05** -0.06*** -0.02 -0.09*** 0.66*** 1.00 
0.19*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.21 *** -0.13*** -0.1 *** 1.00 
0.03 0.06*** 0.03* -0.16*** 0.84*** 0.55*** -0.14*** 
0.12*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.14*** O,ol -0.02 0.07*** 
-0.12*** -0.12*** -0.09*** 0.14*** -0.22*** 0.00 -0.12*** 
1.0454 1.0510 1.0405 1.1703 1.06573 1.0224 1.0180 
0.4062 0.4412 0.4151 0.8835 0.4163 0.2062 0.1991 













The need for using RCM modeling can be partially assessed by calculating 
intraclass correlations (ICCs). Intraclass correlations are calculated to see how variance 
in the dependent variable can be explained by the different levels of analysis in the 
proposed multilevel model. I first ran an unconditional (null) model in which the 
variability in the dependent variable is partitioned to the different levels (county, border 
area, and states). The intra-class correlations for both of the dependent variables can be 
seen in Table 4.4. The intra-class correlations show how the variability in the dependent 
variables is explained by the three proposed levels: counties, border areas, and states. 
Table 4.4: Random Effects and Intraclass Correlations 
Birth Rate Death Rate 
Variance Percentage Variance Percentage 
State 0.0078 3.59% 0.004 2.36% 
Border Group 0.0326 14.97% 0.0194 11.52% 
County 0.1773 81.43% 0.1453 86.12% 
Total 0.2177 0.1688 
For the birth rates, about 3.59% of the variation is due to state differences, while 
14.97% is due to differences between border areas. For the death rates, 2.36% of the 
variation is attributes to state differences, 11.52% is due to differences between border 
areas. When observations are clustered in higher level units, the standard errors can be 
inflated, and Type I errors are more likely to occur (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). Only a 
small percentage of the variance in birth and death rates are at the state level (3.59% and 
2.36%). However, Roberts (2007) found that "group dependence may still exist 
depending on the nature of the covariates introduced into the model" (p. 15) when an 
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intraclass correlation is close to zero. Thus, I kept the random state-level intercepts in the 
model despite the relatively small percentage of variation attributed to states. 
Next, I estimated a control model for both the matched birth and death rate 
differences as dependent variables. These can be seen in Tables 4.5 and Table 4.6. 
Then I estimated a full model which contains both the control and hypothesized models. 
The results can be seen in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. 
Table 4.5: Control Model: Matched Birth Rate 
Variable Coefficient SE t-value p-value 
Intercept .0669 .0434 1.54 .1299 
County Tax Burden .0451 .10090 5.03 <.0001 
Median Income .4173 .10380 10.99 <.0001 
Death Rate Lagged .4719 .0164 28.72 <.0001 
Population Density .0080 .0017 4.60 <.0001 
Year 1997 -.0058 .0153 -.38 .7045 
Year 2002 .0041 .0153 .27 .7872 
AIC 2730.1 Observations 3249 
BIC 2790.9 Border Areas 174 
States 45 
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Table 4.6: Control Model: Matched Death Rate 
Variable Coefficient SE t-value p-value 
Intercept .4196 .0357 11.76 <.0001 
County Tax Burden .0298 .0076 3.91 <.0001 
Median Income .0952 .10338 2.81 .0049 
Birth Rate Lagged .4624 .10141 32.69 <.0001 
Pop_ulation Density 0053 .0015 3.50 .0005 
Year 1997 -.0054 .0139 -.39 .6985 
Year 2002 -.0069 .0139 -.50 .6186 
AIC 1993.2 Observations 3249 
BIC 2054.1 Border Areas 174 
States 45 
Table 4.7: Full Model: Ma.tched Birth Rate 
Variable Coefficient SE t-value p-value 
Intercept .2806 .. 0728 3.85 <.0001 
County Tax Burden .0472 .. 0090 5.27 <.0001 
Median Income .4057 ,,0380 10.66 <.0001 
Death Rate Lagged .4725 .. 0164 28.76 <.0001 
Population Density .0078 .0017 4.54 <.0001 
Year 1997 -.0070 .0154 -.45 .6491 
Year 2002 -.0054 .0154 .35 .7257 
Government Size .0460 .0526 .88 .3814 
Taxation Level -.2680 .0657 -4.08 <.0001 
Union Density -.0254 .0157 -1.62 .1045 
Minimum Wage .0483 .0512 .94 .3453 
AIC 2716.3 Observations 3249 
BIC 2801.5 Border Areas 174 
States 45 
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Table 4.8: Full Model: Matched Death Rate 
Variable Coefficient SE t-value p-value 
Intercept .4829 ,,0578 8.36 <.0001 
County Tax Burden .0337 ,,0077 4.39 <.0001 
Median Income .0861 ,0341 2.52 .0116 
Birth Rate Lagged .4580 ,0142 32.14 <.0001 
Population Density .0052 ,0015 3.47 .0005 
Year 1997 -.0045 .,0139 -.33 .7447 
Year 2002 -.0061 .,0139 -.44 .6601 
Government Size -.0179 ,0392 -.457 .6476 
Taxation Burden -.0343 ,0498 -.69 .4911 
Union Density -.0368 ,0122 -3.03 .0025 
Minimum Wage .0399 ,0389 1.02 .3057 
AIC 1989.4 Observations 3249 
BIC 2074.6 Border Areas 174 
States 45 
The hypotheses can be examined using the results in the full models for matched 
birth and death rates. The matched overall tax burden is hypothesized to have a negative 
effect on both matched firm birth and death rates. I find a negative relationship between 
matched taxation level and matched firm birth rates (-.2680;p < ,0001) supporting 
hypothesis 1. No relationship is found between matched overall tax burden and firm 
death rates (-.0343;p = .4911), Thus, no support is found for hypothesis 2. Matched 
government size is hypothesized to have a negative impact on both matched firm birth 
and death rates. Matched government size was not a statistically significant predictor of 
either matched firm birth rates (.0460;p = ,3814) or death rates (-.0179;p = ,6476). 
Thus, neither hypothesis 3 or 4 was supported. 
Hypothesis 5 predicts a negative relationship between matched minimum wages 
and matched new firm birth rates. There is no support found for this hypothesis (.0483; p 
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= .3453). Hypothesis 6 predicts a positive relationship between matched union densities 
and matched new firm births, but this hypothesis is not supported (-.0254; P = .1045). 
Hypothesis 7 predicts a negative relationship between matched minimum wages and 
matched firm death rates. This relationship is not found to be significant .0399; p = 
.3057). Hypothesis 8 predicts a positive relationship between matched union densities 
and matched firm death rates. However, a statistieally significant negative relationship is 
found (-.0368; p = .0025) instead. 
Service verse manufacturing 
Hypothesis 9 predicts that matched overall tax burden will have a stronger 
negative impact on the matched birth rates of manufacturing firms than service firms. 
While I expect the overall relationship to be negative, it should be significantly stronger 
for matched manufacturing firm births than matched service births. I test this hypothesis 
using an interaction term. I first copy each observation, creating a dataset with 6,606 
observations. I create a new variable ("matched sector birth rate") that represents either 
the service or manufacturing birth rate for each county. Each of the original observations 
now are in the dataset twice and have two different values for sector births, one 
representing the matched service firm birth rate and the other representing matched 
manufacturing firm birth rate. A dummy variable ("manufacturing") is added that equals 
1 if sector birth rate variable represents the matched manufacturing birth rate and equals 
zero if sector birth rate represents the matched service birth rate. I construct an 
interaction term by multiplying the taxation burden variable by the dummy variable 
"manufacturing." Based on hypothesis 9, I would expect the interaction to have a 
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negative coefficient. This would indicate that for manufacturing firms, the relationship 
between the matched overall tax burden and matched firm births is stronger (more 
strongly negative) than for service firms. 
For years 1992 and 1997, industries are categorized by SIC codes. Industries with 
two digit SIC codes of 40-49 (transportation, communication, electric gas, and sanitary 
services), 50-51 (wholesale trade), 52-59 (retail trade), 60-67 (finance, insurance, and real 
estate), and 70-89 (services) are considered service firms. For year 2002, industries are 
labeled with NAICS codes. Firms associated with two digit NAICS codes of 42 
(wholesale trade), 44-45 (retail trade), 48-49 (transportation and warehousing), 51 
(information), 52 (finance and insurance), 53 (real estate and rental leasing), 54 
(professional, scientific, and technical services), 55 (management of companies and 
enterprises), 56 (administrative and support and waste management and remediation 
services), 61 (education services), 62 (health care and social assistance), 71 (arts, 
entertainment, and recreation), 72 (accommodation and food services), and 81(other 
services) are considered service firms. 
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Table 4.9: Interaction Model: Sector Firm Birth Rate 
Parameter Coefficient SE t-value p-value 
Intercept .9476 .1977 4.79 <.0001 
County Tax Burden -.0125 .0249 -.50 .6159 
Median Income -.2491 .1041 -2.39 .0167 
Death Rate Lagged .4694 .0475 9.89 <.0001 
Population Density -.0141 .0047 -3.01 .0027 
Year 1997 -.0374 .0435 -.86 .3893 
Year 2002 .3887 .0441 8.82 <.0001 
Government Size .0074 .1170 .06 .9457 
Taxation Burden -.2685 .17'01 -1.58 .1146 
Union Density -.0390 .0368 -1.06 .2881 
Minimum Wage .1040 .1161 .90 .3706 
Manufacturing .1040 .1802 .58 .5638 




Observations (level-I) 5935 
The results can be seen in Table 4.9. The coefficient on the interaction term 
Manufacturing*Taxation Burden was statistically significant (3.571;p = .0386). 
However, it is in the opposite direction as hypothesized. Thus, hypothesis 9 is not 
supported. 
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Table 4.10: Results Summary 
Hypothesized Relationship Results 
HI There is a negative relationship between the matched overall Supported 
tax burden and the matched firm birth rate. 
H2 There is a negative relationship between the matched overall Not supported 
tax burden and the matched firm death rate. 
H3 There is a negative relationship between the matched state Not supported 
government size and the matched firm birth rate. 
H4 There is a negative relationship between the matched state Not supported 
government size and the matched firm death rate. 
H5 There is a negative relationship between the matched Not supported 
minimum wage and the matched firm birth rate. 
H6 There is a positive relationship between the matched union Not supported 
density and the match firm birth rate. 
H7 There is a negative relationship between the matched Not supported 
minimum wage and the matched firm death rate. 
H8 There is a positive relationship between matched union Not supported 
density and the matched firm death rate. 
H9 A high matched overall tax burden will have a stronger Not supported 
negative impact on the matched birth rate of manufacturing 
firms than service firms. 
4.5. DISCUSSION 
Although several of the hypotheses are not supported, the findings are 
informative. Several explanations exist for why government size, minimum wages, and 
unionization may account little for regional variations in firm births and deaths. 
I hypothesized that small state government size should be associated with higher 
firm birth rates and higher firm death rates. Howe:ver, no significant relationships were 
found. Perhaps large state governments are better able to provide certain public goods, 
such as roads, police protection, court systems, and basic research, while states with 
smaller governments may underinvest in these public goods. If these types of services 
171 
are beneficial to startups, this may explain why government size does not predict firm 
birth or death rates. 
I hypothesized that high levels of unionization would be positively related to the 
matched firm birth rate and the matched firm death rate. However, a negative 
relationship is found between the matched union density and the matched firm death rate. 
It seems strange that this relationship is observed, since unionization if often found to 
exert a negative financial impact on businesses. Unionized workers typically earn more 
money than equivalent non-unionized employees (Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Kwoka Jr, 
1983; Stewart, 1990) and having a unionized workforce has been associated with lower 
firm profitability (Hirsch, 1991; Menezes-Filho, 1997; Voos & Mishel, 1986). However, 
for smaller firms in areas that are highly unionized, the wage rates for their non-union 
workers may be lower making their labor costs lower than areas with higher unionization 
rates. Although no significant relationship was found between matched minimum wages 
and either matched birth or death rates, this finding may be due to the fact that 
differences in minimum wages are relatively modest between states. Furthermore, high 
minimum wages are likely to only deter certain types of startups- those that rely on 
relatively cheap, unskilled labor. While high minimum wages may deter an entrepreneur 
from starting an ice cream shop, they will be unlikely to deter an entrepreneur from 
starting up a biotechnology firm. 
A failure to find support for some of the hypotheses may be due to prospective 
entrepreneurs not "shopping around" much for an area which provides the optimal 
climate in which to do business. Perhaps, entrepreneurs just start their business in the 
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county and state in which they reside. Even if it is advantageous for an entrepreneur to 
start their business in a nearby state, many entrepreneurs may not be aware of any 
advantage in doing so. Or alternatively, it may be that entrepreneurs do have a good 
understanding of such differences, but choose their location based upon other factors. As 
mentioned before, if there is demand for hot pizza in Salisbury Massachusetts, but not in 
Portsmouth New Hampshire, it does not make sense for an entrepreneur to start a pizzeria 
in New Hampshire regardless of other advantages. Entrepreneurs have to consider a 
number of factors when determining the location of a business such as market size 
(Davidsson, Lindmark, & 01ofsson, 1994) and aCI~ess to human capital and knowledge 
(Audretsch, Lehmann, & Warning, 2005; Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998). Although the 
matching technique should eliminate many confounding variables, it certainly cannot 
eliminate all of them. Finally, there is a cost to starting a business in a location other 
than the one in which the entrepreneur resides, even a nearby one. Crossing the state 
border to start a business may entail commuting or incurring relocation costs. 
4.6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are severa11imitations to this study. The matching technique used in this 
study has the advantage of 1imiting- although not eliminating the threat of confounding 
variables. Counties that sit on state borders are likely to be similar to those on the other 
side of the state border in culture, human capital, natural resources, and access to 
customers and suppliers. Thus, any relationship between the differences in taxes and 
regulations and differences between firm births and deaths is more likely to be a causal 
one. However, matching counties on different sides of state borders is not a perfect 
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control, since taxation and regulatory differences may not be the only characteristic that 
differs on different sides of state borders. This technique has minimized, but not 
eliminated threats to internal validity. 
Another limitation of this study is the difficulty controlling for county and city-
level differences in taxation and regulation. These jurisdictions are often empowered to 
regulate business, and often do. For example, New York City has recently banned 
restaurants from serving food with trans-fats, whHe restaurants in cities in neighboring 
New Jersey do not face these regulations as of yet (Wilner & Olshan, 2008). Thus, city 
level regulations may have an impact on differences in firm births and deaths in this 
border area, confounding any relationship found between counties on differing sides of 
the state border. Also, I do not examine the differ,ences in how governments actually 
spend their money. What governments spend their money on may be more important 
than how much they actually spend. Government spending focused on income 
redistribution may deter the birth of new firms, while government spending on education 
has been observed to have the opposite effect (Stansel, Gohmann, & Hobbs, 2008). 
This study is also limited by the fact they there is no differentiating of births and 
deaths of productive firms and those that are unproductive or destructive. Baumol (1990) 
argues that the institutional environment has a profound impact on the type of 
entrepreneurship displayed in an economy. Just because there are births of new firms, 
this does not mean that such firms are productive and ultimately contribute to economic 
growth. In fact, many entrepreneurial ventures including certain lobbying firms, likely 
do not have a positive impact on economic growth. Likewise, interpretation of death 
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rates may be problematic as well. Although the failure of a firm is painful for those 
owning the business, failure is often necessary and a natural part of economic 
development. Schumpeter (1942) argues that new entrants introduce "new 
combinations" or innovations that often lead to the decline and possibly death of existing 
firms. Thus, it is difficult to discern the overall economic impact of a high level of firm 
deaths. 
Examining how taxes and regulations influence different industries is a fruitful 
area for future research. In this essay, I do not evaluate births and deaths by industry, 
other than a broad breakdown between service and manufacturing firms. It may be that 
taxes, government sizes, unionization, and minimum wages influence firm births and 
deaths, but only within certain industries. The establishment births and death data used in 
this study contains the number of firm births and deaths in each county by five digit 
industry codes. Thus, the potential to examine very specific industries exist with the 
data. However, the difficulty with doing this is that many smaller counties would have to 
be excluded from such an analysis, since they may contain very few births and deaths in 
certain industries (or perhaps none at all). However, such an analysis could be done with 
counties with larger populations, such as those in metropolitan areas. 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
In this essay, I hypothesized that small government size, low taxation levels, high 
levels of unionization and low minimum wages will be associated with relatively high 
new firm birth and death rates. I found support for a negative relationship between 
overall tax burden and the birth rate of new firms. However, unionization, minimum 
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wages and government size did not influence the birth and death rates of firms in the 
manner hypothesized. Likewise, I did not find support for the hypothesis that high 
taxation levels would deter the birth of manufacturing firms more than service firms. 
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY 
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the influence of formal 
institutions on the behavior of entrepreneurs. Institutions set the "rules of the game" in 
an economy, determining incentives, reducing uncertainty, and influencing transaction 
costs (North, 1987). The rules of the gamine influence the activities of all "players" in an 
economy, and entrepreneurs are no exception. Institutions influence the level 
(McMullen, Bagby, & Palich, 2008; Ovaska & Sobel, 2005) and type of entrepreneurship 
in an economy (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008). In this dissertation, I build on this research 
by examining how institutions influence the behavior of entrepreneurs in three different 
contexts. I will briefly summarize the findings from each of these separate essays. 
The first essay "The Influence of Institutions on the Likelihood of Self-
Employment: A Multilevel Analysis" I examined the relationship between institutions at 
the country-level and how those institutions are related to the likelihood that individuals 
in that country will be self-employed. Country-level institution measures used in the 
analysis include taxation levels, the strength of property rights, soundness of money, 
trade freedom, and the level of business regulation. Two measures of country-level 
formal institutions are used: The Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney, 
Lawson, Sobel, & Leeson, 2007) and the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage 
Foundation, 2005). These country-level measures are paired with individual-level data 
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on self-employment from the Global Entreprenemship Monitor (Reynolds et aI., 2005). 
The GEM survey is a cross-country data collection project that surveys individuals about 
their engagement (or lack of engagement) in entrepreneurship (Reynolds, Bygrave, 
Autio, Cox, & Hay, 2004). I use data from 2001-2006, and my sample includes data 
from 472,363 individuals and 55 unique countries. The country-level measures of 
institutions as well as individual-level control variables are used to predict whether 
individuals are self-employed. 
With both the Economic Freedom of the World and the Index of Economic 
Freedom measures, I find that sound money in a country is positively associated with the 
likelihood of an individual being self-employed. Likewise, a positive relationship was 
found between property rights and trade freedom and the likelihood that an individual 
would be self-employed with the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) measure. 
However, this was not found with measmes from the Index of Economic Freedom. 
Measures oftaxationlgovernrnent size and the level of business regulation did not predict 
the likelihood of being self-employed in the hypothesized direction. While fom 
interactions were hypothesized, no significant relationships were found. 
In the second essay "Labor Market Institutions and New Firm Employment 
Growth," I examined how state-level labor market factors such as minimum wages, union 
density, and unemployment insurance premiums influence employment growth in new 
firms. Given that new firms are often are resomce-constrained and have less access to 
capital than more established firms (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, 
& Rosen, 1994), new firms must conserve capital during their formative years. Thus, I 
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hypothesized that high minimum wages and unemployment insurance programs that were 
costly and penalized firms for firing workers would keep firms from growing their level 
of employment. Given that labor unions are often going to make labor more costly for 
larger, incumbent firms, I also hypothesized that high union densities would be associated 
with higher employment growth in new firms. 
I obtained firm-level data from Kauffman Firm Survey (DesRoches, Robb, & 
Mulcahy, 2009), which contains data on several thousand new firms across five waves 
from years 2004-2008. The sample includes 2,662 observations in the baseline wave, 
2,107 observations in the first follow up wave, 1,802 observations in the second follow 
up wave, 1,553 observations in the third follow up wave, and 1,391 in the fourth follow 
up wave. These data were matched with state-level data minimum wage, unemployment 
tax, and unionization data. 
None ofthese variables was found to have the hypothesized effect. Minimum 
wages and the unemployment insurance structure did not predict the level of employment 
in new firms. While state union density did have a marginally significant effect, the 
relationship is negative, while a positive relationship was hypothesized. 
In the third essay "The Impact of Taxes and Regulations on New Firm Births and 
Deaths in State Border Counties" I examined how state-level measures of government 
size, tax burdens, unionization levels, and minimum wages influence the birth and death 
rates of new firms in counties located on state borders. Data on firm births and deaths by 
industry were obtained from a custom tabulation from the U.S. Census Bureau's 
Company Division. These tabulations contain data on establishment births and deaths for 
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each county in the United States from 1989-2005 (Plummer & Headd, 2008). These data 
were merged with measures of government size, tax burdens, union densities, and 
minimum wages from the Economic Freedom of North America index (Karabegovic, 
McMahon, & Mitchell, 2005). In the analysis, I examined counties on state borders, 
matching and these counties with counties on the other side of the state border. I 
matched counties with counties that are contiguous with one another and that lie across a 
state border. I used data from the years 1992, 1997, and 2002. The variables were not 
used in their raw form; they were matched with those of bordering counties in a similar 
manner as Holcombe and Lacombe (Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a, b). 
I found support for a negative relationship between overall tax burden and the 
birth rate of new firms. However, unionization, minimum wages and government size 
did not influence the birth and death rates of firms in the manner hypothesized. I did not 
find support for the hypothesis that high taxation levels would deter the birth of 
manufacturing firms more than service firms. 
Future Research Possibilities 
There are several avenues of future research regarding the influence of formal 
institutions on entrepreneurship. In Chapter 3 (Essay 2) I examined how labor market 
institutions influence employment growth in new firms. However, little research has 
examined the impact that institutions have on firm growth; instead it has focused on how 
institutions influence the prevalence of self-employment as well as the births and deaths 
of firms (Bjomskov & Foss, 2008; McMullen et aI., 2008). Future research should 
further examine the link between institutions and firm growth. For example, business 
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regulations may limit firm growth by making operating a business more expensive. 
Alternatively, they may allow existing firms to grow more rapidly ifthey serve as an 
effective barrier to entry. 
-----------
The relationship between institutions and firm growth becomes even more 
interesting when we consider that entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997). This may lead to poor decision making on the part of entrepreneurs 
(Hayward, Shepherd & Griffin, 2006). Since entn:preneurs are overconfident, they may 
not accurately weigh the negative effect that certalln institutional environments may have 
on their business. For example, an overconfident entrepreneur may start a business even 
when business regulation is substantial, because he or she may vastly underestimate the 
time and resources required to overcome regulatory hurdles. Likewise, an overconfident 
entrepreneur may overestimate the amount of tax deductions he or she will be able to 
claim, thus underestimating the tax burden they will endure. This may be addressed by 
testing interaction effects between cognitive variables such as overconfidence, and 
institutional measures, such as the level of business regulation, taxation and property 
rights. However, this would require a large individual-level survey across multiple 
countries that include measures of cognitive biases (such as overconfidence) which are 
not contained in surveys such as the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey. Another 
approach may be to perform a conjoint experimenlt in which entrepreneurs are asked if 
they would start a given business given certain institutional variables. These may include 
tax rates, regulatory burdens, risk of property expropriation, etc. Choi and Shepherd 
(2004) used a conjoint analysis in order to show how customer demand, the development 
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of enabling technologies, capability of the management team, and stakeholder support 
influence an entrepreneur's decision to begin opportunity exploitation. A similar 
experiment could be conducted to examine how different institutional environments 
influence the exploitation decision of entrepreneurs. Interactions could be tested between 
institutional and individual-level variables. Whilt: such an approach has limitations, it 
would not require collecting individual-level surv,ey data from multiple countries. 
One limitation of much of the research regarding the relationship between 
institutions and entrepreneurship has implicitly assumed that entrepreneurship is a 
desirable activity. While researchers are often careful to make positive statements 
instead of normative ones, the large amount of research that uses entrepreneurship or the 
level of entrepreneurship as the dependent variable shows the attention that has been 
given to entrepreneurship. This attention suggests that entrepreneurship is often viewed 
as something that is socially desirable. Entrepreneurship has been linked to economic 
outcomes like job creation and economic growth (Carree, van Stel, Hafer, 2011, Thurik, 
& Wennekers, 2002; FoIster, 2000). However, Baumol (1990) recognized that not all 
entrepreneurship is socially productive; some entrepreneurship is unproductive and even 
destructive. One problem is that it is difficult to determine what entrepreneurship is 
productive, unproductive, and destructive. Sobel (2008) attempts to do this by using 
measures such as firm births and patenting activity to represent productive 
entrepreneurship. He uses the number of lobbying firms and the quality of the state's 
liability system as measures of unproductive entn::preneurship. However, using firm 
births (and even patenting activity) as a measure of productive entrepreneurship may be 
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problematic, since they are crude proxies for productive entrepreneurship. Examining 
how institutions influence unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship may be useful 
as well. Besides the number of lobbying firms us~:d by Sobel (2008), another possible 
measure of unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship may be the percentage of 
individuals engaging in drug dealing or property crimes. Developing better ways to 
examine the influence of institutions on both productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship remains a fruitful area for research. 
In Chapter 4 (Essay 3) I matched counties that are contiguous with one another 
and that lie across a state border. This method is a good way to control for factors, even 
those that are unobservable and immeasurable, that may vary based on location. Any 
observed relationship is less likely to be due confounding factors. Due to this advantage, 
matching techniques have been used in a number of studies (Bronars & Lott, 1998; Card, 
1992; Dube, Lester, & Reich, 2007; Holcombe & Lacombe, 2004a, b; Holmes, 1998). 
This kind of matching technique can be applied to examine the impact of a number of 
state-level institutions and policies. One specific example would be examining how taxes 
and regulations influence the births and deaths offilrms in different industries. The 
establishment births and death data used in this study contains the number of firm births 
and deaths in each county by five digit industry codes making such an analysis possible. 
Taxation, property rights, and business regulation are likely to have different effects on 
the birth and death of firms depending on the industry in which they operate in. 
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